You mention the exhaustion of jihadism in its global version, giving way to what you call "local jihads" which, in the West, are characterised in particular by "artisanal" attacks, "devoid of links with a centre" and "improvised", where does this transformation of the modalities of jihadism’s actions come from?

I think it is primarily the failure of the global jihad. This jihad is global on two levels because, on the one hand, the organisation that launches it does not pretend to be territorialised with borders. For example, the Taliban talk about Jihad but always within the framework of the Afghan state, they have never called for intervention in Pakistan, Iran or elsewhere. Al-Qaeda has always refused territorialisation while Daesh thinks of its territorialisation as global, that is to say, with an Emirate in the Sham area that must expand without tangible borders. So, the relationship to the territory of global jihad is not tenable since in both scenarios there is either no territory, or the territory is in a state of permanent expansion.

On the other hand, the sociology of jihadists has changed, – even if there are still some local jihadists in the Daesh organisation – Daesh, as well as al-Qaeda recruit most of their foot soldiers from global jihadists, individuals who come from anywhere. Most of the time, they are individuals or small groups and who are therefore not rooted in social movements but in individual trajectories. As I say in Jihad and Death 1 , their perspective is clearly martyrdom, either by terrorism or in action. These models do not hold in the long term, the two jihadi organisations have shown their unsustainability by their failure. Daesh was simply trapped by territorialisation and al-Qaeda never succeeded in achieving its objectives, which were essentially the collapse of Western societies or the withdrawal of Westerners from the Middle East.

Local jihads, on the contrary, are deeply embedded in local political anthropology. This obviously varies considerably from one place to another, but if we look at Sinai or Mali, it is clear that tribal issues, ethnic issues or land issues play a very a major role. If these local jihad’s work, it is firstly because they revolve around local problems and secondly because their fighters come from the local population, they are familiar with the terrain, have a social base and therefore are all the more sustainability superior to global jihads.

Is this a passing trend or a real lasting mutation of jihadism?

We are facing different temporalities, local jihad can only sporadically reach its paroxysm, it cannot work in a long-term. The pinnacle of al-Qaeda was September 11, the terrorist organisation lived on it for 10 years until the death of bin Laden. Close to death, al-Qaeda becomes residual. The Paroxysm of Daesh took place in 2017 and since then it has been losing its influence.

On the contrary, the great strength of local jihads lies in their social entrenchment and in the fact that they do not pose a frontal threat to the West. Local jihads have carefully refrained from switching to international jihad. What is strange and still remains for me a question is why did they feel the need to affiliate themselves with a global jihad, that is, to declare themselves either al-Qaeda or Daesh. In my opinion, this is due to reasons of local legitimacy to strengthen their local situation. However, this link with the global jihad organisation had no impact on their behaviour on the ground or on their recruitment.

The great paradox of this whole affair, if you take the trial of Friday the 13th, you see that the accused blame their terrorist action on the French intervention in Syria. Even if chronologically this argument does not stick, they presented things in this way. However, France has been involved in Mali since 2013, long before it was in Syria. Yet no act of terrorism in France has referred to Mali, none. They have always referred to global jihad, never to Malian jihad. The few individuals of Malian origin (second generation) involved in the global jihad have always done so in relation to Syria, never in relation to Mali, which is still very significant. If you like, it also explains why the reaction of the West was less virulent. There was this idea – which was that of President François Hollande when he launched the operation in the Mali – to nip in the bud what was going to become a global jihad. Thus, he appealed for help to the Germans, the American, etc. Then the French left and since then we have realised today that if local jihad is spreading, it does not represent a global threat.

Now, this local jihad strategy is entirely different, it has chosen a war of attrition which as we have seen with Boko Haram for 30 years, which can go on without an end in sight.

Can the creation of a stable Islamic emirate in the area take place? I don’t believe it at all.

Are local jihads as incompatible with the structure of an Iraqi central state as global jihadism was, and how does the state deal with this new segmentation of jihadism?

The Iraqi state fought Daesh obviously since it was on its territory but deep down, I think, even if I am not a specialist in Iraq that the Iraqi state power sees Daesh as a residual organisation today. In some areas it is still a threat but this form of jihad is over, i.e. there is no jihadi movement apart from the survivors of jihad in Iraq. Thus, existing conflicts are political conflicts that can, of course, sometimes hide religious or ethnic conflicts, but they are not ideological conflicts. There is a de-ideologisation of conflicts since even the reference to Iraq today is no longer ideological in Iraq. The concept of jihad as such is no longer a problem because if Daesh makes a new breakthrough in north-east Iraq it will not be for ideological reasons but for local reasons. Thus, what remains of Daesh functions as local jihad and not as global jihad? From the point of view of the Iraqi state, the problem lies in the armed groups, the reconstruction of the state … not in jihad.

If the Daesh organisation has become a marginal force today, in your opinion it no longer represents a danger for the institutions of Iraq and the KRG?

The Daesh organisation exists locally to the extent that it represents local interests, that is, there is no longer a global jihad. It cannot be ruled out that a Chechen will one day blow himself up in Baghdad in the name of Daesh, but this is not the trend. Daesh has lost its fascination for international jihadists, it is no longer fashionable to pursue jihad in Iraq and Syria, that’s over. So, there are international jihadists who are trapped there, especially people from Central Asia because they have nowhere to go so, of course, there are international fighters but at the recruitment level it’s over.

