Contemporary Turkmen identity is characterized by numerous divisions that have a direct impact on the access of its elites to politics. This identity manifests itself sociologically through ethnic contacts and sectarian fractures. Ethnic divisions are delineated by Arab and Kurdish exchanges and demands, but above all by Kurdish aspirations in the most important city for Turkmens, Kirkuk. Similarly, sectarian divisions, such as the differences between Shiites and Sunnis, are a major point of disagreement among Turkmen in the practice of Islam in the country, leaving them vulnerable to foreign influences.

In this context, the study of the Turkmen can be taken as an example to illustrate the influence of Turkish and Iranian regional dynamics that shape the choices of this minority in a highly polarized security-political environment. This polarization is particularly evident in Kirkuk, close to Iran, in Tal Afar and in the Sinjar region, located some 50 km from the Turkish-Iraqi-Syrian border triangle. These factors also play a decisive role in the alliance patterns of the political elite1.

Ethnic dividing lines and sectarian fractures have helped shape what might be called the Turkmen narrative, particularly regarding their relationship with the Iraqi state on the one hand, and with the country's two largest ethnic groups on the other: Arabs and Kurds. This narrative highlights the "victimization of the Turkmen" [2], and enables us to understand the reasons behind their marginalization throughout history, from the Ottoman or Turkish occupation, followed by the British occupation which they resisted, to the American occupation with which they refused to cooperate.

The complexity of their identity derives largely from the chronic division between confessional (Sunni, Shiite) and national (Turkmen) factors, which keeps them out of the public sphere. Due to the weakness, or even absence, of the state after the American invasion, Turkmen have been the victims of Turkish-Iranian rivalries, due to their geographical location, just like other minorities, in a regional geopolitical context that has become an international conflict. This is also true for Christians in the Nineveh plain, and for the Yezidis in Kirkuk, located at the crossroads between Turkey and Iran on the one hand, and between the Arab and Kurdish worlds on the other.

The Turkmens: contact point between Kurds and Arabs

On March 13, 2023, the Iraqi Council of Ministers approved the recognition of the Halabja district as the country's 19th governorate, according to a statement which stated:

"As the anniversary of the Halabja tragedy approaches, the Council of Ministers has approved a bill to create the Halabja Governorate in the Republic of Iraq. The bill will be submitted to the House of Representatives. This measure is intended to pay tribute to the martyrs of this city."

Turkmen greeted the news with some resentment, having submitted a similar request for the Turkmen region of Tal Afar, despite the fact that all administrative requirements had been met. Turkmen political elites claimed this right on the basis of their "victimization", due to the casualties they suffered between 2003 and 2023. Between 2003 and 2017 alone, 4122 people lost their lives, 7273 people were injured and 1300 people were abducted, including 580 women and children [3]. It should be noted that the Council of Ministers had voted in favor of this request in 2014, but the project was opposed by Sunni Arab deputies from the Nineveh governorate. For the latter, the creation of a new region would risk fragmenting the main region on ethnic lines in northern Iraq, thus upsetting the balance of power between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.

Despite Kurdish claims, the city of Halabja has been turned into a Kurdish governorate. Turkmen discourse maintains that the Turkmens affect Arab identity, and they believe that Iraq (which was originally made up of three Ottoman provinces) [4], cannot be reduced to a sole Arab identity. For them, it is an extremely diverse country in ethnic, religious and linguistic terms. The Arabs were not the original inhabitants of Mesopotamia[5]. On the contrary, other populations, minorities and communities have been present on these lands for longer, but this majority has not been able to prevail. Iranians settled in the sacred sanctuaries, Indians and dark-skinned Africans settled in Basra. The Sabeans, also known as Mandaeans or "silver silversmiths" (followers of John the Baptist), were peaceful communities settled in villages along riverbanks and rivers, mainly in southern Iraq. Kurds and Turks have long lived in Mosul, where thousands of Jews worked in the trades for which they were known. Christians of various origins and faiths made up a significant proportion of Mosul's population, their villages being located mainly in the low mountains to the north of the city. As for the mountainous regions of Sinjar and the areas to the north and east of Mosul, they were inhabited by the Yezidis, who gained worldwide recognition after the 2014 genocide[6].

