After almost a decade, Iraq conducted provincial elections on 18 December 2023, covering 15 provinces, excluding those within the autonomous Kurdistan region.

While the results remained provisional as we published this article, the large victory of the Shiite parties backed by Iran was evident. For an in-depth breakdown of the parties, alliances, and quotas per province, refer to Elias Firas' comprehensive analysis.

The French Centre for Research on Iraq asked 13 Iraqi researchers to decipher the election results across ten focal points: voter turnout analysis, provincial outcomes breakdown, unique local dynamics, 2024 predictions, unexpected success of Sunni figure Halbousi, ramifications of Sadr's election boycott, future trajectory of the Tishreen movement, representation of minority groups, impact on militia dynamics, and the evolving role of women in Iraqi politics.

1. Voter turnout, the main issue at stake in this election

Official participation rate and actual participation rate, pay attention to the figures, warns Ziryan Rojhelati, director of Rudaw Research Center

“Approximately 6.6 million voters participated in the Iraqi provincial council elections, 41% of those eligible to vote. However, with a total of more than 26 million voters, this election and its results represent approximately 25% of all eligible voters. The significance lies not solely in reflecting voter will but in its potential to drive crucial political developments.”

To participate or not to participate, that was the main issue at stake in these elections, according to Sardar Aziz, doctor of public administration

The Iraqi people, with the exception of Iraqi Kurdistan, vote in a municipal election after a ten-year hiatus. Such an extended delay should be exceptional in a country undergoing democratisation. Nevertheless, given the abundance of other anomalous features, it is scarcely thought of as such. Notably, during the 2019 Tishreen demonstrations, activists — especially in the southern provinces — targeted not only national party leaders but also local officials. They held them accountable for the lack of services and demanded their abolition. This collective sentiment significantly tarnished the reputation of local governance across the country. Could this election overcome that unfortunate legacy? Alas, the prospects seem bleak.

The election lacked policy focus — an aspect crucial in a country where attention to local and urban issues holds paramount importance compared to other regions. Rapid urbanization, climate issues, and a lack of services are all ingredients for long-term instability within Iraq. Presently, the country stands at a staggering 70.7 percent urbanisation rate, with an annual increase of over 3 percent, as per UN estimates. The variation in the turnout in different places in Iraq highlighted the persistent issues that are trailing the country and that need to be addressed through other means than elections.

Furthermore, the data underscored a disconnect between the people’s desire for clear policies addressing their local challenges and the ruling class' interests and concerns. There is a clear demand for policy implementation that directly addresses the people's immediate worries, a demand starkly contrasting the ruling elite's priorities.

The American writer Raymond Carver wrote a famous short story in the 1980s entitled What We Talk About When We Talk About Love. Similarly, what do the Iraqis talk about when they talk about the local election? In many ways, it largely sidestepped addressing pertinent local concerns, instead veering towards unrelated issues. This shift detracted from the crucial discussion of policies and immediate local matters, especially in a country where rapid urbanization and urban issues are more acute than anywhere else in the region.

More than any other election, voting proved to be problematic in this election. According to one Iraqi observer, to participate or not was the main question driving the campaign, rather than any particular policy topic. Not only may the percentage of votes cast be used to decipher the figures, but the location and quantity of votes cast in each region also provide important insights into the difficulties facing Iraqi society today.

While the number of registered citizens was 16.1 million, in a country where more than 7 million people are on public payroll, only 6.6 million citizens voted. What is more telling are the governorates and their participation rates.

Has there been a lot of electoral fraud compared to 2021? Firas Elias answers: 

Throughout the recent electoral process, there were no observed instances of fraud. Despite encountering technical issues with electronic counting machines, which remained below 3% nationwide in Iraq, the Independent High Electoral Commission largely succeeded in ensuring a secure electoral environment. This success was evidenced by the minimal objections raised by political blocs. However, it's crucial to note that this doesn't entirely negate the existence of fraud instances, such as vote-buying or voter suppression tactics that occurred nationwide. Moreover, a significant number of citizens abstained from participating in the elections due to issues related to not receiving voter cards.

2. Notes on preliminary results

By Yahya al-Kubaisi, Iraqi Center for Strategic Studies (ICSS)

The final results have not been announced at the time of publication.

1. The voter turnout marked the lowest figure in all Iraqi elections since 2005. The ratio of voters to the total number of those entitled to vote was only 26.7%. As for the result announced by the Election Commission, which is 41%, it was not the percentage of voters to the total number of those entitled to vote, but rather the percentage of voters to the total number of those voters who have biometric election cards. This is the first time that the Election Commission has relied on such a criterion to cover up the low percentage of voters.

2. This great reluctance from participating in the elections was not due to the Sadrists’ boycott, but rather to the reluctance of voters in the first place, not only to vote, but also to receive biometric election cards, as more than a third of them did not receive them.

3. It was only because of the Sadrists’ boycott that the Iranian-allied Coordination Framework Forces obtained the largest number of seats. This means that in all central and southern governorates, with the exception of Basra, Wasit, and Karbala, the Coordination Framework Forces will completely monopolise local governments, which gives them great potential to strengthen their position in preparation for the council Representatives elections in the year 2025.