Regarding this structural situation in Iraq, Sunnis suffer from exclusion and a serious crisis of representation that prevents them from looking to the future. Hit by heavy measures, foreign occupation and the political rise of Shiites, Sunnis eventually turned to Daesh to give substance to their collective response. What future does the exhaustion of jihad in its global version foreshadow for Iraq’s Sunni minority?

The pessimistic point of view would be to say that the Sunnis will fall back into jihad since they do not find satisfaction in their demands, but I do not believe in it. Jihad operates on an ethical dynamic, a dynamic of great speeches, of great narrative and this discourse has been seriously damaged by the defeat of Daesh. So, I think that Sunni demands will be expressed by other means that can be violent, that can also be armed, of course, in the form of militias for example but I believe that the label of jihad, may be used as a bogeyman but that it does not correspond to a form of popular mobilisation, it’s over. At least in my opinion.

You say that the notion of radicalisation obscures the complexity of religious space and that jihad is "increasingly the work of people with no connection to Islam", is there still an Islamic paradigm in this local jihadism?

The jihadists claim to represent Islam by definition but the mistake made is that of seeing jihadism as the pinnacle, the purest expression of religious radicalisation in the Muslim world when it isn’t. Jihadists do not care about religion even though Sharia is the common denominator of all those movements that claimed to establish it. In reality, Sharia law is used to control the population, as al-Qaeda has never controlled territory, the movement has never established Sharia law. Thus, because of this focus on religious radicalisation, we miss the real political radicalisation and we do not see the complexity of the religious field we are studying.

Yet from Morocco to Iran, passing by disenfranchised neighbourhoods, there is a complexification of the religious field, an individualisation of beliefs, practices, an insistence on ethics and also a development of disbelief or at least an attraction for other religious forms, including through conversion but no one wants to see it. It would be absurd today to define the Iranian regime as an Islamist regime since it is a dictatorship, born out of an Islamic revolution certainly, but in comparison, it would be like affirming that Brezhnev’s Soviet Union was communist, it no longer makes sense. Ideological references have imploded and we see it in the case of the veil in Iran. Suddenly, the religious significance of the veil no longer matters to society. For the regime, on the other hand, it is a sign of allegiance, it is a means of control so it is a very important element but for society, it is over.

In this regard, there are now two policies. On the one hand, Muslim states policies which are in a perspective of controlling religion. In other words, the statification and functionalisation of religion. This can be observed from Morocco to Saudi Arabia. The problem with Iraq is precisely that religious diversity makes it difficult to have a state institution of control over religion, but everywhere else this is what the regimes are striving to do. On the other hand, in Europe, more generally in the West, there is a search for a moderate Islam. Everyone talks about moderate Islam, both Mohammed bin Salman and Macron except that they do not have the same definition. Europe speaks of the Islam "of the enlightenment", the expression of a "secular Islam" has even been used before. In other words, a "soft" Islam. While from Morocco to Saudi Arabia, the moderate Islam is a conservative Islam that subdued by the ruling state.

Regarding a possible "reform of the Islam", you describe it as "less than ever on the agenda" if this process does not seem possible to counter local jihads, what solution do you envision?

More than that, a "reform" of Islam makes no sense, an anti-terrorist security policy makes sense, but its sole aim is to fight the jihadists. On the purely religious level it is not the responsibility of the States, a state policy in relation to religion may even be counterproductive insofar as by manufacturing a State clergy, this clergy will be immediately discredited. The best response to jihadism would be religious freedom, true religious freedom, i.e. freedom of religious debate, freedom of conversion, freedom of non-religion… This is real "reform" but nobody wants it. From Macron to Mohammed bin Salman, the world wants an Islam under control, which leaves religious dynamics to individuals who are on the margins, who are not necessarily radicals but who are undoubtedly marginalised.

How would you explain that even the field of research is struggling to endorse the decline of jihadism?

I would not say that research has become politicised, but in any case, it has become ideologised and these two lines are obviously very different. On the one hand, secularism and the social sciences are by definition secularising since they lack religion or more precisely, they treat religion other than as religious, that is to say more as a notion specific to identity, sociology, ideology, etc. On the other hand, there is, I would say, a certain complacency, a tendency to treat this from the angle of multiculturalism, in other words, religious radicalisation is often linked to imperialism, post-colonialism, racism and so on.

In both cases, the religious is missing, that is to say that it is considered that individuals are radicalised around the religious for reasons that are not religious; nevertheless, the religious dimension is central but no one understands it. For example, with regards to the debate in France today on the discrete signs of religion in schools, colleges and high schools, preachers on TikTok are targeted, accused of being responsible for a "return of Islamism", an "Islamisation" etc. Yet, when we listen to their speeches, we see that these individuals are not jihadists, they do not care about jihad, they do not even talk about the ummah, they talk about salvation, about the conditions to go to paradise. Most young people, very often girls, participate in this phenomenon, with the aim of saving their souls and their identity. So, the soul and identity are the central elements, so socially it doesn’t matter. These are really individual quests, yet they are perceived as the beginnings of political mobilisation, which is a profound mistake.