Introduction

When the demographic transition in the Arab world seemed well underway, demographers (including the author) were optimistic enough to overestimate its progression, especially in Iraq. Between the invasion of Iraq (2003) and 2022, the population size increased from 23,9 to 34,9 million; an annual increase rate of 2%. Estimates were far off from reality: 42,1 million and an annual increase rate of 2,6%, 30% more. The demographic situation in Iraq is paradoxical; the externally imposed wars and the multiple internal civil wars seem to have increased the population size rather than stabilising it. Iraq, as other Arab countries, entered a phase of “demographic counter-transition”, with a continuously high birth rate and fertility index in the country as a whole and in some regions.

However, what about the different ethnic and confessional groups that share the country? Fertility varies depending on the ethnicity and confession, because not all of them have the advantage of modernity. Nonetheless, the “demographic weapon”, and the “war of cradles” could also have played a role; some communities attempted to increase their numbers to impose themselves in the political sphere and avoid marginalisation. The Iraqi Kurds are one example. Everywhere in the region (Syria, Turkey, Iran), the Kurdish minorities have had more children than the dominant populations; due to, but not only limited to, unfavourable socio-economic situations. After peace was restored in Iraqi Kurdistan at the beginning of the century, the desire to bear many children decreased. This is a challenging hypothesis, but one that needs to be explored more deeply as we are in a deteriorating situation. Especially since the relationship between the demographic and the political isn’t one-sided.

The available data to test these hypotheses are unfortunately incomplete. Iraq has long ago stopped mentioning confession and ethnicity in its various statistics: censuses, civil status, surveys. The researcher is thus compelled to finding proxies, substitutes, to access data, no matter how fundamental, to decipher Iraq’s demographic and socio-political realities.

The most easily available dataset is the distribution of the population. Unequally distributed over the territory, its location may well reflect ethno-confessional differences but with caution. In fact, multiconfessional and multiethnic Iraq has always known population displacements which breaks homogeneity patterns- to suppose it existed- of its various regions and provinces. Without going into the details of each 19 provinces, we find an illustration for the capital, Baghdad. Classified as 80% “Shiite”, to enable statistical evaluations, but also includes, 17% Sunni, mostly Arabs and 20% Kurds (mainly Sunnis). These evaluations should thus be made cautiously, and peremptory conclusions should not be hastily drawn.

The approach used here consists, first in combining the 19 provinces. This is why we have used three Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) from 2006, 2011 and 2018 1 that cover the studied period. Additionally, a demographic study 2 covering the 3 provinces of the autonomous region of Kurdistan: Duhok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah took place in 2018, so leaving out Kirkuk and Halabja 3 , largely populated by the Kurds. Nevertheless, it will be possible, in a more advanced phase and investigations of various statistics and field surveys, to refine the assumptions made here.

Some of these examples: Baghdad is clearly a mixed city, that would require a different treatment. At the moment, one distinction between the central and the periphery of Baghdad can be developed. The case of Kirkuk, classified as Kurd, can be refined. For its capital alone, the census of 1957 showed a heterogeneous distribution of its population 4 . In Ninawa, classified as Sunni, there exists a large Kurdish minority, as in Diyala, classified as Shiite. Furthermore, even inside a group assumed to be homogenic like the Kurds, the differences at the political level can be translated into significant demographic differences, for example between a more conservative Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, famous for being more open. It is also important to consider the displacement of people, forced and voluntary migrations in the last half century sparked by multiple wars and conflicts, recomposing the ethno-demographic map of Iraq. This trend began with the Iran-Iraq war in 1980.

