Reflections of Demographic Change on Immigration Policies and Human Development Indicators in Iraq
A family gets water inside the Hassan Sham camp in northern Iraq. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs are at their lowest state ever after 3 years of war to free them from Islamic State group rule. Vast numbers are displaced from their homes, and the community is unsure what their place will be in the country’s future while Iraq’s other main powers, the Shiites and the Kurds, aim to change the demographics of some Sunni areas to impose their own control.
Aug. 2, 2017 photo, a man walks with a child through the Hassan Sham camp in Northern Iraq. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs are at their lowest state ever after 3 years of war to free them from Islamic State group rule. Vast numbers are displaced from their homes, and the community is unsure what their place will be in the country’s future while Iraq’s other main powers, the Shiites and the Kurds, aim to change the demographics of some Sunni areas to impose their own control.
Iraq has entered a demographic window, leading to a shift in population structure in 2022, with youth representing about 60% of the population. Despite political and economic challenges, including conflicts and crises, fertility rates for women remain high due to the relative improvement in per capita income, especially after 2008 and the salary scale adjustments. However, conflicts and wars have cast a shadow on young people, leading some to emigrate. In contrast, others migrated to urban centres due to high unemployment and poverty, particularly in central and southern governorates.
Despite this demographic dividend, Iraq has not effectively translated it into sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction, or improvements in human development indicators (education and health). However, Iraq is still in the early stages of its demographic window. To harness this demographic opportunity, the Iraqi government must implement programs and plans to integrate young people into the formal labour market by providing genuine support for the private sector, particularly business incubators. This will gradually reflect in the growth of human development indicators in Iraq.
1. Analysing the Reality and Stages of Demographic Change in Iraq
Demographic change refers to the circumstances that occur in the population structure of a particular society. It represents the historical shift in birth and death rates from high to low levels and vice versa (ESCWA, 2009). Changes in population structure encompass changes in the following:
Iraq has witnessed significant demographic changes in recent decades, particularly due to wars, conflicts, and political and economic struggles. The historical trajectory of demographic changes in Iraq during (1980 - 2023) is as follows:
These factors collectively resulted in a decline in the population and its density in some areas, alongside an increase in urban areas and rapid city growth. However, Iraqi society, particularly eastern (developing) communities, tends towards higher birth rates, which will likely contribute to continued population growth in Iraq, particularly after 2008 with the improvement in economic and social conditions. Therefore, studying demographic changes is crucial for several reasons:
Policy Planning: Demographic data helps plan social and economic policies, such as providing health and education services and building infrastructure.
Impact Assessment: Demographic data helps understand the social and economic impacts of population growth and migration.
Trend Analysis: Demographic data can be used to identify future population trends and provide analysis about the future of society.
2. Indicators of Demographic Growth in Iraq
2.1 Fertility Rate Trends (2005-2023)
Fertility rates are among the most important demographic indicators that directly influence the size and structure of the population under normal circumstances. Fertility rates also impact the present and future of the population situation in Iraq. Table (1) shows fertility rates in Iraq during the period (2005-2023):
Table 1: Fertility Rate in Iraq (2005-2023)
Year | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
Fertility Rate | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.2 |
Year | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
Fertility Rate | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.4 |
Year | 2023* | Average Fertility Rate | |||||||
Fertility Rate | 3.4 | 4.0% |
Source: 1. Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Collection (2005-2012). 2. World Bank, Iraq Data, Fertility Rate (2013-2022). * Preliminary data from the Iraqi Ministry of Planning.
The table reveals a strong correlation between the fertility rate and both negative and positive events in Iraqi society. The period between 2005 and 2007 saw a decline in fertility due to sectarian conflict. This trend reversed in 2012, reaching a rate of approximately 4.5 as a result of improved conditions and a rise in per capita income due to increased oil prices on the global market. The events surrounding ISIS’ occupation and its consequences led to a decline in fertility rates from 2014 to 2018. It further accelerated during the most recent study period due to the 2019 October Uprising, its associated events, and the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in 2020, with its subsequent repercussions throughout the following years.
While a direct relationship exists between fertility rates and events (both positive and negative), it is notable that the average fertility rate for the period between 2005 and 2023 remained high, hovering around 4%. This has led to the emergence of a demographic "window of opportunity" (demographic dividend) in Iraq.
2.2 Evolution of the Mortality Rate (2005-2023)
The mortality rate has shown a significant improvement between 2005 and 2023. The mortality rate for children under the age of five in 2023 has seen a significant and notable decline, reaching approximately 21 deaths per 1000 live births. This represents a substantial reduction from the rate in 2005, which was approximately 41 deaths per 1000 live births. Table 2 showcases this trend.
