"Muqtada, Muqtada, Muqtada" – these were the rallying cries echoing among tens of thousands of Shiite followers during the Friday prayer on May 17, 2024. From Baghdad to Karbala and across Dhi Qar, Muqtada al-Sadr's loyal supporters answered the call. Despite announcing his definitive withdrawal from political life in August 2022 and declaring a planned return in April 2023 after “disciplining” his supporters¹, the popularity of this religious and political leader, son of the late "Grand Ayatollah" Mohammed Sadr who was martyred by Saddam Hussein’s forces in 1999, appears to persist. Two years later, his return is both anticipated and feared.

Key indicators of al-Sadr's resurgence in Iraqi politics

With his commitment to "reform the system and end corruption"², Muqtada al-Sadr's electoral list emerged victorious in the October 2021 parliamentary elections, securing 73 seats out of 329 in the Iraqi Parliament³, edging closer to the 165 seats needed for an absolute majority. By forging alliances with Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Mohammed al-Halbousi’s Progress Party (TAK - Hizb Taqaddum), the Sadrists aimed to establish a national and sovereign government in Iraq, sidelining Iran-aligned Shiite parties. These parties formed a coalition called the Coordination Framework and contested al-Sadr's election victory. As a result, divisions in parliament hindered the appointment of the President and Prime Minister, prerequisites for government formation. Amid this political deadlock, on June 13, 2022, Muqtada al-Sadr urged his party's MPs to resign⁴, allowing second-place candidates from the 2021 elections to replace them, thus bolstering the Coordination Framework's seat count. The move triggered widespread protests, with al-Sadr’s supporters occupying parliament in defiance. Amidst clashes between demonstrators and security forces that left nearly 400 dead and injured⁵, al-Sadr announced his political withdrawal in August 2022. By November, a consensus emerged between the Coordination Framework and Sadrists to call for early elections, ultimately scheduled for November 2025 in adherence to constitutional norms, four years after the preceding polls⁶. The Coordination Framework has since formed a government led by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, stabilising the situation. Nonetheless, Mohammed Sadr's son remains highly popular in Iraq, perceived as a "savior against a corrupt and nepotistic political system"⁷.

Although the participation of the Sadrist camp in future elections has not been officially confirmed, there has been a notable increase in public appearances by their leader, suggesting preparations for his return. On March 18, al-Sadr held discussions with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf, a holy city for Shiites⁸. While the specifics of their meeting were not disclosed, local and international media interpreted the meeting as a tacit indication of the Sadrist Movement's reemergence into the political sphere. This is significant, particularly because Ayatollah Sistani, a revered Shiite religious authority in Iraq, generally maintains a reserved stance on political endorsements. Following this symbolic encounter, al-Sadr called on his supporters who had resigned during the 2021 elections to reconnect with the grassroots of the movement, indicating a phase of organisational restructuring. 

More significantly, it was after this meeting that the Shiite political leader made the decision to rebrand his group as the "Shiite National Alliance," solidifying his ambition to position himself as the foremost advocate for Iraq’s Shiite community and the architect of Shiite unity. This strategic move counters criticisms from opponents who have accused him of neglecting Shiite interests, particularly in light of his diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia, notably his meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in July 2017. The new label, however, presents al-Sadr in a different light—as a Shiite nationalist committed to Iraqi interests. Simultaneously, it implies that opposing Shiite factions might not prioritize national interests, suggesting their political loyalties align more with Iranian ambitions.