In the midst of this diversity we find the remnants of ancient Turkmen migrations scattered from Tal Afar to several villages along the Mosul road, but the majority of them settled in Kirkuk. In the end, the Iraqi social structure was composed of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Shabaks, Assyrians, Muslims, Christians, Sabeans, Yezidis, Jews, Yaranites and many others [7].

In fact, the Turkmens find their strength in their geographical location, which places them at the crossroads of other minorities, and thus becomes a factor of balance and peace between Arabs, Kurds and others. For example, a group of Turkmen Christians has been living inside Kirkuk -Castle and coexisting harmoniously with Muslims for centuries 8.Moreover, the coexistence prevailing in Kirkuk between Muslims, Christians and Jews (before 1948, when they emigrated to Israel) is significant. The tomb of the prophet Daniel still stands in Kirkuk's citadel, the city's oldest Turkmen quarter. In addition to the coexistence of Muslims, Turkmens and Jews in the town of Tuz Khourmatou, it can also be seen in the town of Kifri, where cases of marriage between Jews and Muslims have been recorded. Similarly, Muslim Turkmen live alongside Shabaks, Christians and Yezidis in the Nineveh Plains and on the outskirts of Sinjar. Clear traces of this coexistence can be seen in the provinces of Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Diyala.

Turkmen geography: demographic distribution of the Turkmens

The cultural borders of Turkmen identity were formed through contact with Arab and Kurdish identities. Consequently, the Turkmen elite refuses to be considered a simple minority, as one Turkmen politician put it: "We cannot be mixed up with other minorities[9]".

However, it is the Turkmen themselves who consider themselves the third largest ethnic group in Iraq, after the Arabs and the Kurds.

Sectarian divisions create fault lines within Turkmen identity. Indeed, the vast majority of Turkmens are Shiite or Sunni Muslims originally from Anatolia in Central Asia. They adopted Islam under the influence of trade and travel, from the fifty-third year after the Hegira, when they arrived in Basra in Iraq during the Umayyad period. Then, in the Abbasid era, the caliphate called on the Seljuks for their strength and martial skill. They settled in a specific region to preserve their identity and avoid mixing with the Arabs. The city of Samarra, for example, was one of the first regions founded and settled by the Turkmens[10]. The Turkmens have their own language, Turkmen, which is a dialect close to Azeri. They have their own specificities in terms of lifestyle, customs, attitude and popular folklore, among others [11].

Turkmen geography separates the Arabs from the Kurds. Their region stretches from the Syrian borders along Mount Hamrin to Tal Afar in Nineveh governorate in the north, via the towns and villages around Mosul. In addition, there are some 50 Turkmen villages and a dozen Shabak villages[12][13] .

Turkmen are also present in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, where two categories can be distinguished. On the one hand, there are the old families of Turkmen origin in Baghdad, who have lived there since the city was founded. Over time, they have become true Baghdadis. They are recognizable only by their genealogy, their title, the names of their ancestors, their family addresses or even by their Turkmen costume. The latter are known by the names Sayah and Jarawi, which are particularly characteristic of Baghdad's 20th-century inhabitants. On the other hand, there are the families who emigrated from various Turkmen regions to the capital for commercial, financial or educational reasons, or to escape political oppression, security or certain living conditions, etc. Over time, certain neighborhoods have become more and more urbanized.

Over time, some districts have become predominantly Turkmen, such as the locality of al-Fadl, Adhamiyah, Raghiba Khatoun, Al-Sulaikh, Qanbar Ali, the district of Aden, the district of Jamila, the district of Ur, the town of Sha'ab and some districts on the Al-Karkh side [14].

Turkmen identity: fracture lines between Shiites and Sunnis

Turkmen are known from an Islamic point of view as belonging to the Muslim and Sufi community, whether Bektashi or Alawite (Shiites) or Naqshbandi or Kaylani (Sunnis). This led to disputes within the community. Shiism spread in Turkmen regions at the time of Ayatollah Sayyid Mohsen al-Hakim, in the late 1970s. According to Sunni writings, their conversion dates back to the time of Tamerlane's grandson, Shah Rukh, when he dominated the state of Qoyunlu during Jihan Shah's reign over Baghdad, particularly in the northern regions (851/1444), then their domination spread to southern Iraq. They spread Shiism among the Turkmen tribes who settled in these regions. Subsequently, Ismael al-Sawafi (906-930) further increased the influence of Shiism among the Turkmen by sending messengers to these regions, where they were divided between different tendencies such as the Alawite, Bektashi and Sarli tendencies [15].