1. Fertility

1.1 On the national scale

The main drivers of this demographic surge are fertility and birth rates. This demography is expressed through more or less sophisticated indicators with the most widespread being the gross birth rate, here the least relevant indicator. It is preferable to utilise the total fertility rate, more concrete in its data figures as it shows the average number of kids per female from the puberty till menopause. In the world, the numbers vary from 1 kid per female, in some extremely advanced far east countries, to 7 in some Sahel countries. In Arab countries, the range oscillates greatly between Lebanon and some Gulf emirates where fertility has fallen below the threshold required for a population to reproduce: 2,1 kids per female and approximately 4 kids in the less advanced countries such as Sudan and Somalia. In Iraq, fertility is still at its peak: twice more than in Lebanon, 60% more than in Morocco.

The trend in Iraq’s fertility since 2003 is surprising. In the aftermath of this troubled period, fertility, despite the past events that go back to the war with Iran, is still high: 4,33 kids per female (Table 1).

Table 1 : Rate (p. 1000) and fertility index (kids per female), 2003-2018

Age	2003-2005	2008-2011	2015-2018
15-19	68	82	70
20-24	187	214	170
25-29	221	236	194
30-34	188	187	147
35-39	136	131	99
40-44	56	45	43
45-49	9	7	6
Fertility index	4,33	4,51	3,65

This unexpected increase in the fertility index rose the average to 4,51 children per woman in 2008-2011. It is only later that this trend curved cautiously with 3,65 children per women in 2015-2018. Additionally, paradoxically fertility has increased amongst young women that are less than 30 years old, often expected to be more modern and educated. Another feature that deviates from the demographic transition norm: urban women have only marginally fewer kids than rural women: 3,6 compared to 3,8, barely 5% less. In this atypical Iraq, education often seen as the silver bullet to transition, seems to struggle at curving fertility rates: 4,7 kids per woman for the less educated or illiterate, 4,1 for those who received a primary education, 3,7 for those who are in their first years of secondary education, and 2,8 for those who finished their secondary and university education. It is the same for the fertility of adolescents.

1.2 Fertility differences, on the province level and between ethno-confessional groups

To measure these rather puzzling changes in fertility on a national scale, it is necessary to take a closer look at the regional level in the provinces (Table 2)

Table 2: Fertility Index (average number of kids per woman), per province and annual variation (%) 2006-2018

	Fertility Index in 2006	Fertility Index in 2011	Fertility Index in 2018	Annual Variation 2006-2011 (%)	Annual Variation 2011-2018 (%)	Annual Variation 2006-2018 (%)
Baghdad	3,8	4,2	3,7	2,0	-2,5	-0,2
Babil	3,9	4,5	3,7	2,9	-3,9	-0,4
Basra	4,9	4,7	4,2	-0,8	-2,2	-1,3
Dhi Qar	5,0	5,2	3,8	0,8	-6,3	-2,3
Qadisiyya	5,0	4,9	3,8	-0,4	-5,1	-2,3
Karbala	4,8	5,1	4,0	1,2	-4,9	-1,5
Maysan	5,4	5,7	4,9	1,1	-3,0	-0,8
Al-Muthanna	5,3	4,8	5,1	-2,0	1,2	-0,3
Najaf	4,8	4,7	3,9	-0,4	-3,7	-1,7
Wasit	4,8	4,5	4,0	-1,3	-2,4	-1,5
Diyala	3,6	4,3	4,5	3,6	0,9	1,9
Anbar	3,7	4,8	2,5	5,2	-13,0	-3,3
Nineveh	5,4	5,2	3,7	-0,8	-6,8	-3,2
Salah ad-Din	5,1	5,4	2,6	1,1	-14,6	-5,6
Dohuk	4,9	3,9	3,7	-4,6	-1,1	-2,3
Erbil	4,1	3,5	3,1	-3,2	-2,4	-2,3
Halabja	3,8	3,6	2,9	-1,1	-4,3	-2,3
Kirkuk	3,3	4,5	2,1	6,2	-15,2	-3,8
Sulaymānīyah	2,9	2,3	2,8	-4,6	3,9	-0,3

In the first batch of provinces from Baghdad to Diyala, fertility has increased and decreased imperceptibly between 2006 and 2011. These are predominately Shiite provinces. The same trend is observable in the predominantly Sunni provinces (Graph 1).