A highly influential political figure, al-Sadr enjoys broad popularity among Iraq’s economically disadvantaged Shiite population, whom he mobilised into the Mahdi Army during the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. Leveraging this robust support base, al-Sadr's current strategy revolves around galvanising Shiite sentiments through a predominantly religious narrative. Regularly calling his supporters to gather for unified prayers, his April 2024 request to Parliament to establish Aid al-Ghadir as a national holiday reflects his political use of the Shiite card⁹. According to the narrative, the 18th day of Dhu al-Hijjah (the twelfth month in the Islamic calendar) is when the Prophet Muhammad delivered his "Farewell Sermon" at Ghadir Khumm (currently in Saudi Arabia) and designated Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib as his successor. Reviewed since early May, the Iraqi Parliament approved the bill on May 22, 2024, establishing 11 official days of holiday. Presented by interim Parliamentary President Muhsen al-Mandalawi as "highlighting occasions tied to the lives and sentiments of Iraqis"¹⁰ no national holiday was actually abolished, reflecting an Iraqi political life still largely influenced by sectarian dynamics. Hours later, the Shiite leader stated on X: "It is now obligatory for all Iraqis, especially the sons of the national Shiite movement, to go to mosques, raising the banner of Al-Ghadir and wearing the green scarf, to pray two rak'ahs (units of prayer) in gratitude to Almighty God, and to elevate the three testimonies from their pulpits: I testify that there is no god but God, I testify that Muhammad is the messenger of God, I testify that Ali is the Weli of God."¹¹ (أشهد أن لا إله إلا الله، أشهد أن محمدا رسول الله، أشهد أن علي هو ولي الله)

Given these developments, Muqtada al-Sadr's return could destabilise Iraq's political landscape as he legitimises his right to represent the Shiites due to his numerous supporters.

2025 Legislative Elections: Possible Scenarios for the Sadrists?

It seems pertinent to consider the options available to the Sadrists for the 2025 legislative elections.

• (Scenario 1) A similar alliance to 2021?

Could the victorious 2021 alliance reemerge? The Sadrists, the KDP, and Taqaddum sought to ally for parliamentary supremacy. Together, they represented Iraq's major ethno-sectarian diversities, garnering broad public support across Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. However, since their alliance failed and the Sadrists resigned, the context has changed.

Many of Mohammed al-Halbousi's supporters withdrew, accusing him of prioritizing his party's interests over those of Sunnis, especially after his alliance attempt with al-Sadr's Shiite movement and ties with the Coordination Framework. He is nicknamed "Satan on earth" or the "new Saddam"¹². Meanwhile, the Coordination Framework views al-Halbousi as an adversary aiming to "undermine the Shiite majority"¹³. Furthermore, a new Sunni party emerged in the predominantly Sunni Anbar province during the 2023 provincial elections, the United Anbar Alliance (Tahaluf Anbar). Led by Salman al-Jumaili, this party unites small Sunni groups capable of directly challenging Taqaddum, the region's dominant organization. Despite dissension, the Progress Party remains significant, winning Anbar province again in the last elections¹⁴. Recently, following an Iraqi Supreme Court investigation accusing him of document forgery, Mohammed al-Halbousi was stripped of his role as Speaker of the Council of Representatives held since 2018. Halbousi now needs to strengthen his legitimacy among Sunnis, making an alliance with al-Sadr counterproductive. Nevertheless, Sunnis know they cannot wield political influence alone, and an alliance with the KDP and National Shiite Alliance could benefit the common good.

Massoud Barzani, the KDP leader, still holds significant influence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). However, his aging raises the issue of his successor as a Kurdish nationalist figure. Additionally, his main rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), secured the Presidency of the Republic, traditionally Kurdish, with Abdul Latif Rashid, backed by the Coordination Framework. Despite changing circumstances, a 2021-like alliance could be advantageous for all three protagonists. The Sadrists' strong electoral base could aid the KDP against the PUK's rise. Additionally, the Sadrists would need a majority to form their government and could ally with Barzani's party, whose relations with Baghdad have soured recently, offering a mutually beneficial solution. Thus, the 2021 allies, al-Sadr and Barzani, could again face their respective and common adversaries in 2025.

In 2021, the Barzani-Sadr-Halbousi alliance envisioned a national government addressing Iraqi public expectations and promoting unity beyond ethnic and sectarian divides. But what about today? This question is crucial for their alliance's renewal as members seem to refocus on their own interests. Halbousi's sidelining and the former allies' ties with pro-Iranian Shiite parties might undermine an agreement, pushing the Sadrists to go it alone or nearly so.