4. The elections marked a strong return for Ammar al-Hakim and Haider al-Abadi. The National State Forces Alliance was able to obtain 21 to 22 seats, which is a good percentage compared to their bad results in the Council of Representatives elections in 2021.

5. In Baghdad Governorate, the effect of the absence of the Sadrists was clear, as the Sunni lists were able to obtain 17 seats out of a total of 44 seats, or 38.6% of the seats, which is the highest percentage compared to the previous three elections.

6. The State of Law, led by Nouri al-Maliki, maintained its strong presence in these elections, winning 26 seats in all governorates.

7. The forces of the Nabni coalition, which includes the two most prominent forces in the Coordination Framework Alliance, Badr and Asaib, were unable to obtain what they expected in these elections, as they together obtained only 43 seats. Badr won 14 of them, compared to 11-12 won by Asaib Ahl al-Haq, while the alliance of Ahmed al-Asadi, Shibl al-Zaidi and Abu Alaa al-Wala’i, who represent forces affiliated with Iran, won 12-13 seats.

8. The election results in the Sunni provinces marked the dramatic end to the downfall of the first generation of Sunni politicians who emerged after 2003, and also demonstrated the control of the Halbousi-Khanjar duo over Sunni representation in general.

9. As expected, Halbousi was able to sweep the elections in Anbar Governorate, with his three lists, namely Taqaddum, Anbar Our Identity, and Qimam, obtaining 11 seats out of a total of 16 seats. Thus, he will completely control the local government by taking over the positions of governor and head of the provincial council.

10. The Asseyada Party, led by Khamis Al-Khanjar, was able to obtain 14 seats, while obtaining four other seats within the Kirkuk Governorate alliances, which makes it the first winner at the level of parties and not alliances in these elections.

11. The elections of Kirkuk governorate,  Kurdish lists got 7 seats, compared to 6 seats for the Arab lists, and 2 seats for the Turkmen list, with the quota seat close to the Arab lists. This means that if the two Kurdish parties are able to overcome their differences, the two Turkmen seats will be very important for both Kurds and Arabs to ensure obtaining the position of governor, which has a symbolic dimension in the context of the nationalist conflict in the province.

12. The elections in Diyala produced a situation no less complex than that of Kirkuk. Only the Sunni lists were able to obtain 8 seats, compared to 6 seats for the Shiite lists, and one seat for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. But this does not mean that the Sunni lists will obtain the position of governor, which has a symbolic dimension in the province that is witnessing an intense sectarian conflict. The Sunni Azm Alliance, which won two seats, can make a deal with the Shiite lists to give them the position of governor, in exchange for obtaining the position of head of the provincial council, especially since this coalition led by Muthanna al-Samarrai who is closer to the Coordination Framework than to the Sunni lists.

13. None of the Shiite or Sunni lists were able to impose themselves as a difficult number in the electoral equation, and all remained close in their results.

14. The Tishreenists, or the lists affiliated with them, were unable to obtain many seats in these elections, and they retreated greatly from what they achieved in the 2021 elections.

15. The share of women could not exceed the quota set for them, which is 25% of the number of seats.

16. Fraud in the Iraqi elections is systematic and institutional,  it is not practised by individuals but it is structural. The Election Commission itself is a part of this fraud. Commission members, commission directors at the governorate level, election centre directors, and polling officials are all nominated by the dominant parties. Rather, the election law itself is designed to ensure fraud, not to ensure fair and transparent elections.

17. The results of these elections established the duality of clientelism and weapons, which are  the most influential factors in any elections in Iraq.

3.     How can we understand the results in each province?

Electoral issues in each province, detailed by Ziryan Rojhelati, Director of Rudaw Research Centre

Firstly, Mohammed Halbousi’s star of fortune continues to shine as the new Sunni leader of Iraq is closely observed after his expulsion from the position of the speaker of parliament. In the provincial election, his list secured the first place in Anbar, with the second and third lists closely following his. In Baghdad, Sadr's boycott provided him with the opportunity to be the first winner, ranking second in Diyala and fourth in Nineveh and Salahaddin. The highlight of the election is that Nuri al-Maliki's State of Law list claimed the first place in Muthanna province alone, despite an increase of nearly 29,000 votes. In the 2021 elections, he lagged behind the Sadrists in at least four provinces.

The 2023 elections represented, in a sense, internal competition among parties within the Coordination Framework that the Nabni Coalition, potentially an extension of the Fatah Coalition with some changes, secured the top position in five provinces. The list of governors (Tasmim, Ibda' Karbala, Wasit Ajmal) claimed the first place in all three provinces of Basra, Wasit, and Karbala, establishing a significant presence in the internal Shiite competition. Additionally, in comparison to the 2021 elections, the Kurdish vote increased. However, the prevalence of multi-lists appears to be the primary factor contributing to the division of votes.

In 2021, the total votes for the Kurdistan Coalition, KDP, and the New Generation were 138,411; while in this election, the combined votes for these three parties reached 210,741 (excluding other parties' votes). Despite this increase, the Kurds secured only seven seats, falling short of the potential to win half or half +1 based on the votes. Consequently, they now seek collaboration with other parties for the governor's post.