As for Sunni rigorism among Turkmen, it developed in the late 80s and early 90s, when Salafism represented by the Muslim Brotherhood emerged. It was quickly suppressed by security institutions. A few years later, the Wahhabi movement emerged among graduates of Islamic secondary schools, as a result of the religious campaign launched by the Baath regime in 1993[16]. One of the consequences of this was the deployment of volunteers to Afghanistan in early 1999. These ideas began to lead to the disintegration of Turkmen society, day by day. It then worsened after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, when the activity of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, and then of Daech, emerged in Turkmen society, fragmenting it further (Sunni Turkmen targeted their Shiite Turkmen brothers). Despite close relations, family ties, intermarriage and shared nationalism between Shiite and Sunni Turkmen, religious and intellectual affiliation has led to a deep split in Turkmen identity.

There are no accurate statistics confirming the majority of one group or the other, but the situation seems to indicate that Turkmens are evenly divided between Shiism and Sunnism. This can be deduced from the political parties.

Dynamics of geographic fragmentation and its intersection with ethnic divisions

It is possible to discern a pattern of struggle for the acquisition of a "puritan" (Turkmen) national identity within the Turkmen elite. Indeed, some elites see themselves as more representative of the Turkmen essence than others, due to intermarriage and mixed marriages, as well as their influence within a predominantly Arab or Kurdish cultural milieu. For example, the Turkmen elite of Kirkuk consider themselves more representative of the national identity than the Turkmen elite of Erbil (close to a Kurdish majority), or the Turkmen elite of the outskirts and Mosul (surrounded by an Arab majority).

After the creation of the Iraqi state in 1921, a geographical distinction can be observed in the Turkmen region between Tal Afar (in the Nineveh governorate) and Kirkuk. The Turkmen name "Tal Afar" indicates their origin from Al-Afara, thus distinguishing regions and identities. Mr. Mohammed Younes Wahb gave this name to the Turkmen clan of Tal Afar to show their unity, thus establishing a policy of balance of power against the Arab clans, in particular the al-Shammar clan in Rabia, and to compete with Sheikh Ajeel al-Yawer in elections to the House of Representatives. As a result, in the 1957 population census, the population of Tal Afar was registered as Al-Afara[17]. Mr. Wahb played a major role objecting to Turkish claims in the state of Mosul and rejected the Turkish assertion of them being Turkmen in his interview with the League of Nations committee, where he stressed that "We don't want Turks or British, we are Iraqis and we want an independent Arab government"[18]. This information was reported by Mossul historian Ibrahim al-Allaf.

As a result of the Ba'ath regime's policy of Arabization and systematic national change, many Turkmen were forced to conform to the state's chosen identity. The focus was on changing nationality, and many Turkmen of Arab origin but speaking Turkmen were declared as such (as was the case for many minorities, such as the Shabak, as well as Christians presented as Syriac speaking Arabs). Many sheikhs and dignitaries in certain Turkmen regions, particularly in the Nineveh governorate, still adhere to this assumption, inherited from the days of the Ba'ath regime, that they speak Turkmen but their lineage is Arab. Turkmen history also confirms that this policy was implemented by the Kurdish authorities towards Turkmen in the Kurdish regions after 2003, when some Turkmen in the region adopted different identities and presented themselves as being of Kurdish origin.