• (Scenario 2) Securing an electoral majority: Independents as key supporters?

“This time, the Sadrist Movement has more ambitious plans to win more seats and form a majority government,” according to a former Sadrist legislator¹⁵. Should Muqtada al-Sadr secure 100 parliamentary seats in the next elections, he might strategically ally with independents and liberals to form a government in his favor. Given the independents' 2021 electoral success, where they won 40 out of 329 seats, this scenario remains plausible. The rising success of candidates outside traditional political structures, exemplified by the Emtidad movement founded in 2019 by pharmacist Alaa al-Rikabi, which secured 9 seats in the last elections, indicates growing frustration among the Shiite electorate, especially the youth, with the "established" parties.

• (Scenario 3) Political deadlock: Violence or pacifism?

Post-2025, we might observe a more intense conflict between Shiite factions (al-Itar and al-Sadr), potentially plunging the political landscape into another deadlock after the next elections. 

Nevertheless, the Sadrists are unlikely to abandon the political arena if they face setbacks in November 2025; instead, they will strive to solidify their political presence. The casualties from the 2021 protests profoundly affected al-Sadr, prompting him to call for an immediate cessation of protests and a swift withdrawal from Baghdad’s Green Zone. What will be the outcome this time? Can a peaceful political impasse be achieved? If inter-bloc discussions remain unproductive in the long term, might the animosity between their supporters escalate into violence? Is a civil war on the horizon? No political leader seeks to provoke violence... unless it paves the way to power for them and their movement. In such a scenario, violence could be wielded as a political instrument to ensure stability, control, and an exit from the deadlock. While protests would be a measure of last resort, they remain significant, as the likelihood of Sadrists coexisting with corrupt militias in the government seems remote¹⁶. A Sadrist insider notes that “There are factions within the Framework with whom they have long-standing relations and could potentially ally before or after the elections. What they unequivocally reject is entering agreements with corrupt militias"¹⁷.

• (Scenario 4) Nouri al-Maliki and the Sadrist camp: A surprising alliance?

The complex and volatile political relationship between Muqtada al-Sadr and Nouri al-Maliki continues to influence the dynamics of Iraqi politics. Engaged in a struggle for Shiite supremacy, their opposition is also shaped by the influence of foreign actors, particularly the Islamic Republic of Iran. Maliki, who served as Iraq's Prime Minister from 2006 to 2014 and is affiliated with the Islamic Dawa Party, remains an influential figure whose role in the 2025 elections is particularly noteworthy.

According to sources cited by Asharq Al-Awsat¹⁸, Maliki is currently drafting amendments aimed at reducing the chances of the incumbent Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, from winning a substantial number of seats. Iraqi sources also report that the former Prime Minister has been secretly corresponding with the Sadrist bloc. This political maneuver could enable Maliki to gauge the potential for an alliance and his relationship with the Sadrists. Accusing the current executive of using state funds for his campaign, the Coordination Framework suspects that an alliance is forming between Sudani’s movement and figures backed by Qais al-Khazali, the leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq ("League of the Righteous"). For Maliki, this potential association poses a serious threat to the Coordination Framework and would bolster Sudani’s bloc in the forthcoming elections. Initially a member of Maliki’s State of Law coalition, the Prime Minister broke away in 2019 to lead the al-Furatain Movement. To counter the formation of this potential alliance, Maliki might seek to establish a counterweight by considering dialogue with Sadrist forces.

Muqtada al-Sadr faces two choices in these elections: either to dismantle the Iraqi political class to profoundly reform it and eradicate nepotism, or to adopt a partisan strategy to ensure a realistic chance of victory¹⁹. Although an alliance between Maliki and al-Sadr is not the most likely scenario, the Sadrist leader currently lacks the means to govern Iraq independently. Effective governance will require strong coalitions and compromises, which remain challenging in Iraq’s fragmented political landscape²⁰.

• (Scenario 5) A possible alliance with Mohammed Shia al-Sudani?