Graph 1: fertility index (average number of kids per woman), 2006, 2011 and 2018 per province

Table 3 : fertility index per the dominant ethno-confessional groups and annual variation (%) 2006-2018

Dominant Group	Fertility Index in 2006	Fertility Index in 2011	Fertility Index in 2018	Annual Variation 2006-2011 (%)	Annual Variation 2011-2018 (%)	Annual Variation 2006-2018 (%)
Shiites	4,61	4,74	4,12	0,6	-2,8	-0,9
Sunnis	4,70	5,13	2,91	1,7	-11,3	-4,0
Kurds	3,90	3,61	2,98	-1,5	-3,8	-2,2
Total	4,33	4,51	3,56	0,8	-4,3	-1,4

Despite an already high fertility rate among the Shiites in 2003-2006: 4,61 kids per woman, it continued to increase in 2008-2011 to 4,74 in the Shia-majority provinces. Among the Sunnis, this increase was even more pronounced, increasing from 4,70 to 5,13. Should this be interpreted as the effect of uncertainties, especially with civil wars raging, which have had an impact on families and communities as a whole, and for whom a large number of descends; particularly, male remains a guarantee for the future, despite its high costs: upkeep, health care, education, housing. In contrast to the trends among these two majority groups, the Kurds differ in their atypical evolution if compared to Iraqi norms, but are more in line with the axioms of demographic transition. On the other hand, the decrease in Kurdish fertility rate is remarkable. Unlike predominantly Arab groups, their fertility rate was already lower in 2003-2006: 3,90, then: 3,61 in 2009-2011. However, the temptation to indiscriminately include all Kurds in the same group must be avoided. In Sulaymaniyah, more progressive and modern, fertility rates in 2006 and 2011 were lower than in Erbil reputed as more conservative. In 2018, women in Erbil were still more fertile.

It is tempting to go further by grouping, with the usual reservations, the provinces according to the dominant ethno-confessional group whether: Shiite, Sunni or Kurdish. Only the predominantly Kurdish provinces experienced a significant decline in fertility during this period. Does this exacerbation of Shiite and Sunni fertility have anything to do with the political tensions of the time? Did the decline in fertility have anything to do with the acquired autonomy of Kurdish regions? More recently, the transition has encompassed all communities, with a remarkable reversal between Sunni and Shia.

On the other hand, it must be emphasised that between 2011 and 2018, fertility was declining almost everywhere, in all provinces, regardless of ethno-confessional affiliations, which gives hope for the future, a phenomenon that must necessarily guide the prospective on the Iraqi population’s future.

1.3 The close, socio-economic and ideological fertility determinants

The fertility determinants are situated on multiple levels. First, there are the close or direct determinants. The most explanatory are early and intense marriage, contraception, provoked abortion and breastfeeding. While marriage is not excessively early in Iraq, contraception, especially by modern methods, is very insufficiently widespread, with barely one in two married women practising it, and it can be assumed that this is also the case for provoked abortion. Breastfeeding, whose intensity and duration help reduce fertility, is widespread in the country, with more than 9 out of 10 women doing it. This is one of the oldest methods of reducing fertility, which is also totally free and healthy, contrary to bottle feeding.

Going further, another level of explanation is that of socio-economic determinants, which is well demonstrated by the surveys in Iraq include child mortality, urban or rural residence, level of education, especially for women, level of household wealth, and women's participation in the workforce.

Finally, the last level of explanation is that of the determinants of ideals, political factors, power issues and relations between ethnic and religious groups, which are particularly important in Iraq. They are also the most difficult to measure because they are taboo and therefore impossible to quantify.

