Interviewer: Can you contextualise the significance of Bush’s 2003 order and Biden’s extension in 2024, considering military, geopolitical, security, economic, political and social dimensions? 

Dr. Abbas Kadhim:  Before 2003, especially during Saddam Hussein’s regime from 1979 to 2003, Iraq progressively turned into a pariah state. Saddam Hussein and his regime found themselves devoid of allies in the international community. Their engagement in destructive policies both domestically and internationally led to widespread global hostility, ultimately paving the way for the US and its allies to invade the country in 2003. This followed a series of wars and severe sanctions imposed by the United Nations, which inflicted substantial damage on Iraq’s economy, society, and many other aspects.

By 2003, Iraq had become an easy target for an invasion, and the United States of America (U.S.) seized the opportunity to do so. It occurred without authorisation of the UN. Several resolutions had constrained Iraq’s sovereignty, beginning with the invasion of Kuwait, which was deemed a violation of international law. These resolutions initially aimed to compel Saddam Hussein’s regime to withdraw from Kuwait but later expanded to include objectives such as disarmament and the relinquishment of weapons of mass destruction. The UN’s sanctions on Iraq were among the most severe imposed, causing immense suffering in the nation from 1988 to 2003, with some sanctions persisting post-2003. These measures were utilised to force Iraq to dismantle its arsenal of nuclear weapons and, in a sense, to influence and shape Iraq’s future. Associated resolutions often became entangled with corruption. For example, the UN’s Oil-for-Food Programme was marred by widespread corruption, with numerous companies and individuals, including personnel within the UN, implicated in bribery and kickback schemes. Neither Iraq’s regime nor the UN system emerged from this period with clean hands.

The decision to invade Iraq and alter its regime did not receive approval from the UN. The legal framework employed by the US to justify the invasion relied on a combination of existing UN resolutions and executive orders from US Presidents, supported by specific US laws and congressional authorisations, such as Order 13303 issued by President Bush.

The US used a carrot and stick approach in how they dealt with Iraq through Executive Order 13303: 

• Carrot: The order protected Iraqi assets from being seized and claimed in court by individuals who suffered under the 1979-2003 regime. This measure ensured that Iraq would not bear the burden of damages caused by Saddam Hussein, allowing it to rebuild and reintegrate into the international community. 

• Sticks:  The US could impose sanctions on individuals, groups and political parties as deemed necessary. This executive order - a national emergency order - authorised Washington to take actions to maintain stability in Iraq and protect US national security.

Efforts led by the US, including by officials like Olin Wethington, aimed to drop or forgive some of Saddam Hussein’s debts, negotiating with the Paris Club to forgive around $120 billion. This allowed Iraq to start afresh. However, debts related to UN resolutions, particularly those to Kuwait, were not forgiven. Iraq paid approximately $52 billion in damages to Kuwait over 19 years, becoming the only country in history to pay its entire debt under Resolution 1483. Saudi Arabia also claimed reimbursement for war expenses, during the Iraq-Iran war, leading to ongoing disputes with Baghdad. 

To summarise, the order protected Iraq from claims by companies and individuals, ensuring that Iraq’s Development Fund could be used to rebuild the country. Nonetheless, the resolution allowed the Americans to impose sanctions and take necessary actions to maintain stability and security in Iraq and the US. Although Baghdad is no longer under Chapter VII “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression (Articles 39-51)” of the UN Charter, US executive orders remain active, giving this State leverage over Iraq’s economy, particularly through sanctions.

Interviewer: Was the U.S. presence in Iraq predominantly military, or did it extend to other levels such as economic and political engagements?

Dr. Abbas Kadhim: It is inaccurate to label the US-Iraqi engagement in 2003 solely as a military action. Although it began as an invasion, the US government chose to overthrow the Iraqi regime by force, acting without UN authorisation and also relying on the Coalition of the willing. Following the invasion, the Iraqi state apparatus collapsed. Initially, the US military governed Iraq until May 2003, when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by Paul Bremer, assumed control of civilian administration.