In Diyala, the Kurdish parties garnered 21,722 votes in 2021, increasing to 30,916 votes this year. In Nineveh, the combined votes of Kurdistan Coalition and KDP were 167,521 in 2021, rising to 173,877 this year. Unlike the Shiites, who adopted a joint list strategy in multi-ethnic provinces, the Kurdish parties ran on separate lists, leading to divisions despite the overall increase in Kurdish votes. Notably, in Salahaddin, Kurdish parties collaborated with other coalitions, creating a different dynamic.

The PUK secured the first position in Kirkuk, serving as a test for the party leader, who seems to have successfully solidified his position. In the 2021 election, the PUK had 63,371 votes, and this time it increased to about 140,000. Also in Kirkuk, the Turkmen were divided, the Sunni Turkmen aligned with the Turkmen Front, while the Shiite Turkmen followed a different path. However, the Turkmen Front struggled to establish a firm position and only secured two seats. Meanwhile, Sunni Arabs emerged stronger than before.

The election results will bolster the Coordination Framework's position in Iraqi politics. With a majority in parliament and the presidency of the executive branch, they will enhance their standing through the powers of governors and local councils. Their influence extends beyond the southern and central regions; using their lists or political tools, they will contribute to shaping local administrations in Nineveh, Kirkuk, and even Anbar and Salahaddin. In Nineveh, the Nineveh for its people, led by former governor Najim al-Jubouri, secured the top position and requires support from Shiite lists to pass the Ba'ath eradication law that prompted his resignation. Halbousi's list needs the approval of Shiite parties in parliament if it wants to regain the post, which may entail them demanding a greater role in Anbar in return. Similarly, the Kurds rely on their support to secure the position of governor in Kirkuk, a common demand among Kurdish parties.

One noteworthy point is that Sadr may be more comfortable with the current results, given that Nuri al-Maliki failed to secure victories in many provinces, and Basra did not fall to the Nabni Coalition. The success of the Nabni Coalition in five provinces, led by Hadi al-Amiri, coupled with the victories of three previous governors (Karbala, Wasit, and Basra), presents a better option for Sadr than Maliki's list. This is because Sadr can deal more easily with those governors and Hadi Amiri.

Another notable aspect is that Halbousi's Sunni rivals, mostly seasoned politicians and ministers from previous cabinets like Rafi al-Issawi, Khaled al-Obaidi, and others, failed to overcome him. This solidifies Halbousi as the most influential figure in the new generation of Sunni leadership. Despite the increased votes, Kurdish parties secured fewer seats in Diyala, Salahuddin, Kirkuk, and Nineveh, looking ahead, their role is expected to grow in the local administration and provincial councils of Kirkuk and Nineveh during the next phase. This is particularly positive given the challenges they have faced since 2017.1

Focus on the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, by Duraid Tawfiq, specialist in electoral issues, Al-Bayan Center

Baghdad is the largest province, but it has the lowest participation. For example, in the 2021 parliamentary elections, the number of voters was 1,500,000 out of 5,000,000, making it the least participatory in local elections. This can be attributed to several reasons:

1. Boycott: The number of votes for the Sadr Movement in Baghdad in the 2021 parliamentary elections was approximately 350,000.

2. Lack of conviction in the importance of provincial councils among the Baghdad community.

3. Lack of trust in the electoral process due to interference by losing parties in every election, accompanied by complaints.

4. Lack of belief in the significance of participation due to disillusionment with the winners in every election.

5. Administrative problems in the overlap between the administration of the capital and the provincial councils.

High voter turnout in Kirkuk isn't indicative of democracy, regrets Sardar Aziz

In this oil-rich province, the leading party is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). However, to appoint a governor, the divided Kurdish community will have to contend with the Turkoman and Arab coalitions. "The highest turnout was recorded in Kirkuk (65%). Unfortunately, this is not a sign of democratic participation, but rather a sign of high tension in the city. It was only in September that the city was the scene of demonstrations, violence, and killings. The high turnout reflects the high level of tension between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens over the city's governance and even its identity. It also reflects the vigorous campaign waged by the PUK and its two young leaders, Bafel and Qubad Talabani. We know that, if not properly managed, the ethnic divide has proved to be a major  impediment to the establishment of a stable democracy. Consequently, Iraq's ruling elites should interpret the high level of electoral participation in Kirkuk as a warning sign rather than an endorsement of the election", explains Sardar Aziz.

What are the consequences of this victory for the pro-Iranian parties in Iraq? by Firas Elias

Based on the results announced by the Independent High Electoral Commission in Iraq, the electoral lists affiliated with pro-Iranian parties succeeded in achieving important successes in these elections, specifically in the governorates of Nineveh and Baghdad and the cities of southern Iraq. This success will play an important role in reshaping the nation's political landscape, particularly by elevating its significance within local councils. It further cements its political and economic influence, potentially strengthening Iranian influence in the country.