1.3.1 The close or direct determinants of fertility

Of the four main close determinants of fertility differences: intensity and early marriage, breastfeeding, contraception and provoked abortion, the last is not known. For moral and pragmatic reasons, no questions were asked about provoked abortion in the surveys, although everything indicates that it may be practised clandestinely, both in the cities by experienced practitioners and in the rural areas by traditional abortionists 5 .

MICS data since 2006, sometimes identify provinces (of a dominant ethno-confessional affiliation) in addition to indicators for the whole country, Kurdistan, and all other provinces in the South and Centre. Thus, in 2011, the Kurdistan region appeared more "modern" for marriage customs where early marriage, before the age of 15 or 18, was less prevalent than in the southern and central provinces. Only 9.9 % of girls aged 15-19 were already married in Kurdistan, compared to almost 23 % in the southern and central provinces. A colossal difference that has not diminished in 2018, with the very low age at marriage and early childbearing, in sharp contrast to Kurdistan, where these customs were 2 times less frequent: a teenage fertility rate of 40 against 77 %.

In contrast, breastfeeding is the close determinant that least discriminates between communities. In 2018, it was already dominant almost everywhere, more than 90% of mothers were breastfeeding, and a greater preference among Kurdish mothers, but with the differences remaining quite insignificant.

Table 4 : Percentage (%) of breastfeeding women per ethno-confessional group, 2018

Shiites	92,8	Sunnis	91,6
Baghdad	92,3	Anbar	87,0
Babil	95,4	Nineveh	96,7
Basra	96,9	Salah ad-Din	85,0
Dhi Qar	94,2
Qadissiya	83,3	Kurds	94,7
Karbala	96,0	Dohuk	91,4
Maysan	97,5	Erbil	94,6
Muthanna	96,5	Halabja	94,3
Najaf	86,2	Kirkuk	93,9
Wasit	91,4	Sulaymānīyah	97,4
Diyala	89,7
Total
Kurdistan	94,6
South/Centre	93,0

In 2006, contraception was more in vogue in Kurdistan with more than 58% of Kurdish women practising it against 48% of Shiites and Sunnis. Far from closing this behavioural gap, it has further widened with 63% of "practising" Kurdish women against less than 50% of Sunnis and Shiites combined.

It is striking in this respect to see that in the capital, Baghdad less than 55% of married women practise contraception against 67% in a more rural, agricultural and mountainous Kurdistan lacking large cities.

Through the practices of marriage, contraception (and perhaps provoked abortion) but not through those of breastfeeding, one can hypothesise that Kurdish women enjoy a more preferable status than their Sunni or Shiite compatriots.

Table 5 : Percentage (%) of women practising contraception per ethno-confessional group, 2018

Shiites	50,6	Sunnis	49,3
Baghdad	54,9	Anbar	57,7
Babil	47,5	Nineveh	44,4
Basra	49,5	Salah ad-Din	51,5
Dhi Qar	42,4
Qadissiya	45,4	Kurds	63,1
Karbala	56,2	Dohuk	56,9
Maysan	45,9	Erbil	66,1
Muthanna	45,0	Halabja	61,9
Najaf	48,4	Kirkuk	51,3
Wasit	52,9	Sulaymānīyah	73,4
Diyala	51,7
Total
Kurdistan	66,6
South/Centre	49,8

1.3.2 The socio-economic determinants of fertility differences

Four socio-economic factors prevail. Urbanisation, education, economic level and female participation in the workforce.

Urbanisation contributes to increasing the cost of children and consequently reduces the preference for large families and fertility. Yet in Iraq, despite intense urbanisation, fertility remains, as previously discussed, very high. However, the absence of a recent census prevents us from having a clearer picture 6 . In this respect, the differences in urbanisation rates between ethno-confessional groups are probably not very significant between the predominantly Shiite or Sunni provinces. However, for the traditionally rural, mountainous and agricultural Kurdish populations, times have changed, notably due to the political situation and the recurrent clashes between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish militias which had led to the displacement of the population, accelerated urbanisation and declined the agricultural sector. To such an extent that Kurdistan was reduced to importing fruit and vegetables from Iran, as its agricultural production declined. Moreover, since 1991, oil resources and the newly acquired autonomy have allowed the recruitment of a plethoric administration (800,000 civil servants...), and in its wake, an accelerated urbanisation.