Sociology of Turkmen society: between the family and the clan

Like Arab and Kurdish societies, Turkmen society shares a deeply rooted tribal character, marked by loyalty to clan elders, particularly in villages and rural areas. In urban areas, however, the family dimension takes precedence over the clan. This distinction manifests itself in the pride attached to surnames and homes, as well as in the gathering of descendants and extended families around the name of the grandfather or lineage. They take pride in the use of patronymics, toponyms and other designations derived from a particular title or characteristic. Originally associated with the grandfather's name, the patronymic is then passed on to the next in line with this characteristic, perpetuating an centuries-old tradition19. While this aspect can be seen as positive, promoting healthy emulation and stimulating creativity between families, chiefs, elites and the various sectors of the economy, society and politics, it can also be seen as a weakness when confronted with a clan-based environment that perpetuates well-established customs and traditions. Indeed, Turkmen society rejects any form of clan segregation or fanatical tribalism, which are often instrumentalized during many political and electoral events. For example, under the previous regime, mobilization was organized around Arab and Kurdish clans to obtain parliamentary seats or political advantages. This reality highlighted the low representativeness of Turkmen society, which does not have such solid and unified clan structures. In addition, sectarian divisions between Shiites and Sunnis, as well as intellectual cleavages between secular and religious, Islamist and nationalist, extremist and moderate, have a significant impact on reducing Turkmen representation in parliamentary elections, governorship appointments and municipal mandates.

Creating a Turkmen narrative across ethnic and confessional divides

The Turkmen story illustrates a methodological policy that has been successively initiated by Iraqi governments, from the Iraqi Fundamental Law of 1925 to subsequent constitutions[20]. Turkmen rights were deliberately omitted from the constitution in favor of Kurdish rights. Furthermore, it is recalled that the British Mandate systematically expelled the Turkmen because of the war with the Ottoman Empire. According to British reports, the British government refused to recognize the presence of Turks in the governorate of Mosul and to respond to the claims of Ismet İnönü, who confirmed the existence of a Turkmen society in Tal Afar, in the Mosul region, as well as in Souleymanieh, where all speak the Turkish language21.

The United States adopted the same policy (according to this narrative), systematically excluding the Turkmen from the political process, as Turkey refused to use its military bases to invade Iraq and satisfy the Kurds, allies of the United States, while the Turkmen had a significant presence and influence in Kirkuk.

This narrative, which continues to shape the imagination of many Turkmen political elites, fuels the hypothesis of the reasons behind the division of the Turkmen between religious (Shiite and Sunni political Islam) and nationalist (Turkmen) parties, and undermines their ability to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq after the American invasion.

In this context, Turkmen researcher Chet Zarzis argues that the demographic weight of the Turkmen was reduced to 2% by the British mandate in Iraq when the state was created, using demographic estimations that do not reflect reality. This marginalized their minority and failed to attract the attention of the international media and related organizations[22].

The Turkmen narrative highlights a continuity of systematic violence, including the massacre of Turkmen in Kirkuk in 1924 by Levi (Assyrian) forces, followed by the Gavurbağı massacre in 1946, and persecution by communists after the establishment of the first republic in 1959. The Turkmens also faced the armed Kurdish rebellion when it broke out in September 1961, which affected their relationship with the Kurds[23].

The Turkmen narrative explains their exclusion from the political equation in Iraq as a result of their rejection of occupation at the creation of the Iraqi state in 1921. Their participation in the revolution of the 1920s against the British, their opposition to King Faisal, as well as their participation in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 alongside American forces.

To analyze this position in detail, we need to understand that Turkmen society was divided into two factions: the first, of Shiite faith, loyal to Shiite parties close to Iran, and the second, nationalist and close to Turkiye. The Shiite political parties were in favor of toppling the regime, while the Iraqi Turkmen Front, close to Turkey, was opposed to contributing to the overthrow of the regime because of its disagreement with the policy of the Turkish government at the time.

Turkmen and the state in contemporary Iraq

The Turkmen narrative takes shape as one of "victimization", in which Turkmen see themselves prevented from achieving equality with the Arab and Kurdish populations. They perceive their relationship with the contemporary Iraqi state as a series of continuous violence and ethnic cleansing, threatening Turkmen identity through Arabization policies in schools, comparable to a form of cultural genocide. Names, titles and nationalities have been changed from Turkmen to Arabic. Saddam Hussein's regime bombed and destroyed numerous Turkmen villages and regions, expelling populations from their hometowns. These actions were accompanied by a severe deportation campaign and led to many administrative changes. This was particularly visible in Kirkuk, which was carved up and annexed to neighboring provinces. Turkmen were deprived of the possibility to buy and sell real estate, the Turkmen identity was diminished and their professional opportunities were considerably restricted^[24].