4.     After the elections, an unpredictable 2024

The analysis of Dr Muhammad Elwia, of the Ishtar Center for Democracy Support

“More than a year after the formation of the government led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, a candidate from the Itar al-Tansiqi, these forces managed to extend their influence within the mechanisms of ministries and central government institutions. This occurred in the absence of Muqtada al-Sadr and his political movement from the political and governmental scene due to their withdrawal from the Parliament.

Prior to the government formation, the ministerial agenda was drafted and approved by the Parliament, becoming the governmental program for the Sudani government. One of the agenda items stipulated the government’s obligation to conduct elections for provincial councils within a maximum period of one year from the start of the government’s term.

The local elections were scheduled for December 18, 2023, and took place with Muqtada al-Sadr, his followers, and his political movement abstaining from participation and boycotting the voting process. The election results were somehow expected, with seats in local councils distributed among well-known political forces. The Nabni Alliance (the political wing of the Popular Mobilization Forces – Al-Hashd) led in the central and southern provinces, followed by the Maliki coalition and the State Forces Alliance led by Ammar al-Hakim. The civil streams emerging from the October protests, aligned with the Communist Party in the Values Alliance, did not secure a significant number of seats in these elections.

In the western provinces, the Taqqadum Alliance, led by al-Halbousi, secured the most seats. The Kurdistan Democratic Party led in Nineveh province, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led in Kirkuk province. Observing from a distance, with the Itar al-Tansiqi parties, often associated with Iran, exerting significant influence over the central government's mechanisms and set to extend their control over local administrations, the imminent selection of an Itar-aligned parliament speaker, and considering Muqtada al-Sadr's withdrawal from the equation, the electoral setback faced by civil and October forces potentially marginalizes them. Meanwhile, al-Halbousi's opposition to the Itar forces, triggered by his removal from office by the Federal Court, and the failure to address fundamental regional and central issues, may breed discontent within Masoud Barzani's Democratic Party, leading to a sense of disillusionment with the current scenario.

All these factors suggest that 2024 will be an unpredictable year due to the significant imbalance in power dynamics caused by the dominance of the ruling party. Despite the continuous efforts of the Prime Minister and some moderate forces within the Itar to settle disputes and restore equilibrium, the results seem to be leaning towards an unbalanced scenario.”

5. Against all expectations, Halbousi did not leave the political scene

Dr Sardar Aziz’s analysis

Anbar is following Kirkuk and equals Saladin by 57%. The two cities are primarily Sunnis, but in addition to their sectarian identity, the expulsion of Iraqi parliament speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi played an important role in mobilizing the constituencies. Against all expectations, Halbousi did not leave the political scene and managed to lead his party, al-Taqadum, in the election. As the result shows, he proved to be one of the most powerful Sunnis in the country. Not only in Anbar, but in Baghdad, as he is competing with his arch-rival Nuri al-Maliki --- the Iraqi politician who suffered under the former Ba’ath regime, and whose world view is based on anti-Ba’athism in Iraq. In this regard, to understand him, one needs to explore where he comes from, his early days as an ambitious young revolutionary, and his defining decades of hardship and punishing exile.

In fact, the Maliki versus Halbousi dynamics in Baghdad present a number of complex implications. Prior to the election day, Muqtada al-Sadr's decision to boycott the election was viewed as a significant advantage by the Coordination Framework, as it signaled the withdrawal of their primary rival. However, concerns arose concurrently about Sunnis potentially gaining seats in Baghdad in the absence of the Sadr’s supporters, who make up four million in the capital.

This situation will intensify the Maliki and Halbousi rivalries. However, it is not unexpected that the two sides will take a pragmatic approach, especially if the regional power wants that.

In addition to these, the high Sunni turnout is a turning point in the current political history of the Sunnis. Since 2010, especially after the electoral battle between Iyad Allawi and Nuri Maliki, the Sunni constituency has lost faith in the Iraqi election. In that year, the Iraqiya list was ahead in the parliamentary elections. However, the people’s will proved to be weaker than the international consensus. In this context, the former US National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes says in his book The World as It Is: “Biden is the person who hijacked the electoral process from Ayad Allawi and gifted it to Maliki under Iranian pressure. That happened in Muscat, Oman. Ayad Allawi won the 2010 elections, and that upset the Iranians a lot. So, the Iranians threatened to stop the negotiations on the nuclear file if Allawi became the Prime Minister of Iraq. Iran asked Obama, frankly and clearly, to facilitate and support al-Maliki to reach power”. Ayad Allawi says on this matter: “Iran not only rejected my presence as the head of the government but also rejected the presence of any member of the Iraqiya list.”

6.     How did Sadr's boycott influence the outcome?

Under the Shia coalition, the majority of Shiites boycott in protest, explains Sardar Aziz.

While Sadr’s call for a boycott wasn't the sole factor contributing to the low voter turnout, as he asserts, it undeniably had significant influence, notably in Baghdad and the southern provinces. As the numbers show, the Shia in the south had the lowest turnout in the country.

In addition to Sadr’s power, the low turnout has a number of other symbolic gestures. Under the reign of the Shia coalition, the majority of the Shia are boycotting as a protest. Furthermore, it shows that local governments are not taken seriously by the voters.