Men and women’s education, considered as the path to demographic transition and fertility decline is very unevenly distributed in Iraq, even within each ethno-confessional group. Table 6 shows female educational attainment at the lower and upper secondary levels and at the university level, which makes a real difference in access to income-generating activities and in assessing the cost-benefit of having children and the rationale for birth control. Figures 2 and 3 show the striking inequalities that continue to plague Iraq as a whole, its regions and its ethno-confessional groups.

Unsurprisingly, given the previous indicators on marriage and contraception, the Kurds stand out as the biggest beneficiaries of the public and private education system. With over 55% of women having benefited from secondary education compared to only 47% of Shiites and 42% of Sunnis. Moreover, if we take into account only the attendance of secondary education in its final phase and higher education, the superiority is even more apparent among the Kurds: 39% of women have reached these levels against 27% among the Shiites and 23% among the Sunnis. For the latter, the legacy of a privileged position within the Power of the Ottoman era until 2003, did not translate into preferential access to education. Since then, the Kurds have rushed to close the educational gap. The level of education, particularly for women and at secondary level, appears to be one of the most important factors explaining differences in fertility in Iraq, as in most Arab and developing countries.

Graph 2: Female secondary and university education per ethno-confessional group, 2018 (%)

Graph 3 : Economic level (%) per ethno-confessional group, 2018

The economic level is, of course, highly correlated with the intensity of urbanisation as well as the level of education. Nevertheless, its measurement is quite subjective, depending on household self-declaration rather than an objective measure of household income or consumption.

The 2018 MICS 3 survey classified the different Iraqi provinces according to the proportion of households in each quintile from the poorest to the wealthiest: 'very poor', 'poor', 'middle', 'well off' and 'rich'. These differences leave no room for doubt.  More than 27% of the "very poor" are among the Shiites, 19% among the Sunnis and at the other extreme, only 5% among the Kurds. On the other hand, 60% of the Kurds were in the top quintile compared to only 7% of Shiites and 14% of Sunnis. One might think that material wealth is likely to induce a preference for large families in traditional societies where family values predominate. In fact, the opposite is true: material wealth induces and stimulates more or less uncontrolled consumption. A large family is an obstacle to the enjoyment of consumer goods, so birth control is essential. Rich neighbouring countries have learned their lesson: in the Emirates, the average is of 1.64 children, Kuwait: 2.24, Bahrain: 1.67, Qatar: 1.90 and even Saudi Arabia: 1.92. In Iraq, the Kurds are more inclined to follow this example, with a fertility rate clearly lower than other Iraqis.