This cultural genocide was also apparent through a census in which Turkmen were forced to accept one of two imposed authorities: Arab or Kurdish. Many were registered as Arabs, the rest as Kurds. Even the Iraqi left, from the Turkmen point of view, adopted an ambivalent attitude, supporting the Kurdish cause and the right to self-determination for the Kurds, while accusing the Turkmen of being Turanis, right-wing, collaborating with their enemies, reactionaries as well as other accusations that justified their isolation and even violence against them. Yet the Turkmens could be considered an important demographic balancing factor in northern Iraq^[25].

The Arabization policy was also expressed by the Arabization of Kirkuk Governorate’s name, in accordance with Republican Decree no. 14 issued on January 29, 1976^[26]. This policy was planned and then implemented by the Baath Party regime, as follows:

1- Arabization and demographic change: Following the signing of the March 11, 1970 agreement between former president Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Democratic Party, granting a degree of autonomy to the Kurds, the Ba'ath regime began implementing an extremist plan to Arabize Kirkuk and displace the Turkmen population. The Revolutionary Command Council issued a major decision to move the Turkmen to the three governorates in the South (al-Amara, Samawah and Kut). This decision, number 1391, was issued in January 1930, and included the construction of housing complexes in which the Turkmen population would settle[27]. As fate would have it, however, this resolution was not implemented, due to the Iran-Iraq war of September 1980. Nevertheless, the regime implemented the Arabization policy by welcoming Arabs from the south and center of the country to Kirkuk. The latter benefited from privileges such as free land, reinforced by decision n°1081 issued on September 27, 1984, which granted agricultural land to Arab peasants. The government also decided to pay a bonus of 30,000 Iraqi dinars to Arab families settling in Kirkuk after 1991[28]. Thus, through the Displacement Committee, the regime deported 2,000 families to other regions[29].

2- Bombing and destruction of Turkmen villages: The above-mentioned policy includes decisions to demolish Turkmen villages. The regime has also proceeded to expropriate agricultural land in these villages at derisory cost, subsequently allocating it to Bedouins to help them in the area. In recent years, Turkmen citizens have also been denied the right to own commercial vehicles (trucks, excavators, heavy vehicles, etc.). Furthermore, the authorities have issued a ban preventing Turkmen from renting out their houses or commercial premises, by virtue of an administrative decision handed down in 199430.

3- Annihilation of national identity: Despite the fact that Turkmen constitute the third largest group, after Arabs and Kurds, the Iraqi constitution, from the Law of 1925, followed by an interim constitution in 1959, then another in 1970 followed with amendments in 1973, 1974 and 1977, and finally the constitution of 1990, has not addressed their situation. They were even deprived of the most fundamental rights to citizenship. Indeed, they were forced to change their nationality to become Arabs, according to decisions taken by the government, which were imposed on them by force[31].

4- Denying Turkmen access to land ownership: The Revolutionary Ruling Council promulgated Decision No. 418 on April 8, 1984, resulting in the confiscation of land in the Kirkuk governorate owned or sold to citizens, unless they had obtained governorate approval or proof of their change of nationality. In fact, any possession or sale of land to a Turkmen is conditional on his being an Arab[32]. Furthermore, the authorities have issued directives not to register properties belonging to 77 Turkmen families living in the Adhamiyah and Raghiba Khatoun neighborhoods of Baghdad, notoriously inhabited by Turkmen.

5- Rectification of nationalism: The Revolutionary Command Council ruled in decree no. 199 of September 6, 2001 that, in the event of there being evidence of a change of group from the archival records of the Ottoman era in Iraq, any request for a change would be authorized. However, in 1988, the Revolutionary Command Council had decided to prohibit any change of groups for Arabs, whatever the reasons[33]. Forms were distributed to request rectification of their nationality, but the conditions for obtaining this rectification were rigorous, aimed at hindering any official request resulting in the withdrawal of ration cards (food distribution cards during the economic blockade 1991 to 2003) until the citizen had obtained satisfaction for his or her request. Certain policies have encouraged Turkmen clans to opt for Arab lineage. It should also be noted that the Ministry of the Interior has suspended transactions aimed at changing Kurdish nationalities[34].

