Iraq, a country with multiple security concerns, quickly and within 12 days faced a new Syria, whose future development prospects remain uncertain. The potential delay in international recognition of Syria’s new government–similar to the 3.5-year wait for the Taliban– coupled with the challenges that could arise in future diplomatic relations, has left Baghdad uncertain about its ties with its Western neighbour.
The Syrian Situation and Its Impact on Iraq's Security
The fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has had a significant impact on the Axis of Resistance in the region, tightening Israel's security circle around them. Iraq, home to numerous resistance groups, is a key part of this alliance. While these groups are dispersed across the country, their activities have become more focused1 since November 2, 2023, under the umbrella of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” (IRI).
The IRI’s main objectives in Iraq, in light of recent developments in Syria, are to sever Syria's link to Hezbollah, which has relied on the country as a transit route for weapons, ammunition, and funding to it, and to ensure the security of the main Shiite shrine in southern Damascus.
“We defended Syria previously because it is a pivotal state, and its fall means the violation of the entire region,” said2 Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, in a televised speech. Falih al-Fayyadh chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission also viewed the Syrian crisis as an internal matter for Syrians, “but it is not wise3 for there to be a fire in your neighbor’s house while you sleep, reassured without thinking of what might happen.”
IRI in Iraq is highly sensitive about defending Shiite shrines and is likely to react to recent thefts4 of such shrines following the fall of Assad. The theme of shrine defense has been reignited5 by leaders of Shiite armed groups in Iraq, including Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq chief Qais Al-Khazali. Recently, Khazali was seen6 in military fatigues, visibly emotional and vowing to protect the Sayyidah Zainab shrine near Damascus.
Beyond the role of resistance groups, the potential disintegration of Syria represents a more immediate concern for Iraq. The group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) that have seized Damascus is not the only actor on the ground. Numerous factions such as the Kurds in the east and northeast, Alawites on the western coast, the Free Syrian Army in the north, the Druze in the south and southwest remnants of the old regime's army, and various foreign powers with conflicting interests are all involved in Syria’s turmoil. These foreign powers include Russia, Iran, Turkey, the US, and Israel, each with their own goals.
Despite the external involvement, Syria’s future7 likely points toward further fragmentation, if not complete disintegration. In the short term, Israel and Turkey may exploit the situation, dividing Syria to suit their interests, while Moscow focuses on its own concerns in Ukraine and Tehran prepares for escalating conflicts with Israel and the US. In the long term, the complex mixture of Kurds, Turks, Israelis, and Islamist Arabs will reinforce Syria’s disintegration.
The fall of Assad evokes memories of the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. Syria’s fragmentation leaves Iraq facing fractured governments with diverse origins and interests, making it difficult or impossible to engage with them cohesively. The presence of multiple groups further undermines Iraq’s security. Iraqi government spokesperson, Bassem Al-Awadi, emphasised8 that developments in Syria directly affect the security of Iraq. According to him, the division of Syria is Iraq’s red line, and political action must be taken to contain the Syrian crisis.
The sectarian crises in Syria serve as an unpleasant reminder for Iraq of its own struggles. Internal tensions and ethnic and religious divides fuel discontent and autonomy movements among marginisalised groups. Iraqis vividly9 recall the influx of thousands of extremists from Syria following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, which triggered years of sectarian violence. The most devastating period came in mid-2014, with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) seizing control of large parts of northern and western Iraq, leading to a four-year war. Abu Mohammed Al-Jolani, leader of HTS, began his militant career with Al-Qaeda in Iraq, where he was imprisoned by the U.S. before moving to Syria to establish an extremist faction. In 2016, he broke away from Al-Qaeda to form HTS.
For this reason, as the rebels advanced towards Damascus, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani, held10 a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, raising alarm11 over what he warned of “ethnic cleansing targeting various groups and sects in Syria.” “Iraq will not just stand still in the face of the grave repercussions unfolding in Syria, particularly acts of ethnic cleansing targeting various components and sects. Having suffered from terrorism and the fallout of extremist groups, Iraq cannot allow a repeat of such devastation."
Kurds: Baghdad's growing concern
The Kurdish issue poses a potential threat that could shape Baghdad's relations with Iran, Turkey, the U.S., Israel, and the broader Kurdish sentiment for independence. During Syria's protracted civil war, which began in 2011, the Kurds managed to seize control of a third of the country, spanning from the north to the east. In 2016, they declared12 an autonomous region in Rojava, encompassing key assets like Syria's largest oil fields and tallest dams.
Their control of Deir ez-Zor province, bordering Iraq, might position them to expand their territory further with U.S. support and linking northern Iraq and northeastern Syria into one entity. Such a development would move closer to the Kurds’ vision of an independent Kurdish state, an outcome that Turkey and Iran vehemently oppose, given their sizable Kurdish minorities and histories of armed struggle against Kurdish separatism.
Foreign powers, particularly the U.S. and Israel, may exploit13 Kurdish forces, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as tools against the Iranian front and its allies. This includes attempts to disrupt the “Shiite Crescent” by gaining control over the Iraq-Syria border, notably the Deir ez-Zor–Albukamal–Al-Tanf triangle. If financial backing (from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) and militarily (by the U.S.), the Kurdish participation in this conflict will jeopardize Baghdad’s security.
Moreover, as the evolving dynamics also invite greater involvement from external actors such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, the latter may become increasingly involved, further complicating the situation. For Baghdad, this creates risks of escalating tensions with neighboring countries, increased influence from foreign powers, and intensified challenges in countering Kurdish independence aspirations.
Israel could also enter the equation, complicating matters. Gideon Saar, Israel's new foreign minister, declared in November that his country should strengthen ties14 with minorities in the region, including the Kurds and Druze, who are Israel's “natural” allies. “The Kurdish people are a great nation, one of the largest nations without political independence,” he said.15
Following Assad’s escape Israel has deepened its engagement in the region, capturing16 the Golan Heights buffer zone and conducting over 300 airstrikes in Syria. Israel may be aiming17 to establish a foothold in Syria and support minorities by connecting the Druze areas in southern Syria, which are connected to the U.S. base in Al-Tanf and the Kurdish regions, creating a hub of potential allies or proxies close to it in Syria. The risk of Israel’s presence in the western neighbor for Iraq’s security is very damaging, given the extensive influence of Iran in Iraq and the significant role its proxies play in the country’s politics and current developments.
The fall of Damascus has created a security vacuum for Iraq. Iraq's concerns include exacerbating growing insecurity near its borders due to the possibility of arms smuggling to terrorist groups in Syria, protecting Shia holy sites, preventing ethnic cleansing against minorities and avoiding the creation of an ISIS-like entity that could rekindle memories of Islamic State extremism.
The information and opinion contained in the articles on the CFRI website are solely those of the author(s) and do not engage the responsibility of the centre.
To cite this article : Mohammad Salami, "What are the potential impacts of the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime on Iraq?", Centre Français de recherche sur l'Irak (CFRI), 13/12/2024, [https://cfri-irak.com/en/article/what-are-the-potential-impacts-of-the-fall-of-bashar-al-assads-regime-on-iraq-2024-12-13].