Table 2: Under-5 Mortality Rate per 1000 Births in Iraq (2005-2023)
Year | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
Mortality Rate | 41 | 41 | 44 | 43 | 43 | 42 | 43 | 42 | 40 |
Year | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
Mortality Rate | 38 | 33 | 32 | 29 | 29 | 28 | 28 | 27 | 26 |
Year | 2023* | ||||||||
Mortality Rate | 21 |
Source: Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Collection. *Preliminary data from the Iraqi Ministry of Planning.
Life expectancy at birth has risen steadily, reaching about 72 years in 2023. This indicates that youth are the most significant demographic group in society, with approximately 26 million young people out of a total population of around 43.3 million (Ministry of Planning, 2023). This means that young people make up roughly 60% of the population.
3. Reflections of Demographic Change on Population Migration in Iraq
Demographic changes are a significant factor influencing population migration in Iraq, shaping migration trends and their impact on Iraqi society. Among the most notable demographic changes affecting migration in Iraq are:
Based on the above, we find that migration in Iraq takes two forms:
A. External Migration: This occurred due to events, conflicts, and divisions, particularly those that took place in 2006 and 2007. The National Human Development Report (2008) indicated that young people's reactions to terrorism and the loss of security, coupled with unemployment and poverty, increased their desire to migrate outside of Iraq. The number of migrants reached approximately 16.8% out of a total population of 8,114 young people, which is the highest proportion here. (Ministry of Planning, 2008). The number of migrants increased after the 2014 ISIS terrorist events, particularly among minority groups residing in cities occupied by the terrorist gangs at the time. Finally, the events of the 2019 Tishreen Revolution witnessed the migration of many young people out of Iraq.
B. Internal Migration: Young people tend to leave their rural areas and head towards urban centres in search of work. This has specific reasons, including push and pull factors. Pull factors refer to the attractiveness of the business environment that motivates others (unemployed youth) to migrate to these areas. Push factors, on the other hand, depend on driving unemployed young people towards urban centres to improve their economic and social lives.
Overall, as a result of push and pull factors, the period between 2015 and 2023 witnessed the phenomenon of illegal expansion of informal settlements (slums). These are population clusters that migrate from their original areas towards urban centres and face high housing rental costs. Consequently, they have chosen areas on the outskirts of cities or abandoned government buildings as their residence. These slums are characterised by severe deprivation in social, economic, political, and cultural spheres.
Like other developing countries, Iraq suffers from the spread of informal settlements in its cities, especially in the capital Baghdad. This phenomenon has become entrenched, with its size expanding in a controversial and concerning manner after 2003. Therefore, slums pose a new challenge for any government economically, socially, and politically. Baghdad has experienced rural migration and migration from other cities in search of job opportunities. Iraq suffers from an increase in the number of unemployed and high poverty levels, pushing people towards rent insecurity in areas known as the "Baghdad Belt." This, amidst the security breakdown and weakened rule of law after 2003, prompted some individuals to seize government buildings and numerous state-owned lands within urban neighbourhoods. Additionally, informal settlements have social and economic consequences. They foster aggressive behaviours and serve as breeding grounds for violence and conflicts, distorting urban development and defying laws (Dadoosh, 2022).
In an official report, it was revealed that there are 4,000 informal settlements in Iraq, encompassing approximately 522,000 housing units. This means that around 522,000 families live in slums. Baghdad ranks first in terms of the number of slums, with around 1,022 informal settlements, representing 25% of the total slums in Iraq. It is followed by Basra Governorate with about 700 settlements, accounting for 17.5% of the total slums (Ministry of Planning, 2022).
3.1 Direct and Indirect Impact of Population Migration on Iraq:
A. Skills Shortage: Migration affects Iraq's workforce. The emigration of skilled workers leads to a shortage of expertise and skills in various sectors, hindering economic development.
B. Changes in Population Structure: Migration impacts the population structure in Iraq. The emigration of young people leads to a decrease in population growth rates, affecting the growth of society.
C. Social Impact: Migration affects social relationships in Iraq. The emigration of family members leads to family fragmentation, impacting family ties within the country.
3.2 Analysis of the Impact of Migration Policies in Iraq
The Iraqi government has responded to demographic changes by implementing various migration policies:
A. Voluntary Return Program (2008): This program was established to encourage displaced Iraqis and refugees to return to their homes.
B. Nationality Law (2014): This law made changes to the requirements for obtaining Iraqi nationality, allowing more displaced Iraqis to register as citizens.
C. Directorate of Migration and Passports (2017): This institution was established to facilitate and regulate migration processes in Iraq.
Furthermore, Iraqi migration policies focus on facilitating the return of refugees and migrants, addressing internal displacement and the resettlement of displaced people, managing irregular migration and human trafficking, and strengthening cooperation with international organisations on migration issues. Despite this, migration policies in Iraq face numerous challenges, including ongoing security instability, a shortage of resources and infrastructure, and social and political tensions.