6- Death sentences and imprisonment: throughout its reign, the Ba'ath regime handed down numerous death sentences, particularly between 1970 and 1973. When the security organs discovered the attempts to set up a Turkmen political party under the aegis of the Turkmen Brotherhood Club in Baghdad, they executed 26 young men, accusing them of working for Turkish interests. Saddam Hussein's regime also executed a large number of Turkmen from Kirkuk, Taza, Tal Afar and Tuz Khurmatu, because of their affiliation with the Islamic Dawa Party, during the last days of the month of Ramadan, corresponding to March 28, 1991. The Republican Guard carried out a massacre in the Turkmen town of Altun Kupri, killing 102 citizens[35].

The Victimization narrative : From Arabization to confessional divisions

The victimization narrative emerges as the Turkmen, under the Baathist regime, were subject to deportation policies aimed at altering the ethnic composition in the regions where they are present, particularly Kirkuk. This account highlights their reality after 2003, characterized by confessional divisions, where religious affiliation plays a role in dividing Turkmen society, in contrast with the strengthening of extremist Sunni and Shiite groups, thus weakening Turkmen decision-making unity. In addition, the growth of Kurdish influence has impacted the demographic balance between Turkmen and Kurds.

The Turkmen narrative justifies the absence of a unified strategic framework governing. Following the Arabization policies, the Turkmen narrative highlights the political influence of Kurdish parties over most Turkmen regions after 2003, considered to be continuation of an unequal pattern in the Arab-Kurdish-Turkmen equation.

The Turkmen narrative highlights the process of organized demographic changes, involving the displacement of many Kurds to Turkmen areas and the Islamic State's takeover of most Turkmen areas between 2014 and 2017. These “cleansing” policies led to the deportation and dispersion of the inhabitants of these areas, the displacement of Shiite Turkmen to central and southern Iraq, and the fleeing of many Sunni Turkmen to Turkey and Syria[36].

From then on, the division dynamics highlight the position of the Turkmen parties, seemingly subject to the influence of three major actors: a regional power (Iran), aiming to exploit the Shiite confessional factor in order to rally Shiite Turkmen away from any Turkish influence; an equivalent actor, namely Turkey, working to arouse Turkmen nationalist emotions (as well as Sunni Turkmen religious sentiments), using them as leverage against Kurdish aspirations in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and against the federal government in Baghdad. The third player is the Kurdistan Regional Government, which, after 2003, adopted a policy aimed at encouraging Turkmen to join the Kurdistan Region, based on pluralism, recognition of religious and ethnic diversity, and support for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, thus sending a reassuring message to Turkey: that Turkmen, under a Kurdish state advocating coexistence, serve the interests of their future, against a backdrop of instability in Iraq. In any case, this divisive dynamic highlights the fragmentation of Turkmen political elites, divided by these actors, who aim for a monopoly on Turkmen political representation. This contributes to the creation of a Turkmen scene marked by disunity, and encourages the development of a discourse focused on cultural specificity.

The geopolitical and historical contact line between Iran, heir to the Safavid Empire, and Turkey, heir to the Ottoman Empire.

While the Turkmen are at the intersection of the Shiite-Kurdish contact line on a national scale, they are also the junction point between Iran and Turkey on a regional scale. This geopolitical configuration shapes many of the Turkmen policies and outlooks. Geographically, we see a mixed region that has become a meeting place between Erbil and Baghdad, but also between larger entities such as Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis. This explains how the geopolitics of minorities in Iraq has become the geopolitics of international conflict. This also applies to other regions in Iraq, such as the Nineveh Plain for the Christians, and Sinjar for the Yezidis. However, the most representative and crucial place is Kirkuk, where Turkish-Iranian influences on the one hand, and Kurdish-Turkmen and Kurdish-Arab influences on the other, intersect.

Turkmen forces give paramount importance to management issues and power-sharing in the "disputed territories" between Baghdad and Erbil, particularly in Kirkuk. On the one hand, Turkmen nationalists are striving to defend the Turkmen territory in the administration of these regions, while on the other, Turkmen forces allied with Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni forces are considering joint management of these territories, thus being influenced by the choices of their allies or sponsors, such as the Badr organization for the al-Wafa movement, or the Kurdistan Democratic Party for the al-Shorouk party and the Turkmen Democratic Movement.