After a decade-long delay, the Iraqi government finally conducted local elections. Initially not a priority for the current administration, it has become a means to solidify the Coordination Framework's dominance and to further marginalize the Sadr movement.

In the absence of Sadr and the high level of disenchantment, voting turnout was low. The majority of Iraqis attempt to send a clear message of their disapproval of the current ruling elites and idealistically hope for international pressure as a result of the low turnout. Though this will add further disappointment to the Iraqis as the world paid little or no attention to the election.

The Sadrist movement continued to deepen its political control at the local council, explains Elias Firas:

The Sadrist movement, under the leadership of Shiite figure Muqtada al-Sadr, chose to boycott the local elections. His influence was directed towards weakening the legitimacy of the elections. However, this absence might trigger political instability in the country, while the influence of the Coordination Framework continues to expand. Despite this, the Sadrist movement maintains its political control at the local council level. Assessing the direct impact of Sadr’s boycott is premature, given that the election results have yet to materialise on the ground. Sadr's reaction in the next phase hinges on the forthcoming developments resulting from these elections.

7.     What lies ahead for the Tishreen protest movement in the foreseeable future?

Hussein Alnajar, youngest leader of the communist party in Iraq, and an expert on the question of the “new political parties” (Tishreen), explains:

The recent elections for the provincial councils posed a significant challenge to forces advocating an alternative to sectarianism and Islamic influence, given the substantial resources at the disposal of the latter. Despite achieving a political and popular victory, the actual results fell short of expectations. Voters abstained and boycotted the recent elections, expressing their distrust in the political process due to past experiences that failed to bring meaningful change. This void was exploited by established political entities leveraging their support base. Their electoral strategies involved creating pseudo parties, local entities, buying loyalties, and fostering clientelistic ties, securing victories across every electoral station. Meanwhile, civil forces and parties formed after 2019 did not exert significant efforts to unify their voices under a common opposition program. Consequently, these forces faced visible fragmentation and division, despite their potential to create a substantial impact had they united. Their political triumph was achieved through direct engagement with the people, presenting their projects and programs. Notably, rather than outright rejection, their challenge stemmed from voter abstention.

Montadhar Nassir al-Alam al-Jadid, editor-in-chief of Al-Alam Al-Jadid magazine 

The October Movement was on the cusp of a historic event in October 2019, after its success in winning the sympathy of the “silent majority” within society and the voice of the highest Shiite religious authority in Najaf, Ali al-Sistani, and being able to cause a political earthquake that would change the face of Iraq. However, the movement was exposed to major cracks that led to its disappearance from the scene almost completely. The movement faced unprecedented repression by the authorities and militias supporting the ruling regime. Many active activists in Baghdad and the provinces were killed and displaced, and many demonstrations and sit-ins in squares were emptied by excessive force. They were also demonised in the media through the partisan media, while the government of Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, which came in the name of the movement, sought to end it using intimidation and enticement methods. The security forces deployed in Freedom Square the “Icon of October” to prevent any new demonstrations, and it also lured many of them to remove them. This was compounded by the challenges posed by the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic, which also served as a reason to discourage gatherings.

But the question remains: Can “Tishreen” regain its momentum? The conditions that created the October Moment will be difficult to realise at the present time, for the following reasons:

1- The dispersion that activists are suffering from, the signs of which appeared in the tents of the protesters in Baghdad, and the failure to formulate a unified position on crucial issues such as participation or non-participation in the elections. They were divided in the legislative elections during October 2021, and the local elections a few days ago, not to mention the cases of betrayal spread among their ranks, which made them turn hostile one against another, instead of uniting in a single front against the parties that oppressed them.

2- The failure of the parties emerging from “Tishreen” to create a successful political model, in addition to the historical mistakes committed by some of those parties.

3- The success of the government of Muhammad Shia Al-Sudani (by taking advantage of the rise in global oil prices, as Iraq is considered one of the most prominent exporters) in dismantling the base of popular protests by implementing projects and services that are absent in marginalised and deprived areas, and providing about 800,000 job opportunities for young people with degrees, in addition to opening the field of “social welfare” to thousands of families and the unemployed, not to mention allocating more funds to the sports, culture and arts sector (and the actors in these two fields were one of the most important tools of protest), which enabled it to create a customer audience, regardless of the causes of the protests represented by corruption.

4- The killing, migration, and isolation of many influential activists due to the repression they faced and the frustration they experienced as a result of the situation.

The emergence of a new protest movement hinges on the dissolution of the government-created clientelist structure, along with its failure to generate additional employment opportunities amidst a labour market surge resulting in an estimated annual increase of one million in unemployment figures. This factor is intricately tied to oil prices, a pivotal force shaping the economic scenario. It is intertwined with the public sector, given the government's limitations in invigorating the private sector. Moreover, it hinges on price decreases correlated with the resolution of international conflicts like those between Russia and Ukraine, the Gaza conflict, US-China tensions, African coups, and other global issues.