Demographic changes are a significant factor influencing population migration in Iraq, leading to a range of positive and negative impacts on Iraqi society. This necessitates the Iraqi authorities to find effective solutions to address the migration problem. The best way to tackle this is to provide job opportunities and improve living standards, contributing to reducing migration rates and preserving the workforce in Iraq. Moreover, implementing effective migration policies is crucial for addressing demographic changes in Iraq and managing the associated challenges. Through international cooperation and well-informed policies, Iraq can build a more stable and prosperous society that respects the rights of all its citizens.
4. Reflection of Demographic Changes on the Reality of Human Development Indicators
Undeniably, there has been a significant loss of human capital in Iraq over the past three decades due to conflicts and persistently high levels of fragility. While Iraqi education and health systems were ranked among the highest in the Middle East and North Africa region in the late 1970s, they have fallen to the bottom of the rankings, particularly after 2003. Many achievements in literacy and gender equity have been eradicated. Although some progress has been made in increasing primary school enrollment, achieving gender parity in primary education, and improving maternal health, a significant amount of work remains to enable the country to progress towards achieving sustained growth, reducing unemployment, and combating poverty.
Furthermore, heightened levels of fragility exert pressure on the development path, which is already suffering from weakness, decline, and fragmentation in the public policy-making system. There has been a steady erosion of human capital due to decades of political conflict, reflecting on the country's economic reality. These challenges are directly and indirectly reflected in human development indicators, namely education and health.
4.1 Demographic Change and Education Indicators
Article 34 of the Iraqi Constitution stipulates that education is a fundamental factor for societal progress and a right guaranteed by the state. It is compulsory until the primary stage, and the state shall ensure the eradication of illiteracy. Iraq, being in the early stages of a demographic opportunity window, having entered it in 2022, highlights that its ability to address the quality of its workforce is at the heart of making the most of its demographic potential. This, in turn, underscores the urgent need to improve the quality of education to create alignment between skill sets and the requirements of the modern labor market, as well as create avenues for everyone to enhance their skills. It also calls for developing career paths, focusing on technical skills and higher-order thinking, and providing opportunities to meet Iraq's growth needs by developing skills for suitable jobs. However, the challenge of a small percentage of the Iraqi workforce possessing skill sets relevant to the requirements of the modern economy deepens inequality. Rapid improvements in modern technology lead to those with skills benefiting more from available opportunities. Faced with skills scarcity, competing employers constantly seek to raise wages for skilled workers while putting pressure on wages for those with lower skills, widening the income gap in the labour market (Rabi, 2022). Table 3 shows the most prominent education indicators in Iraq:
Table 3: Evolution of Education Indicators in Iraq from 2010 to 2022
Years | Literacy Rates for Age Group (15-24)% (1) | Enrollment Rates in % | ||
Primary (2) | Secondary (3) | Higher Education(4) | ||
2010 | 85.6 | 91.7 | 41.7 | 14.6 |
2011 | 80 | 97 | 45.3 | 14.5 |
2012 | 80 | 94.4 | 48.9 | 15.9 |
2013 | 85 | 95 | 50.6 | 17.5 |
2014 | 88.8 | 96 | 54.3 | 17.6 |
2015 | 89.6 | 94.7 | 58.3 | 19.4 |
2016 | 90.9 | 92.9 | 57.4 | 17.6 |
2017 | 93.8 | 94 | 56 | 19.8 |
2018 | 95 | 91.6 | 57.4 | 19 |
2019 | 94 | 94 | 58.0 | 19 |
2020 | 94 | 94 | 56.8 | 20 |
2021 | 95 | 95 | 58.1 | 21 |
2022 | 96 | 96 | 58.7 | 21 |
Source: Ministry of Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics, available on the website www.cosit.gov.iq.
Table (3) shows an improvement in education, as evidenced by the increased literacy rates, which account for two-thirds of the overall indicators. In 2011, the literacy rate was at its lowest, reaching 80%, while in 2022 it hit its highest point at 96%. The enrollment rates for all three educational stages, which constitute one-third of the overall indicators, have also shown remarkable improvement, particularly in primary education, where enrollment rates reached a high of 97% in 2011. However, in 2018, they reached their lowest point at 91.6%. Despite this, these are still remarkably good rates compared to the decline observed in enrollment rates for both secondary and higher education. In 2010, the enrollment rate in secondary education was around 41.7%, gradually increasing to reach around 58.7% in 2022. Meanwhile, higher education enrollment rates reached their lowest point at 14.5% in 2011, while the highest rate was recorded in 2022 at 21%.
This table shows that educational indicators are on the right track, especially between 2019 and 2022. The demographic changes, as reflected in the increasing enrollment rates across all educational levels and literacy rates, are positive. However, a government action plan is necessary to address the issue of youth unemployment (both males and females) by allocating funds to support business incubators in the country. Additionally, there is a need to align education outcomes with the labour market by global advancements in technology, artificial intelligence, innovation, and other fields.