Table 6: Level of education and level of wealth (per quintiles), 2018

	Secondary Low	Secondary/ University	Total	Very Poor	Poor	Middle Class	Well Off	Rich
Shiites	20,6	26,8	47,4	27,1	25,2	23,2	17,7	6,7
Baghdad	23,6	33,0	56,6	8,7	17,3	25,2	33,3	15,4
Babil	13,5	28,5	42,0	33,3	20,8	19,1	19,1	7,7
Basra	27,8	26,1	53,9	41,1	30,9	21,7	5,6	0,6
Dhi Qar	14,5	28,1	42,6	28,3	37,0	23,4	9,3	2,0
Qadissiya	19,6	29,4	49,0	30,7	25,4	24,5	14,2	5,1
Karbala	21,5	26,3	47,8	29,4	25,3	22,1	16,8	6,4
Maysan	15,8	16,6	32,4	48,3	30,0	12,1	7,6	2,1
Muthanna	20,9	16,4	37,3	32,1	30,0	28,2	8,1	1,6
Najaf	20,4	24,2	44,8	36,5	27,0	16,3	13,3	6,9
Wasit	20,8	25,6	46,4	31,8	25,7	25,9	13,4	3,1
Diyala	21,5	28,6	50,1	16,1	22,2	31,6	24,1	6,0
Sunnis	18,6	23,3	41,9	19,1	21,5	23,9	21,6	13,8
Anbar	20,3	20,0	40,3	33,3	25,4	22,4	13,9	5,0
Nineveh	18,8	25,0	43,8	8,7	14,9	22,0	30,0	24,4
Salah ad-Din	16,7	25,1	41,8	14,0	23,7	27,3	21,8	13,2
Kurds	16,3	39,0	55,3	5,0	5,4	7,9	22,1	59,8
Dohuk	16,6	38,2	54,8	2,8	3,4	7,8	18,1	67,8
Erbil	16,9	36,2	53,1	2,5	5,6	9,5	17,5	64,9
Halabja	16,6	39,1	55,7	5,1	5,4	7,8	22,3	59,4
Kirkuk	16,2	39,1	55,3	12,1	10,1	8,8	32,6	36,6
Sulaymaniyah	15,2	43,1	58,3	2,9	2,7	5,1	21,0	68,4

1.3.3 Female participation in the workforce

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) states that economic participation rates for both sexes have always been very low, obviously for women, but also for men. Even more serious is the clear downwards trend maintained by war and an almost permanent conflict. For women, these rates are 5 to 6 times lower than those of successful former "Third World" countries (South Korea, 60%). Such a low Iraqi level can only stimulate fertility.

What about regional or ethno-confessional differences? The ILO estimates that unemployment in Kurdistan increased from 6.5% before the conflict between the Iraqi army and Islamist militants in 2013 to 14% in 2016, mainly due to the influx of internal refugees. Certainly, women had to bear this burden more than men, affected by unemployment and underemployment. Thus, the determinant represented by female participation in economic activities does not seem sufficiently relevant to account for differences in fertility by ethno-confessional group, not to mention the fact that data on employment, particularly female employment, according to age, sector, type of activity and intensity of work, are singularly absent. (Figure 4.)

Graph 4 : activity rate of working age population, Iraq 1990-2020 (%)

1.3.4 Political, ideological and spiritual determinants 

Ideological, religious, confessional, political, emotional and institutional factors of fertility belong to a fading rhetoric. Sometimes called "remote-remote determinants".

In the Arab world ranging from North Africa to Lebanon, including Palestine, it is assumed that an explanation of national or sectoral fertility differences by age at marriage, contraception or by level of education or income factors, may be short-sighted. Hence the need to delve deeper and reach the collective unconscious, which can account for demographic differences. It is also necessary to go beyond the simple, even reductive, explanations of high fertility, often explained by religion, whether Shiite or Sunni Muslim, Christian or Jewish. In Egypt, for example 7 , high fertility was advocated by the Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood, who penetrated the national Planned Parenthood program and torpedoed it under the table. Nonetheless, their opponents, often secular, left-wing, could occasionally celebrate the cult of fertility as a guarantee of Egypt's durability... Does Iraq escape this kind of rationalisation?

The great difficulty lies in the lack of quantified, objective data or qualitative surveys. For Iraq, in addition to the improvement of demographic data - essential for the good management of the country - the perception of the deep determinants that differentiate the behaviours of the different ethnic and confessional groups that share and oppose each other in the country, is essential to establish the foundations of a solid nation-state, which has not been able to emerge in the last century. 8

The official population policy is supposed to help guide the growth or rather the mitigation of population growth. It is most timid in Iraq as a whole and probably in the Kurdish areas as well. In 2020, with only a meager $10 million total budget allocated to Planned Parenthood, the government was responsible for only 1%. Even without an official policy, 'good governance' in the health sector and through the integration of health and sexual services could have improved performance in this area. Yet, demographic indicators suggest otherwise. In the face of Iran and Turkey that are twice as populated, Syria and the Arabian Peninsula experiencing high population growth and Israel, which has a much smaller population but has shown aggression towards Iraq, it is not excluded that the timidity of this population policy can be explained by the quest for power based on its demographic underpinning.