Turkey's concerns and interests in the Kirkuk governorate are closely linked to a neighbor representing an influential regional power, both ideologically in Iraq and in neighboring countries. The Turkish government fears that an uncontrollable situation or incident could trigger clashes between the central government and the region around Kirkuk. Iran, particularly influential in Iraqi politics, strongly supports Iraqi Shiite parties and movements. Thus, a conflict would prompt Iran to intervene alongside the central government and support it against the regional government, which already suffers from a weakness in terms of weaponry compared to the center.

From the Turkish point of view, such a scenario would strengthen Iran's hold on a new area beyond its current control, enabling it to take hold of a city rich in oil and gas, with a large Turkic population[37]. However, on the other hand, Turkish and Iranian interests in Kirkuk converge on one precise point: preventing the annexation of Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region. Kurdish political parties are aware that Turkey views the issue regarding Kirkuk the same way as Russia views Abkhazia. Turkey has reluctantly accepted the creation of a small federation on its borders, stretching from Erbil to Dohuk and as far as Sulaymaniyah, on the border with Iran. However, it will not allow the annexation of Kirkuk to an independent Kurdish state, and this is also the position of Iran, a country opposing any annexation of Kirkuk by the independent Kurdish region. Furthermore, the Shiite presence within the Turkmen community could justify Iran's intervention to protect this Shiite minority within a potentially hostile or different majority. The creation of a Kurdish state on Iran's borders would also have the same effect, and as mentioned. In fact, thanks to Turkmen political figures within Islamist groups such as the al-Dawa party and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution, Iran has been able to integrate Shiite Turkmen into parties within the Iraqi government.

Turkey exploits the national, cultural and linguistic links with the Turkmen, as well as their denominational or religious affiliations for some of them, as a means of pressure. On the one hand, this pressure is aimed at the Kurds and their aspirations for independence, and on the other at the central government in Baghdad. Prior to 1990, Turkey provided no significant assistance to the Turkmen of Iraq when they experienced horrifying experiences and their fundamental rights were violated. This was because Saddam Hussein's regime was a strong one, allied to Turkey in exchange for its hostility towards Iran.

This policy and position was very clear in the late 70s of the last century, when many Turkmen were executed for their involvement in the Islamic al-Dawa party or the Turanian national movement. From 1980 to 1988, Turkey did not allow the creation of any Turkmen political entity[38]. Turkmen were murdered on the basis of prefabricated accusations and for ethnic and confessional reasons. If they were Sunnis, they were tried for belonging to nationalist movements or accused of collaborating with Turkey, while Shiites were tried for belonging to Islamic parties or accused of collaborating with Iran. A statement by the president of the Revolutionary Court to retired colonel Abd al Hussein Malla Ibrahim sums up much of the explanation and details of the double targeting of Turkmen. When announcing his death sentence decided by his sham court, he told him: "We will execute you twice: the first time because you are a Turkmen, the second time because you are a Shiite."[39]

The impact of the Turkmen's complex identity also left its mark on their relations with third parties such as the USA. These relations were not very clear or deep in terms of communication; on the contrary, there was real suspicion. This was particularly evident after Turkmen opposition to the attachment of Turkmen forces - i.e. vanguard or raiding forces - to the international coalition forces when the Baath regime was overthrown in 2003, while they were stationed in Erbil in northern Iraq. What's more, the Turkmen front refused to join these forces, upsetting the United States and its Kurdish allies[40].

The divided Turkmen political forces are also subject to the influence of the two main regional powers, Turkey and Iran, with regard to their relations with third parties. At the same time, Washington does not want Turkiye to expand into Iraq, so it is working to reduce Ankara's role in Iraq by supporting Kurdish forces. The United States tends to consider most Turkmen nationalist forces to be financially and ideologically linked to Turkey. Moreover, Turkmen forces have no weight or influence within the USA (as is the case for other minorities such as the Assyrians in Chicago or the Chaldeans in Detroit). Moreover, the Shiite Turkmen forces are part of a broader alliance in which the Turkmens do not occupy a significant negotiating position with international players.