8.   For minorities, the quota system is seen as a curse

The analysis of Mikhael Benjamin, Board Director of the Nineveh Center for Minority Rights

For many years, minority representatives and the bulk of their political entities have been complaining that the quota, which was a blessing for them, has turned into a curse. Influential parties within majority communities have exploited loopholes in the voting system, allowing anyone to vote for minority candidates. Deliberately creating entities and pitting individuals, who garner substantial votes, against genuine minority representatives, has resulted in most elections being secured by those who represent majority bloc orientations and interests, rather than prioritising minority concerns. Consequently, minority participation has become illusory, ineffective, and bereft of significance.

This election was no exception, if not worse than the previous ones. Waiting for the final results, we will discover the number of seats that were won with the votes of the minority communities themselves or through votes directed by the security forces and military personnel within the militias of the armed groups. I believe that it will not exceed one to two seats out of the ten seats distributed among five minorities in six Iraqi provinces.

Therefore, representatives of parties who represent the true interests of their minorities, constantly call for the creation of various mechanisms and measures to translate the right to the quota, including a separate register of voters with separate ballot papers and boxes, and even a separate voting day, in the hope of limiting the seizure of these seats by the powerful blocs. But we are convinced that even when those who represent the interests of their minorities reach elected councils at various levels, they will still need to be given veto power on issues that affect their private affairs, because otherwise representation will remain meaningless.

The notion of securing positions was vividly captured in a comment made by a friend from Dohuk, who remarked: The Kurdistan Democrat pioneered this concept in the region during the second parliamentary elections, later seeing its adoption in Baghdad and the southern regions through Shiite blocs that assimilated the approach. Currently, the focus seems to be transitioning towards the Sunni Arabs. In Kirkuk, they contend for the Christian seat, a victory they have so far secured, pending the final results that will determine its fate. Will it retain its position, or shift to the Shiite-supported Babylon movement?

It is worth mentioning that the last ten seats were distributed as follows: 3 in the capital, Baghdad, one seat for each of (Christians, Sabian Mandaeans, and Feyli Kurds), 3 in Nineveh, one seat for each of (Christians, Shabaks, and Yazidis), one seat in Kirkuk and the other in Basra (for Christians). A seat for the Sabians in Maysan and another for the Feyli Kurds in Wasit.

9. What implications do the results have for the militias?

By Adel Bakawan, Director of the French Centre for Research on Iraq

In Moqtada al-Sadr's absence, the Coordination Framework (Itar) political factions, wielding influence over militia organisations, emerged victorious in the provincial elections. Last year, following the resignation of the 71 deputies linked to al-Sadr from the National Assembly, the militia deputies became the main force and successfully manoeuvred to establish the federal government. A year later, due to al-Sadr's supporters boycotting the elections, the militias secured triumph, asserting control over the majority of councils across Iraq's 15 provinces.

As a result, the militias are set to dominate the National Assembly, the government, and the provincial councils. Their control over the state, territory, and society at large is progressively expanding. Although Mohammed al-Halbousi, the former Speaker of the National Assembly, secured victories in Baghdad and Al-Anbar, the undeniable sweep of Itar lists across all 15 provinces solidifies their triumph.

Command over the provincial councils holds significant weight, granting them the power to shape the selection of the provincial governor and oversee the allocation of budgets for sectors such as health, transportation, education, and the overall infrastructure of the province.

Just a day after the elections, the three primary coalitions stemming from the Coordination Framework — Hadi al-Ameri's Nabni (We Build), former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law, and Ammar al-Hakim and former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's Patriotic Forces of the State coalition — voiced their intent to forge a unified bloc across all provinces. Their aim? To assert their collective agenda and wield influence over their adversaries.

The triumph of this bloc in the 18 December 2023 provincial elections is set to advance the implementation of the “State-militia, Nation-militia, militia-building” model, which originated post the 2003 occupation of Iraq by the United States. This model, intended to be deployed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, holds the potential to reshape the Middle East in the forthcoming years.

10.  Women, the most disadvantaged in Iraq's electoral system

Being a woman in politics in Iraq: the testimony of Rua Darwish, candidate to the Provincial Council of Najaf

My experience as a woman in the nomination process, overall, is far more challenging compared to that of a man with limited connections, constrained authority, and financial constraints. Movement within social circles is curtailed due to the security situation's decline. Social constraints confine women to specific places, further diminishing their chances of success. For women to emerge as influential figures, especially those venturing into new civil movements and emerging parties, obstacles loom larger. Unlike traditional parties where influence or a personal agenda might not be prerequisites — just the assurance that the party will gather votes for you — in emerging platforms, women confront a sceptical society unfamiliar with their capabilities. The unfortunate reality is that civil advocacy in our societies lacks vigour, failing to rally behind individuals seeking leadership. The intellectual side tends to critique without contributing to viable solutions.

What is evident is that the centre of the governorate, despite having the least votes, didn't see successful candidates. Instead, those who secured victory hail from parties, tribal affiliations, and rural backgrounds. Surprisingly, individuals with extensive credentials or prominent positions garnered the fewest votes, indicating a stark contradiction. I'm referring primarily to men, let alone considering the perspective of women. The votes seemed incongruent with the essence of the electoral programs I presented. This factor played a pivotal role, significantly influencing emerging movements, including from my personal standpoint, and significantly impacting the financial dimension.