2. The mortality

Mortality indicators such as the mortality rate, per age rate, notably infant and juvenile, life expectancy at a certain age, gender differences all serve, like fertility indicators, to measure the past, present and future population growth projections and to evaluate the heterogeneity of population groups within the country.

2.1. On the national level

The oldest studies, ILC 2004, MICS 2006, reveal a high mortality rate (more than 60%) in children aged less than 5 years old. Fortunately, it has been reduced to half today (26 in one thousand in 2014-2018), but still very high on the world scale and even among some Arab countries where the rate is less than 10, even 5 per one thousand. All over the world, the rates of advanced countries are between 1 and 2 per one thousand, 20 times less than Iraq. Additionally, the moderated increase in children mortality between 2009 and 2013 and 2014-2018, after a small decrease is worrying.

Table 7 : Child mortality rate (p. 1000), 2003-2018

Period	New Born	Post New Bord	Infant	Juvenile	Less than 5 years old
2014-2018	14	8	23	3	26
2009-2013	11	9	20	3	23
2004-2008	15	11	26	4	29

Child mortality reveals many atypical features. Living in the city does not represent an advantage for increased chances of survival. The regional variations are flagrant: from 8 per thousand to 44 per thousand. The influence of the mothers' education, which one would have thought decisive, is most limited: 27% for the illiterate, 24% for the most educated, in secondary and university education, thus representing a marginal 11% difference. Lastly, the mortality rate of girls between the ages of 1 and 5, normally 30% lower according to the laws of biology, is 30% higher. Household wealth is the only factor that fully explains child mortality, which is twice as high in poor households than in wealthier ones.

For the population as a whole, life expectancy at birth remained fairly low, especially for men, 69.5 years, and 73.9 for women. Fertility and mortality, especially that of children, are interlinked; high mortality tends to stimulate procreation and vice versa, the latter, in excess, can harm their health.

Since the beginning of 2020, the COVID 19 pandemic has become a tangible reality, impacting the statistics with an effective increase in the mortality rate and a probable decrease in the birth rate. Assuming that the 25,000 excess deaths recorded in the statistics are not under-reported, their incidence accounts for at least 0.31 per thousand for a normal mortality rate without COVID of 4.70 per thousand; this is not negligible. However, there is no data to judge the various impacts of the pandemic on the Kurdish regions, or those in the South and Centre.

2.2 Mortality regional variations

For the year 2018, Table 8 shows regional variations in child mortality, also reflecting ethnic and religious differences.

Child mortality: 22 per thousand is lower among Kurds than among Shiites with 26 per thousand and Sunnis: 31 per thousand. In these mortality differences lies a key to decipher the higher fertility rates of these two groups. This is the so-called "replacement effect"; couples wishing to have a certain number of children, particularly males, multiply their pregnancies until they obtain the number of boys deemed sufficient.

Table 8 : Infant, child and under 5 mortality rates (p. 1000) per province by dominant ethno-confessional group

	New born	Juvenile	Less than 5 years of age
Shiites	22	3	26
Baghdad	22	1	23
Babil	12	5	17
Basra	29	2	32
Dhi Qar	20	1	21
Al-Qadissiya	19	2	20
Karbala	26	7	32
Maysan	34	4	38
Muthanna	13	5	18
Nadjaf	17	2	19
Wasit	17	1	28
Diyala	35	10	44
Sunnis	27	4	31
Anbar	25	6	31
Nineveh	23	4	27
Salah ad-Din	33	2	35
Kurds	20	3	22
Dohuk	22	3	26
Erbil	15	2	18
Halabja	19	4	23
Kirkuk	32	8	40
Sulaymānīyah	8	0	8
Total	23	3	26