The influences mentioned above severely undermined the effectiveness of Turkmen political participation in the political system after the American invasion. While Turkmen forces defend their representation in senior positions under a system of shared responsibility (each component having its share), they are largely affected by the choices of their Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish allies. However, this strategy can secure certain interests by benefiting from the strength of these allies. Unfortunately, during the formation of Al-Kazemi's government, the Turkmen failed (despite attempts by the Al-Fateh bloc) to secure a ministerial post in Culture or any other ministerial position.

Confessional divisions (Shia/Sunni) within the Turkmen identity weaken the minority and paralyze its effectiveness as a distinct national group. Indeed, some Turkmen elites believe that these divisions have enabled ISIS to take control of predominantly Turkmen areas. In this regard, the head of the Iraqi Turkmen Front in Tal Afar, Qassim Kara, claims that the town is divided between Shiite and Sunni Turkmen, and that it easily fell into the hands of ISI after the Iraqi army withdrew, as "the Turkmen there were unable to overcome sectarian divisions and unite around a common goal". Subsequently, Shiite Turkmen sought refuge in Tal Afar in areas controlled by Kurdish Peshmerga forces, while Sunni Turkmen fled to Mosul, which was under the control of ISIS. Thus, the choice of cities has become an example illustrating the fact that Turkmen attach more importance to their faith than to their nationality, which also affects the Turkmen division regarding the governments in Baghdad and Erbil, ultimately weakening the Iraqi Turkmen front[41]. Similarly, Shahin Turkmenoglu, the head of the Turkmen front in Kifri, believes that "there is a political manipulation of sectarian divisions in Tal Afar, the aim being to suppress the Turkmen presence in Tal Afar to achieve political objectives by suppressing diversity and the Turkmen presence there. Indeed, playing on sectarian divisions between Shiites, Sunnis and Christians among the Turkmen is an effective way of eliminating the Turkmen presence as a nationality. Firstly, this division weakens the minority and leads to the division of its elites. Then, in a second phase, it disperses and eliminates the group. It is our history, as Turkmens, to be divided and then dispersed"[42].

Future outlook: Overcoming sectarian and ethnic divisions

One of the most widespread stereotypes of Turkmens is that they represent remnants of the Ottoman Empire's occupation or Turani movements [43] . Many institutions and political parties in Iraq continue to be influenced by these stereotypes, seeing them both as legacies of the Ottoman Empire and sometimes as spies of the Turkish state. However, when the Iraqi state was founded in 1921, a definition was adopted to define an Iraqi (from Ottoman dependency) according to the article:

"The Iraqi is every Ottoman settled in Iraq, claiming no foreign affiliation"[44].

Indeed, many inhabitants of southern and central Iraq acquired Iranian nationality to escape Ottoman military service. After the mid-1920s, following the various border demarcations around Mosul (formerly part of Kirkuk), they remained within the borders of the new Iraqi state rather than moving to Turkey, in accordance with the articles of the Treaty of Lausanne. The notables of Tal Afar, of Turkmen identity, preferred Baghdad to Istanbul after having been consulted by the League of Nations committee concerning the Mosul mandate in 1925.[45]

To achieve greater cohesion among their political elites, the Turkmens need to engage in dialogue and overcome the Shiite-Sunni and sectarian-nationalist divisions. Common demands could provide an opportunity to find common ground within the minority. Despite their identity and sectarian divisions, the Turkmens are seeking to transform Kirkuk into a special region, a "little Iraq", with an administration managed by the different groups. This would maintain the current situation where the administration is divided between the Turkmens, Arabs and Kurds, each with a 32% share, while the Chaldeans have 4%.

Although they did not obtain the post of vice-president of the republic, this prompted them to lobby for parliamentary recognition as the third Iraqi component after the Arabs and Kurds. The House of Representatives approved this recognition at its session on April 21, 2012. However, this recognition remains symbolic, and the Turkmens have yet to play a significant role in building a new Iraq inclusive of the different ethnic groups: Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, and Assyro-Chaldeans.

To cite this article : Saad Salloum and Hussein Aslan, "The Turkmens in Iraq: Fragmentation dynamics, ethnic contact lines and sectarian fractures", Centre français de recherche sur l'Irak, (CFRI), 23/06/2023, [online]. https://cfri-irak.com/article/les-turkmenes-en-irak-dynamiques-de-fragmentation-lignes-de-contact-ethniques-et-fractures-sectaires-2023-07-20