This article was published by Le Monde Diplomatique "In Iraq, the Hashd calls the shots" by Adel Bakawan. Published on october 2023. https://mondediplo.com/2023/10/04iraq

When ISIS fighters took Mosul, Iraq’s second city, on 10 June 2014, the nation suffered a collective shock. The army, anti-terrorism forces, police and other national security bodies had proved unable to defeat a few hundred jihadists and, as state forces retreated, they left behind tonnes of military equipment that was picked up by the Sunni-affiliated Daesh (ISIS) fighters. It was experienced as a national disaster, creating a widespread sense of panic and humiliation.

Three days after Mosul fell, Ali al-Sistani, the highest religious authority in Najaf — the heart of Iraqi Shiism — issued a fatwa calling for a popular military mobilisation against ISIS.

In response, thousands of young volunteers who would never have considered signing up to Iraq’s discredited army joined new or existing militias. To keep control of these diverse militias, the government created a body called the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Committees). Some Iraqi politicians were soon calling it the ‘new Republican Guard’, a reference to Saddam Hussein’s elite corps. The Hashd played a crucial role in defeating ISIS and its influence still largely shapes Iraqi politics.

The militias, united under one banner, have expanded their operations beyond fighting ISIS and its affiliates 1. It’s indicative of the Hashd’s growing importance that in July 2023 the government budget recorded its headcount as 238,075 (compared to 122,000 in 2021) or 6% of the civil service, with a payroll of around $2.65bn (1.8% of the total national budget). By way of comparison, the army has a staff of 454,000 and the interior ministry 700,000. Understanding how a paramilitary outfit reached such a size and got to have such a significant impact on public finances entails tracing the evolution of post-Saddam Iraq.

For the authorities that took over after Saddam was removed from power on 9 April 2003, the Hashd was a guarantor of survival, much like the Pasdaran who defend Iran’s Islamic Republic. Its initial mission — fighting jihadists — did not in itself secure its role as the regime’s protector, so a legal framework was created to legitimise it, ensure its continuity and give it control over territory and Iraqi citizens. In November 2016 Iraq’s parliament passed a law making the Hashd an official state entity, formally headed by the prime minister as commander-in-chief. However, this control existed in name only; the Hashd, having become institutionalised, was de facto beyond the government’s authority.

Regime or government?

Here, it’s essential to distinguish between true power and the government. The former has been shaped by pro-Iranian groups and inspired by the Iranian model. Founded in the mid-2000s on an assumption of the primacy of Shiism, it operates according to its own rules and strategies and does not treat Kurds or Sunnis as legitimate partners with whom national reconciliation can be envisaged.

The government, meanwhile, serves as a front and operates in a strictly limited space. But working away behind this façade, those with true power use legislative elections to give the impression of power changing hands, new governments being formed and even political parties competing — as long as their own position remains unchallenged.

This being so, the Hashd or one of its factions sometimes clashes directly with the government, as happened during Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s premiership 2. In the night of 5-6 November 2021, his residence in the capital’s high-security Green Zone came under drone attack. Kadhimi survived, but many Iraqis surmised the Hashd was behind the attack. Kadhimi was suspected of involvement in the assassination in Baghdad in January 2020 of Iran’s Major-General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (‘the engineer’), who was commander of the Kataib Hizbullah and deputy chief of the Hashd. Kadhimi had also been accused of trying to build an international profile to enable him to isolate the regime’s most radical pro-Iranian factions and limit the Hashd’s political influence.

The Hashd is not a homogeneous entity: it contains three major factions whose interests sometimes conflict. The first is ideologically aligned with Iran and currently in the driving seat. The second is loyal to the Marjaiyya of Najaf, a religious authority represented by Sistani. And the third pursues an Iraqi nationalist agenda under its political and religious leader, Muqtada al-Sadr.

After the defeat of ISIS, the latter two factions followed different paths. The Marjaiyya forces joined the Iraqi army, while Sadr’s — grouped under the organisation Saraya al-Salam (the Peace Brigades) — remained part of the Hashd, allowing them to keep receiving funding. Over time, Saraya al-Salam has also distanced itself from the pro-Iranian faction, thereby effectively ceding control of the Hashd to it.

Factions and sub-factions

In addition to these three major factions, there are smaller militias, from Sunni or minority groups (Christian, Yazidi, Shabak etc), which ally themselves with one of the main factions depending on their interests, their choice often favouring the pro-Iranian group because of its clout.

The influence of factions within the Hashd is especially significant because they have established political branches that participate in the country’s political life. This means they can sit in parliament, take part in government and benefit from state resources, expanding their room for manoeuvre in managing power dynamics inside government.

Since 2018, Hashd-affiliated candidate lists have consistently come first and second in legislative elections. In May 2018 Sadr’s coalition, supported by the Peace Brigades, came first, with 54 seats. The list of Hadi al-Ameri — a figure close to Tehran who is supported by the Badr Brigades, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous) and the Kataib Hizbullah — was second, with 48. The list of then prime minister Haider al-Abadi, who had Western and Gulf support, finished third, with 42 seats.

In 2021 Sadr’s list again topped the polls with 73 seats. Adding Ameri’s seats to those of former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, another figure close to Tehran, gave them 51 seats. So political formations supported by the Hashd militias are the determining force in Iraqi parliamentary life.

In addition to its substantial budget from the state, the Hashd is also working to establish economic autonomy, in the manner of Iran’s Pasdaran. In November 2022 the government authorised it to establish a public works company, Muhandis (‘Engineer’), named in honour of the founder of Kataib Hizbullah. In reconstruction-focused Iraq, where the state is the primary contractor for infrastructure projects, this company, with capital equivalent to around $69m, will enable the Hashd to sign contracts and build up a significant war chest — an insurance policy against potential pressure from a hostile future government.

Hashd forces also profit from illegally imposing taxes on goods entering Iraq. Militias are posted at the five official terminals along the border with Iran, as well as at the sole crossing point with Turkey and in the docks at Umm Qasr, where they demand a levy for permitting shippers to circumvent bureaucratic delays. In March 2021 the Iraqi finance ministry admitted it only collected 10%-12% of the taxes due to it.

Smuggling oil and other commodities in and out of Iraq is another significant revenue stream for the Hashd. In July 2022 the Iraqi National Security Service revealed it had seized over a million litres of smuggled petroleum products in the previous few months. Two months earlier, the Iraqi National Oil Company estimated 7 million litres of oil were being smuggled per day, approximately half the country’s total daily production. Between 2017 and 2019, smuggling may have cost the country $2bn in lost oil revenue.

Over the years, the Hashd has put down roots and increased its influence. The widespread belief in the West that it is merely a coalition of militias is increasingly misguided. This organisation has a social base, armed branches, political representation and financial resources. The longer it remains in existence, the harder it will be to push it out of the political arena let alone eliminate it entirely.

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