Introduction

The relations between Iraq and Iran are historical and conflictual, especially regarding their borders. Iran suffered particularly from the Iraqi invasion of 1980-1988 and is determined to contain the emergence of a new powerful Arab nationalist state by any means possible. The 2003 Iraq war allowed Iran to play a role on the international stage by quietly supporting the invasion of its neighbour.

In this regard, it is worth asking how Iran's Iraq policy was born and implemented and what difficulties were encountered.

First of all, it will be necessary to show that the trigger for this policy was the American invasion of Iraq. Iran then took advantage of this to change its strategy, in return for a relative understanding with the Americans in the country, following the famous proverb "The enemies of my enemies are my friends". Iran and the United States have become the "sponsors" of Iraq. Nothing can be done without their approval. The second point is the implementation of this policy. It involves Iran's aggressive interference in Iraq using various means in the country. Finally, there are two main difficulties. The first of these is the fight against the emergence of the terrorist group; Islamic State and the contestation of this Iranian interference by the Iraqi people.

The fall of Saddam Hussein: “The enemies of my enemies are my friends.”

Initially, Iran was formally opposed to any American invasion of Iraqi territory. Iran had been placed by the Americans on the list of «axis of evil » states despite their discreet support for the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. However, Iran has adopted a form of neutrality. The then, President of the Islamic Republic indicated that Iran would remain neutral but circumstances would later lead them to pursue their interests. Saddam Hussein, the raïs of Baghdad, unified Americans and Iranians for the first time since 1979. Indeed, both countries had great contempt for Saddam Hussein. Iran exchanged intelligence with the Americans. Thus, under the umbrella of the Revolutionary Guards, the Badr Brigade was able to gather intelligence on the presence of Iraqi ground units and anti-aircraft defences for the Americans in southern Iraq. It had been preparing this since 1999. For example, the Iranian vice-president said that "without Iran, Baghdad and Kabul would not have fallen"1. When Saddam Hussein was executed in 2006, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called it divine news.

Americans and Iranians share the same vision of Iraq. It must be kept stable for the security of the region. Iran pressured Iraqi Shiite groups to participate in the country's political reconstruction effort while having to spare the American partner. In 2006, a sectarian war emerged after the explosion of a Shiite mosque in Samarra. The United States and Iran together relied on the 10,000-strong Badr Brigade to secure the Iraqi streets. However, this brigade had prepared a list of former Ba’ath Party officials to be executed when Saddam Hussein fell, as well as Iraqi citizens guilty of collaboration with him. In 2004, a report stated that 2,000 Iraqis were murdered by this militia2. In 2005, nearly 180 former Iraqi pilots from the Iran-Iraq war were murdered by pro-Iran Shiite militias3. Americans and Iranians also supported the same Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish leaders between 2004 and 2014.

However, this friendship between the two countries did not last. From 2007 onwards, Shiite groups affiliated with Tehran attacked American troops. Iraq acted as an intermediary between them. A precarious ceasefire emerged in 2008 4 but was violated the following year.

This American policy of Iraq without a medium or long-term vision 5 facilitates the infiltration of Iran into the country. Indeed, Iraq is now a shadow of its former self and its powerful neighbour Iran is taking advantage of this.

Iran's Aggressive Interference in Iraq's Internal Policies

Iran's strategy in Iraq is clear. An Iraq that is excessively shaped by Western democracy poses a threat because it could allow the Americans to use its territory to carry out strikes on Iran. The latter will then skilfully play on the destabilisation of Baghdad to show that the Americans are incapable of enforcing order in Iraq while supporting the Iraqi Shiite leaders who, for their part, will provide some security in the Iraqi street. To carry out this skilful strategy, Iran will rely on different elements.

On the religious level, Iraq offers representation that emphasises confessionalism. This has favoured the emergence of Shiite groups within Iraqi political life, which Iran will rely on. Different Shiite parties exist in Iraq, but there are differences between them. The Sadrist movement is more focused on Iraqi nationalism and rejects Iranian interference in the country. In May 2006, the first post-war government in Iraq was formed and led by the Shiite Nouri Al-Maliki. Al-Maliki established contacts with Iran and in 2008 President Ahmadinejad visited Iraq, sealing the beginnings of an official reconciliation. Iran was also the first state to recognise the post-Saddam Hussein government. It has become a major player in Iraq's politics but it is also focusing its attention on ensuring that a strong Iraq like the one under Hussein never comes to life.

Moreover, the militia circle is very much linked to the religious and political spheres. Iraq is full of Shiite militias trained and armed by Iran. They were integrated into the regular Iraqi army in 2016 and have their own budget. They also attacked the United States after the assassination of the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in early 2020. Finally, they were recruited by Iran to go and fight the Syrian rebels fighting against Bashar al-Assad.

Iran is also present on the economic level by financing major infrastructure projects and exporting gas and oil. Iraq has gradually become its first customer. Today, economic exchanges between the two countries are estimated at more than twelve billion dollars per year.

Tourism is also a way of interdependence between the two states. Numerous pilgrimages take place every year to the various Shiite shrines in Iraq. Approximately five to six million Iranian pilgrims visit Iraq every year6. Among these pilgrims are Iranian intelligence agents who infiltrate the country. Some have been arrested by Western coalition forces in Iraq.