Al-Sadr may find an opportunity to expand his base and secure a parliamentary majority through an agreement with the current Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, whose popularity continues to rise and who enjoys favorable relations "with parties across the political spectrum"²¹. Although integrated into the coalition of Shiite parties, Sudani leads his own movement, al-Furatain, and appears most amenable to forging ties with Muqtada al-Sadr. Notably, in 2021, Sudani endorsed the call for early elections championed by the Sadrists and lauded their movement as a "great popular and patriotic force"²². Recently, Hadi al-Yasiri, a member of al-Furatain’s political bureau, stated that the movement is "open to national political directions, aiming to establish a unified national front in the forthcoming phase"²³ aligning with the Sadrist vision of 2021. Al-Yasiri further suggested that a post-election alliance with Moqtada al-Sadr is not off the table, remarking that "anything is possible in politics"²⁴.

Nevertheless, the Sadrist riots of 2022 intensified following the announcement of al-Sudani as Prime Minister, a figure perceived as too closely aligned with former Prime Minister Al-Maliki and Iranian influence. The Sadrist faction refused to join any government formed under his leadership. Moreover, on March 27, 2023, al-Sudani’s administration enacted a law reverting to the previous electoral system, drawing criticism from opposition parties. This law replaces the 83 electoral districts used in the 2021 elections with Iraq's 18 provinces, a system favoring traditional parties over reformist groups and independent candidates. Will Muqtada al-Sadr be compelled to form an alliance with Sudani?

Conclusion

As alliances and compromises play a decisive role in the upcoming elections, the influence of key actors in Iraqi politics, particularly Iran and the United States, remains a critical factor to scrutinise.

Tehran perceives the re-emergence of the Sadrist camp on the political scene as a mechanism to sustain the Shiite-dominated Iraqi political system over the long term, even though it refrains from positioning the Shiite leader as a favoured interlocutor akin to Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah. This partly accounts for the Sadrist movement's relative detachment from Iranian influence. al-Sadr's marginalisation is viewed as a threat by Iran, which may be compelled to reintegrate him into the political sphere to avert severe intra-Shiite rifts and consequent destabilisation. While Iran is unlikely to directly confront the Sadrist bloc, it will also not permit it to single-handedly manage the state²⁵.

Conversely, the relationship between Washington and al-Sadr continues to deteriorate, having already been tainted by significant historical rivalries. Since 2004, the Sadrist camp has vehemently opposed the presence of American forces in Iraq, declaring a "jihad" that led to intense conflicts. More recently, al-Sadr reiterated his demand to expel the U.S. ambassador from Iraq and to close the embassy through diplomatic channels without bloodshed on the X platform²⁶. This rhetoric is compounded by an overarching rise in hostility toward American interests, illustrated by recent attacks on American establishments such as KFC and Chili House in Baghdad²⁷. Despite being perceived as a direct threat to U.S. interests in Iraq, al-Sadr's opposition to Iranian influence concurrently positions him as a strategic counterbalance to Tehran. Given his significant political, military, and popular clout, the U.S. must engage with him to maintain the country's stability²⁸.

While numerous and unpredictable scenarios loom over the 2025 elections, an alliance between the Sadrist movement and its former allies, namely the PDK and Taqaddum, presently emerges as the most plausible. Nonetheless, al-Sadr’s political stance remains volatile and elusive. With more than a year and a half until the election, all scenarios are still conceivable, shaped by evolving regional dynamics. Therefore, closely monitoring Iraq's political and strategic developments in the ensuing months will be essential. The Sadrist force is poised to be a critical determinant for November 2025.

The CFRI does not take collective positions. Its publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

To cite this article : Juliette Garret, Léa Philipperon, "Muqtada al-Sadr’s Political Comeback: What Cards Does He Have Yet to Play?", Centre Français de recherche sur l'Irak (CFRI), 03/07/2024, [https://cfri-irak.com/en/article/muqtada-al-sadrs-political-comeback-what-cards-does-he-have-yet-to-play-2024-07-03]