Emerging parties plunge into elections without a robust internal structure, relying on a dilapidated and feeble form of populism. Consequently, candidates encounter organisational hurdles. On the front of female candidacy, from my perspective, women grapple with limited capacities, organisational deficiencies, and a lukewarm reception due to the absence of training, development, and persuasive skills needed to sway public opinion in their favour. The electoral process grapples with significant challenges, notably the financial aspect. Women constitute merely 15% of supporters advocating for female participation in electoral processes. Presently, regrettably, women exhibit a lack of concern regarding female representation in the provincial council. The status of women remains dismal. They trade their votes for minor incentives like clothes, food, or small sums of money. Educated women exhibit minimal inclination, particularly within provincial councils, and fail to recognize the importance of supporting female candidates. They remain unaware that having female representation on the provincial council could significantly elevate their influence and comprehension. In my experience, I gained minimal support from this segment while expending considerable energy, despite their understanding of the importance of female representation in provincial councils.

The parties have learned to play with quotas, says Ilham Makki

When discussing content analysis, women's images are prevalent in public spaces through various posters, often explicitly named as 'women without hijab' signifying a feminine appearance or being 'complete'. There is no apparent endeavour to decrease women's presence in the streets, a trend that seems consistent. However, I'm not expecting women to exhibit reluctance to participate solely due to this aspect. It might be more broadly tied to the general situation, including men's perspectives, overall despair, and a sense of futility regarding these elections.

Let me share my personal experience in the region. I spearheaded our almost successful campaign as a female candidate. The majority of participants were women, ensuring a safe security environment. This women-led engagement, encompassing both voters and candidates, represents a considerable female demographic. While we are unsure of the exact numbers today, it is evident that a substantial number of women actively participated.

How do political parties approach the women's bloc? It was a key aspect we delved into, aiming to comprehend their approaches. We engaged with traditional politicians, mainly those with conservative leanings, as well as emerging parties that surfaced post the October protests.

In our study, we highlighted the significant observation that almost all right-wing conservative-oriented parties, or in fact, a vast majority, addressed the quota issue. We specifically mentioned in our research that these parties, which strategically manoeuvred with the quota system for their advantage, were not actively involved in representing marginalised communities during the formulation of the Iraqi Constitution in 2000. This lack of participation was noticeable during the drafting phase, roughly around 2004, eventually ratified in 2005, and most of these parties were against the inclusion of specific provisions. However, it's remarkable how swiftly these very parties adapted to the quota system, a fact that wasn't lost on us during our analysis.

The quota has gained widespread acceptance among political parties, particularly the conservative or religious factions. Take, for instance, the Fadila Party, a notably conservative Islamic group. It strategically positioned women in specific regions, leveraging the quota to ensure a higher number of female winners. This adaptation has become a norm across all parties, shaping their strategies around the quota game. For instance, if a region lacked male candidates with winning potential, parties would nominate women as they required fewer votes to secure victory.  

Regarding the recent elections, the quota was anticipated to be 25%, but in practice, it slightly increased to 28%. Yet, it is crucial to note that several women succeeded without relying on the quota. A prime example is Nissan, a prominent female activist from the October movement, securing the highest votes at the governorate level, surpassing many male candidates with 28,000 votes. Despite benefiting from the quota, parties seem content with maintaining the minimum 25%, as it is the legally mandated threshold. However, there is some ambiguity in the law. The previous elections recorded a higher percentage, and I'm eager to see the final results for this one.

The perception of women by party leaders, especially those from the older conservative and traditional parties, is critical to understand. Men benefit from the quota law by securing seats with fewer votes, which shapes the selection criteria for candidates. You'll notice these criteria are distinctive when it comes to women candidates. Emerging parties tend to exhibit some differences in their approach, specifically in targeting women with conservative and religious orientations.

However, when it comes to roles and forms, a prevalent pattern emerges. Many parties impose standards on women's appearance, emphasising modest dressing with hijabs and abayas, implying a degree of subordination to the party's decisions. Men may find themselves in spaces for discussion, whereas women encounter limited room, particularly within parties less inclined to progressive views.

Leadership roles for women within these parties are rare, confined to traditional roles, and they seldom occupy influential positions. The view held by party leaders greatly influences the activities, roles, and consequently, the impact of women within these political structures.

The contrast might lie in the approach of some emerging parties, born after the October protests, which now present nominations in a more egalitarian manner, not conforming strictly to the 25% quota. In previous elections, there were instances where parties maintained a near-equal number of men and women, but the real question lies in who holds influence, who occupies pivotal roles, and who wields authority within these parties.  

Even when there is a semblance of equality, women often find themselves kept away from leadership positions and sources of power. Female representation within party leadership remains remarkably scarce. This pattern is consistent across various regions, be it Baghdad, Basra, or Najaf. The question remains: How do these parties perceive the involvement of women in politics? While they rely on women's participation to mobilise and secure positions, what we witness is that while one woman might lead a political bloc or party, it remains an uphill battle for the majority to attain such roles or positions of significance.