Iran also relies on the Iraqi Kurdish community. The objective for Tehran is to weaken the centralised power in Baghdad and to diversify its influence in Iraq. However, during the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini declared that “the Kurds are the greatest kufar 7”. Iranian trade and investments have multiplied towards Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran became the first state to open a consulate there. However, Iran did not welcome the announcement of a referendum on self-determination for Iraqi Kurdistan in September 2017. Iraq considers the referendum illegal and Iran is opposed to any independence for Kurdish territory due to fears of instability within the Iraqi territory. Iran has an interest in preserving some form of unity in the Iraqi territory as its national security would be at stake if it did not. It also refuses to do so because of the geopolitical context: Israel supports Kurdish independence. Many Iranian officials spoke publicly. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared the need to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and added that "those who reject this issue are considered opponents of Iraq's independence and identity8". Foreign Minister Javad Zarif announced that "the referendum in Kurdistan was against the Iraqi Constitution (...) which emphasises Iraq's national unity and territorial integrity as immutable principles "9.

The fight against the Islamic State in Iraq: the return of the sponsors

With the US combat troops having left Iraq in 2011, the Iraqi political power, still weak and corrupt, was unable to face the first fights in 2013 against the Islamic State group. The latter was born as a reaction to Prime Minister Al-Maliki's violent policy towards Sunnis.

The United States and Iran can be described as the sponsors of Iraq. Without them, nothing is possible and the desperate situation in Iraq in the summer of 2014 showed this: several large cities in northern Iraq fell almost without a fight, such as Mosul, while the Iraqi troops were fleeing the Islamic State10. The Americans then returned to Iraq to fight against ISIS and support the Baghdad government. Iran also felt that Baghdad was no longer in control of the situation and decided to intervene militarily. The Iraqi Shiite authorities also issued a fatwa against the Islamic State and called on all young men to do jihad. A popular mobilisation force was set up, formed mainly by young people of the Shiite faith, pooling together around 150,000 men. The Al-Quds force11 coordinated, equipped and trained these militias against the IS. Iran offered part of its fleet of Sukhoi SU-25 aircraft to the official Iraqi forces and also helped the Kurdish forces, fighting in northern Iraq.

These operations against the Islamic State have not been the subject of any particular collaboration between Iran and the Western states. However, occasional intelligence was exchanged. Officially, Iran was not invited to the formation of the international anti-IS coalition, formed in 2014 in Paris, because of its unconditional support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Iran argues the opposite. It would have refused the American invitation to be part of it. Nonetheless, on the ground, the American bombings are nevertheless the result of a collaboration albeit discreet, between Iranians and Americans. This has enabled the Shiite militias supported by Iran to take over certain Iraqi towns. However, no real alliance between Iran and the United States will emerge, given Iran's capacity to cause harm to Israel and Saudi Arabia, which are allies of the United States.

While cooperation with the United States against the IS was ad hoc and not integrated, this is not the same situation with Iran's neighbours, who are also attacked by the Islamic State. At the end of September 2015, Russia announced the creation of a joint intelligence sharing centre in Baghdad between Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Its main function is to coordinate intelligence against ISIS and operations around the Syrian-Iraqi border. Iraq, Iran and Syria, under the leadership of Russia, will therefore coordinate against ISIS.

Iraq then sank into a form of special dependence to Iran in terms of security from which the latter drew significant benefits. Yet, the Iraqi street violently contested this quasi-control over the country in 2019.

Iranian Interference Challenged by the Iraqi street 

However, this Iraqi dependence on Iran exasperated the youth who demonstrated their anger against the corrupt Iraqi political class in the autumn of 2019. The government harshly repressed this revolt, with more than 600 deaths. The protesters attacked Iranian consular offices in Iraq. For Tehran, these demonstrations were the symbol of a plot organised by the West to weaken Iran. General Soleimani was then sent to coordinate the counter-demonstration operations of the Iraqi security forces. To fend off allegations of fierce repression, the government blamed the militias established in the country, especially in Baghdad and in the south of the country. Prime Minister Abdel Mahdi resigned in December 2019.

Officially, Iran wants to end its Iraqi policy. It has sent a note to Iraqi Shiite militias and groups stating that it does not intervene "in any of the details of the current political process in Iraq. The election of the Prime Minister is an internal matter and Iran does not interfere, it is up to the Iraqi leadership to decide who is suitable for the position"12.

Although this policy is contested by the Iraqi street, in a telephone conversation in early February 2022, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazimi and Iranian President Ebrahim Raissi, indicated that "the relations between Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran are privileged"13.

In addition to this internal disintegration on the Iraqi domestic scene, Iran is also facing a new challenge on the regional scene. To appease the Iraqi street, the new Al-Kazimi government is trying to diversify its support and is now turning to Saudi Arabia. Economic contracts have been signed between the two states. The Iraqi situation a massive rejection of Iranian interference in the country, similar to the Lebanese situation where the Iranian influence is also being questioned.

Conclusion

Thus, Iran's Iraq policy was born out of an effective strategy and desire to infiltrate Iraq at all levels by taking advantage of the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. Iran has seized an unprecedented opportunity to extend its influence in its Iraqi neighbour. Relations with the United States on the Iraqi issue were strained but when the influence of these two "sponsors" was threatened by the emergence of the Islamic State group, Iran and the United States demonstrated that they were able to exchange some information to fight against it. They still had a common enemy in Iraq. The main difficulty encountered by Iran during the implementation of this policy was the popular protest against the Iraqi political class accused of being too close to Iran. Despite this challenge, Iran remains influential in Iraq and continues to aim at preserving a more or less stable Iraqi state, but is still dependent on it financially, economically and in terms of security.

To cite this article :
Antoine BUZAT, “La politique irakienne de l’Iran, de 2003 à nos jours”, Centre français de recherche sur l'Irak (CFRI), 15/04/2022 [en ligne]. URL : https://cfri-irak.com/article/la-politique-irakienne-de-liran-de-2003-a-nos-jours-2022-04-15