Bremer, who had limited experience with Iraq, handpicked numerous American and Iraqi officials with ties to the US to assist in governing. This administration managed Iraq comprehensively. However, some Iraqis resisted governance, questioning the legitimacy of the CPA’s actions. As mentioned in question 1, some actions, like debt relief, were positive. Bremer issued directives dismantling Iraq’s military and civilian institutions, intending to rebuild them anew. However internal and international pressure led to the establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council (GC) composed of diverse ethnic and sectarian representatives, with Bremer holding veto power. The GC operated until the Transitional Administrative Law was adopted and power transferred to Iraqis on June 28, 2004. This transition enabled the election of the government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who held executive and legislative authority, initiating the process of drafting a new constitution and holding elections. 

The US involvement from 2003 to 2011 had several phases: 

• CPA Phase:  The US controlled all aspects of Iraq’s governance and even though Iraqis were part of the Governing Council, the institutions were not fully functional. The US identified itself as an occupation force, leading to complexities as this label acknowledged the Iraqi right to resist. 

• Post-CPA Phase: After June 2004, with Allawi’s government in place, Iraqis started to take on more governance roles, resuming oil exports and generating revenue. However, the sovereignty was limited with US and coalition troops still present. 

• Gradual Transition: By 2007-2008, Iraqi governance began to strengthen, although still under US tutelage. During this period, the US signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) with Iraq, formalising their relationship and cooperation beyond military matters.

The US initially managed everything in Iraq, but gradually handed over responsibilities as Iraqis developed governance capabilities. USAID played a crucial role in reconstruction, training, and capacity building, often working discreetly due to security concerns. Despite the loud presence of military actions, many non-military efforts were significant. The US did not always publicise these efforts, focusing on safety and effectiveness. In recent years, the relationship between Iraq and the US has focused on non-military cooperation, including economic, cultural, and technological exchanges. This shift is evident from recent high-level visits emphasising these aspects, reflecting Iraq's improved stability and security.

Under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq sought full sovereignty by ending the US military presence, which was materialised in December 2011. The US reengaged in 2014 to assist with the ISIS threat but maintained a different engagement scope.

Iraq is now more stable and secure, allowing focus on non-military relations and cooperation. The US continues to support Iraq through various programs, emphasising reconstruction, economic development, and cultural exchange. This comprehensive relationship reflects a move towards normalising Iraq's status as a sovereign nation engaging with the global community.

Interviewer: What are the implications of the declarations made during the recent Biden-Sudani meeting for U.S.-Iraq relations?

Dr. Abbas Kadhim: The United States makes no secret of its distrust towards Iraq, largely due to the close relationship between the Iraqi government and Tehran. U.S. policy towards Iraq is often seen as an extension of its broader regional strategy, with significant attention directed towards Iran. During the Trump administration, the departments handling Baghdad and the Islamic Republic were consolidated under the same Deputy Assistant Secretary with Iran being a major focus. Furthermore, the department’s handling of Iraq and Iran were consolidated under the same Deputy Assistant Secretary, initially under David Schenker. This organisational framework continues under the Biden administration, with Victoria Taylor currently responsible for both portfolios.

The U.S. allocates significant attention to Tehran; we can estimate that 80% of their focus is on Iran and only 20% on Iraq. The deep economic, cultural, and religious ties between the neighbouring countries, such as the critical supply of gas for electricity from Iran, make complete disengagement impossible. Historically, Arab countries’ reluctance to engage with Iraq left a vacuum that was filled by the Islamic Republic, making Iran and Turkey Baghdad’s major partners.

The U.S. is concerned about groups in Iraq that appear more loyal to Iran and hold key government positions. This complicates U.S. efforts to impose sanctions and pressure Iran, as Iraqi cooperation is essential. However, Baghdad often claims it cannot comply fully due to its dependency on Iran for critical resources, leading to American frustration.

Informal discussions reveal the U.S. acknowledges Iraq’s logistical and financial dependence on Iran. This reliance is so entrenched that Iraq struggles to act independently. American politicians have mixed feelings about Iraq, viewing them variably as friends or unreliable allies, with some Iraqi leaders expressing anti-U.S. sentiments publicly while others engage in a more duplicitous diplomacy.