Graph 5 : Infant, child and under 5mortality rates (p.1000) by ethno-confessional group, 2018 (p.1000)

3. International migration

The demographic panorama would be incomplete if we didn’t take into consideration the international migration initiated by four decades of war and unrest in Iraq perhaps even more than the excess mortality. We estimate (UN DESA) that more than 2 million Iraqis emigrated to 4 cardinal points in 2020: Australia, the United States, Europe and Arab countries. The migration crisis has significantly contributed in decreasing the rate of the population growth: in 1985-1989, the net rate of migration attained near 8 p. 1000, a considerable rate.

4. Perspectives 

In terms of mortality and fertility rates, Iraq has not yet entered the 21st century. What can be the perspectives of the middle of this century? Can it compensate for this delay? A necessary inflexion of the demographic growth, fertility rate and mortality rate require a simultaneous action from both components to work.

It is only then that Iraq will be able to generate the "demographic dividend" that is essential for improving the overall economic situation and the well-being of individuals and families. The demographic dividend is the result of the decline in the Iraqi fertility rate from its current 2022 level: 3,4 kids per woman according to the United Nations (3,2 according to the US Census Bureau) to 2,1 in 2050. The latter being the level supposed to ensure the reproduction of the population at the same level 9 ; a reduction of -34% in 28 years, -1,2% per year looks very high but attainable.

Under what conditions can this be achieved? By acting on the determinants of fertility, starting with the one that over determines the others, that of beliefs, ideology, ethno-confessional rivalries, etc. Simply put, this means establishing a nation-state at the demographic level, where Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds are no longer distinguished collectively by demographic difference. Impossible? Not at all. Numerous Arab countries have succeeded in eliminating their interethnic and confessional differences. Lacking a population policy, the authorities could devote more effort in the future, especially financial, to promote Planned Parenthood, education in terms of population growth and the integration of health and sexual services.

Acting simultaneously on the socio-economic determinants that have slowed down the Iraqi demographic transition is imperative. The key is raising the population’s level of education, eliminating the ethno-confessional inequalities, particularly for girls, with the aim of doubling or even tripling the number of young people with secondary or university education by 2050. In addition, it is crucial to entirely eliminate the phenomenon of inactive youths, the NEETS (Not in Education, Employment or Training). Undoubtedly, the rise in educational levels will have an impact on the standard of living in general and for the groups, another factor in fertility differences.

An effective intervention targeting these socio-economic conditions would stimulate most of the immediate determinants of fertility: increase in the age at which men and women are married, increase in more modern and effective contraception (and certainly less provoked abortions, which is beneficial) but with as a counterpart, a risk in the reduction of breastfeeding.

Conclusion

In line with this analysis, it will be necessary to develop prospective models, to be presented to decision makers, that show the demographic dividend likely to be generated by the transition, with all the benefits expected from these transformations: an increase in the support ratio, i.e. a transformation of the age structure with an increase in the share of working-age adults and a relative decrease in the share of non-working-age adults, an increase in the activity rates in general, especially for women and older people, a decrease in the phenomenon of NEETS and a reduction in the unemployment rate through a voluntary policy of job creation. These models will enable decision makers to see that the demographic transition is paying off in terms of the expected benefits for the standard of living, the human development index and the reduction of regional and ethno-confessional differences.

To cite this article :
Youssef COURBAGE, “The recent Iraqi demography: Between demographic transition and ethno-confessional differencess”, French Research Centre on Iraq (CFRI), 17/06/2022 [Uploaded]. URL : https://www.cfri-irak.com/en/article/the-recent-iraqi-demography-between-demographic-transition-and-ethno-confessional-differences-2022-06-27