4.2 Demographic Changes and Health Indicators
Health is a crucial factor in achieving development success, as it is directly linked to the core of development – people and society. Individuals with good health indicators are more capable of learning, contributing to productivity. This sector has focused on six objectives, all aimed at improving the health of individuals and the health system. The health situation in Iraq has been severely compromised due to years of neglect of the healthcare system, resulting from wars and economic sanctions between 1990 and 2002, which in turn led to economic and social isolation and a failure to keep pace with global developments. This negatively impacted healthcare levels due to reduced medical and health capabilities, and the emigration of specialised medical professionals abroad.
The following are some of the major challenges facing the health sector in Iraq (Ministry of Planning, 2018):
Table (4): Number of Medical Professionals and Beds in Iraqi Hospitals (per 10,000 people) for the period (2010-2022)**
Year | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
Number of Medical Professionals | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 7.6 |
Number of Beds | 13 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 12.5 | 13 |
Year | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
Number of Medical Professionals | 8.4 | 9.4 | 9.1 | 9.3 | 9.2 | 9.3 |
Number of Beds | 7.7 | 7.8 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 7.1 | 7.2 |
Source: Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics, Data Period (2010-2022).
Table (4) reveals that the number of medical personnel has remained relatively stable, with a steady increase over the study period. The number of general practitioners rose to approximately 9.3 in 2021, compared to only 6.1 in 2010. Hospital bed numbers stood at around 13 per 10,000 between 2010 and 2012, then decreased to approximately 12.5 per 10,000 in 2014 due to the state of healthcare services in Iraq. The number increased again in 2015 to 13 beds per 10,000, followed by a decline between 2016 and 2021, ranging from 6.9 to 7.8 beds per 10,000. This indicates a lack of attention to healthcare specialties in Iraqi health institutions. The low number of beds, without any significant improvement during the study period, further exemplifies this point.
Table (5) presents the percentage of children immunised with a single dose of measles vaccine between the ages of 12-23 months, and the percentage of children immunised with the triple vaccine within the same age range. Both indicators demonstrate fluctuations throughout the period from 2010 to 2021.
Table (5): Percentage of Children Immunised with Measles and Triple Vaccines (Percentage in the Age Range of 12-23 months) for the Period (2010-2021).
Year | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
Measles Vaccination Coverage Rate | 75 | 80 | 74 | 72 | 68 | 71 | 80 | 85 | 83 | 82 | 83 | 84 |
DTP Vaccination Coverage Rate | 74 | 81 | 73 | 74 | 72 | 68 | 73 | 85 | 84 | 84 | 85 | 86 |
Source: Researcher, relying on World Bank indicators available at the following link: http://data.albankaldwli.org/indicator .
(A) Measles vaccination coverage rates showed an increase in 2011, reaching 80%, compared to 2010. The indicator then declined until 2015, reaching 71%. Subsequently, it rose again between 2016 and 2021, reaching a range of 80% to 84%.
(B) DTP vaccination coverage rates exhibited slight fluctuations between 86% and 72%. In 2011, it registered 81%, followed by a decline between 2012 and 2015, reaching 68%. From then on, it rose again for the remaining period (2016-2021), reaching 86% in 2021.
The life expectancy at birth indicator, which reflects the health dimension in the Human Development Index, has shown a gradual increase, driven by health awareness among certain segments of Iraqi society. After reaching its lowest point of 69 years in 2014, it improved to 73.6 years in 2018, the highest level recorded during the study period. Table 6 illustrates this trend:
Table 6: Life Expectancy at Birth in Iraq (2010-2023)
Year | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
Life Expectancy at Birth | 68.5 | 69 | 69.6 | 69.4 | 69 | 69.67 | 69.89 |
Year | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
Life Expectancy at Birth | 70 | 73.6 | 72 | 69 | 70 | 71 | 72 |
World Bank, Iraq Health Data, 2010-2023.
Based on the aforementioned health indicators, the healthcare sector in Iraq is relatively weak. Therefore, it requires restructuring in line with global health advancements and the acquisition of expertise and experience from specialised companies. We believe the path to achieving this lies in contracting with foreign specialized companies to establish research and development centers in Iraq, aimed at technology localization. Furthermore, collaboration between Iraqi doctors and international experts is crucial to control and prevent the spread of viruses and diseases, particularly in remote areas far from urban centers.
To cite this article : Ali Dadoosh, "Reflections of Demographic Change on Immigration Policies and Human Development Indicators in Iraq”, Centre Français de recherche sur l'Irak (CFRI), 26/06/2024, [https://cfri-irak.com/en/article/reflections-of-demographic-change-on-immigration-policies-and-human-development-indicators-in-iraq-2024-06-26]
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