Iraqi leaders must navigate complex relations, balancing between the American government and Iranian influences. This complex relationship stems from Iraq's evolving political landscape, where many leaders lack extensive governance experience, making the transition towards stable and sophisticated leadership a challenging journey. The current Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani, exemplifies this dynamic, as his recent visit to Washington focused on economic, cultural, and trade aspects rather than military issues, highlighting a shift towards a more multifaceted relationship.

Interviewer: Do you see a path towards a more balanced relationship between Iraq, Iran and the United States in the future?

Dr. Abbas Kadhim: Right now, the United States faces low approval ratings globally, including in Iraq. This sentiment is not isolated to Iraq; even within the country itself, anti-U.S. demonstrations can be as intense. The U.S. encounters significant challenges in the Middle East, a region burdened by the legacy of colonisation. The decolonisation process left deep grievances, similar to the strained relations between Algeria and France or the Palestinians and the United Kingdom. Post-World War II, the U.S. emerged as a major influence in the region, filling the vacuum left by the decline of British and French powers. This increased presence, particularly in strategic locations and oil-rich areas, has not always been welcomed. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 profoundly impacted Iraqi pride, leading to a lasting sense of resentment. The American-led intervention and its aftermath, marked by numerous mistakes and atrocities, have compounded this animosity. This historical context complicates U.S. efforts to improve relations with Iraq.

To address the question of how Iraq, Iran, and the United States can move forward, one approach is to separate the issues. Advocating for bilateral relations between Baghdad and Washington, independent of U.S.-Iran relations, might simplify the problem. The Iraqi government seeks to be treated as a sovereign state with unique national interests, distinct from Tehran. The misconception that Baghdad has departed from the Arab region is incorrect. Initially, Arab countries abandoned Iraq, especially during Saddam Hussein's rule and after his ousting. Their boycott and support for destabilising acts left the country to forge closer ties with Iran and Turkey. This abandonment allowed other regional powers to establish significant economic and social relations with Iraq.

However, changes began in 2015 after the failure of ISIS. Recognising the stability of the new Iraqi regime, Arab countries like Saudi Arabia started to engage more positively with Iraq. The death of King Abdullah and the rise of Mohammed bin Salman marked a shift in the Kingdom’s policy. Iraq, under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, welcomed this change, leading to improved relations and regional cooperation. Iraq adopted a doctrine of positive neutrality, refraining from siding with either Saudi Arabia or Iran in regional disputes. Instead, Baghdad positioned itself as a mediator, facilitating the restoration of relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Iraq even hosted nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic, showcasing its neutral stance. Despite these efforts, Iraq remains entangled in regional conflicts not of its making. The ongoing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia or Iran and Israel often play out on Iraqi soil, complicating Iraq's attempts to remain neutral. However, the situation has improved significantly compared to the early 2000s and the peak of ISIS's influence.

Today, Iraq projects itself as a country without enemies, focusing on positive international relations. The UN resolutions that lifted Iraq from Chapter VII sanctions praised its adherence to responsibilities and promises. Although challenges remain, Iraq's prospects are brighter with the country prioritising social and economic matters instead of military issues and disentangling itself from regional conflicts.

Interviewer: What is your opinion on the possible return in the political scene of Muqtada al-Sadr, in light of his party name “the Shiite National Movement” and his ties with Iran? Also, can you give us an insight on that matter regarding the extension of the American decree in Iraq? 

Dr. Abbas Kadhim: Muqtada al-Sadr is a pivotal figure in Iraqi politics. He commands a loyal and dedicated following, making him a significant player despite the inherent instability of his constituency. His supporters, deeply committed to their cause, helped al-Sadr's political bloc win 73 seats in the Iraqi parliament during the last election, the highest of any group. They also emerged as the leading faction in the 2018 elections. However, even with this advantage, al-Sadr does not have enough power to govern Iraq independently.