Many parties intend to empty the quota for women of its content, explains Hiyam Ali, of the Bayan Center (Baghdad)

« Article 15 of the Governorate Councils Law III/D states: “The percentage of women candidates must not be less than (25%) of the number of members of the Governorate Council in each governorate”. Although this percentage does not represent women’s ambitions, setting a quota for women’s representation in local councils is extremely important because it contributes to women’s involvement in local administration.

Unfortunately, many parties intend to empty the quota for women of its content by selecting women who do not have the qualifications for such positions. Therefore, the parties exploit the weakness of female candidates to use women’s seats and voices to achieve their own goals.

The experience of women in the provincial councils is still poor compared to their experience and presence in the Parliament. This is due to several reasons, the most important of which is that the provincial councils at the institutional level and the social and political awareness towards them are not yet mature in Iraq, as the country has only witnessed two elections.

What is blamed on female candidates for provincial councils in Iraq is the weak political empowerment of female candidates at the local government level. There is a clear weakness in the female candidates’ understanding of their role in these councils. For example, the female candidates’ lack of awareness of local needs, the legal and legislative aspects, the political frameworks, and the administrative divisions of local bodies.

Therefore, in the electoral programs of the female candidates in general, there is an unclear understanding of the powers of the Provincial Council and its difference from the roles of the municipality in Baghdad, and the Parliament. There is confusion within the electoral programs about the roles they will play after obtaining the seat. As for the issues on which the electoral programs of female candidates are based, they are very similar despite the differences in geographical regions and political orientations, and the electoral programs lack an action plan and realistic strategies to address the problems in a way that is consistent with the powers granted to the members of the Provincial Council.

Also, most of the female candidates in the provincial council elections relied on the element of the clan to which they belong. Therefore, visits to tribal sheikhs and clan members are one of the female candidates’ priorities in their electoral propaganda, instead of paying attention to Iraqi civil society, which represents the true voice of society. There are other immoral methods adopted by some female candidates, and they have been subjected to criticism. Large amounts of money are carried out by society, such as buying electoral cards from voters, taking advantage of their financial poverty and political ignorance.

We have hope that women’s participation in local councils will improve in the upcoming elections and that there will be real representation close to the needs of society and far from personal and political interests. »

Power Dynamics and the Election in Nineveh, by Reem Ghassan

In Nineveh, it became weighted that Itar al-Tansiqi (the Iranian-backed parties) may record the highest victory, with the allied lists within it obtaining the largest percentage of seats, estimated at 13 seats. As a result, it became evident within political circles and decision-making spheres in Nineveh that the Coordination Framework emerged as the genuine power spawned by the governorate council elections, dictating the course of the governorate for the forthcoming four years.

The estimated results were a product of evident dynamics in Nineveh's power equilibrium, hinged on Itar Al-Tansiqi's command over political, economic, and military resources, along with tribal and religious social frameworks. Despite the sway of several Kurdish and Arab political factions, benefiting from tribal social structures for provincial council seats, Itar Al-Tansiqi had the upper hand in distributing power. The patriarchal system served as a conspicuous backdrop for scrutinising the election dynamics and their outcomes. This was particularly noticeable in the ascendancy of (male) descendants of former political leaders to top votes in the governorate — Najm al-Jubouri, son of Nineveh's governor; Thabet al-Abbasi, son of the Defense Minister; and Atheel al-Nujaifi, son of the former governor — operating within an inherited framework primarily grounded in the clan system and conservative ideologies.

In regards to Mosul, a significant portion of its society resists conforming to this system. They often abstain from participating in elections due to their disagreement with its nature, citing a pervasive lack of trust in the candidates. Notably, the prevalent mindset in Nineveh concerning the roles of decision-makers, including parliament representatives and Provincial Council members, is to offer administrative conveniences and cater to the interests of select individuals around them — be it relatives, friends, or acquaintances — prioritising personal connections over serving the public good or amending laws and regulations. Voters tend to cast their ballots based on personal relationships, opting for candidates they know and trust, which might explain the subdued engagement in elections.

In light of these power dynamics, women emerge as subjects within the patriarchal system. The quota mandates their involvement in the electoral process, with political parties cognizant of the potential to leverage minimal votes for women to secure seats. This occurs while the prevailing power balance leans toward the political entity's leader to steer the decisions and trajectories of the female representative. Contrastingly, voters prioritise close personal connections as the criterion for selecting and casting their votes for a candidate, with many not deeming gender as essential. Instead, they have embraced the inclusion of women in positions of authority, displaying trust in them and supporting their candidacy. Notably, in Nineveh, five women garnered the highest votes on their respective lists without relying on the quota.

The CFRI does not take collective positions. Its publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

To cite this article : CFRI, "Special feature: the 2023 provincial elections in Iraq", Centre Français de Recherche sur l'Irak, (CFRI), 22/12/2023, [https://cfri-irak.com/en/article/local-elections-in-iraq-reality-and-implications-2023-12-15]