Iraq's political system is not presidential but parliamentary, ensuring that no single group can dominate. The fragmented nature of Iraqi politics necessitates coalition-building, often driven by party interests or personal agendas rather than national interests. While al-Sadr can block actions due to his significant following, he cannot unilaterally enforce actions, as the party lacks the necessary majority of 165-166 seats to conduct business effectively. After the 2021 elections, al-Sadr aimed to form a coalition with the united Sunni front and the largest Kurdish bloc to govern. However, the Supreme Court intervened, complicating his efforts. They ruled that a president could only be elected with a two-thirds majority present, which al-Sadr's coalition lacked. This stalemate prevented the formation of a government, and it was not until al-Sadr withdrew from politics in October 2022 that a new government was formed.

Al-Sadr seems to be improving his political acumen. Nevertheless, he lacks the tools to govern Iraq alone. Effective governance requires strong coalitions and compromise, which is challenging in Iraq's divided political landscape. Post-2003, Federal State's divisions have deepened, with sectarian divides compounded by internal splits within the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish groups. The Shia factions are split into three or four groups, the Sunnis into at least two, and the Kurds into three main groups: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and newer parties. This fragmentation allows opposing factions to exploit discord within each group to block majority rule.

Interviewer: Let’s go back to the debts of Iraq as you have mentioned previously, in terms of their national debts and obligations to international firms, what challenges arise if the orders are not renewed? 

Dr. Abbas Kadhim: The invasion of Kuwait and the policies of Saddam Hussein's regime created a negative global perception of Iraq. This atmosphere allowed even unfounded claims against Iraq to be taken seriously. Many exploited this situation, raising baseless claims against the country. However, some companies did have legitimate claims. The U.S. government's implementation of the order seeks to address both unfounded and legitimate claims.

Initially, reparations for Kuwait and other affected parties after the invasion did not require verification. Claims were often accepted at face value, leading to significant payments by Iraq. The United Nations' handling of Iraq during this period was harsh. For instance, the UN and Kuwait unilaterally redrew borders without Iraq's input, setting a precedent of imposing terms on Baghdad. 

Iraq complied with these terms, including paying reparations, despite questionable legitimacy. The U.S. government recognizes its leading role in these UN actions and is now attempting to mitigate some consequences. However, balancing legitimate claims against Iraq's need for reconstruction is challenging. The country's reconstruction costs are immense, estimated at over $500 billion, covering damage from the U.S. invasion, subsequent terrorism, and the fight against ISIS. Cities like Mosul remain in ruins, with many internally displaced people unable to return home. Moreover, the economy is heavily reliant on oil, which is volatile. In 2020, oil prices even dipped into negative territory. Iraq's government revenue barely covers operational costs.

Iraq's economy needs diversification, but current revenues are insufficient. Approximately 90% of government revenue comes from oil, with 8 million Iraqis dependent on government paychecks. With a rapidly growing population, the government struggles to sustain this. If Iraq had to pay all claims, it would cripple its economy. The U.S. order aims to protect Iraq from baseless claims while recognizing legitimate ones. However, Iraq's cooperation is crucial for this protection. The U.S. uses this leverage to ensure compliance, understanding Baghdad’s limited resources and tremendous reconstruction needs. The threat of lifting protections, exposing the country to lawsuits and claims, serves as a significant motivator for Iraq to comply with Washington’s expectations.

In essence, while the order provides necessary protection for Iraq, it comes at the cost of Iraqi sovereignty and economic strain. The U.S. seeks to balance these interests, encouraging Iraq to rebuild and cooperate while mitigating unfounded claims against it.

The CFRI does not take collective positions. Its publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

To cite this article : Abbas Kadhim, "The New Iraqi Landscape: Between Internal Demands and External Pressures After the Renewal of the 2003 Presidential Decree", Centre Français de recherche sur l'Irak (CFRI), 05/06/2024, [https://cfri-irak.com/en/article/the-new-iraqi-landscape-between-internal-demands-and-external-pressures-after-the-renewal-of-the-2003-presidential-decree-2024-06-05]