As he had been preparing for the past two weeks, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s shift in position regarding the Gaza crisis since 7 October was resoundingly affirmed during the grand rally in support of the Palestinians on 28 October 2023, which took place at the former Atatürk airport in Istanbul. This event, announced and carefully prepared since 25 October, when the Turkish head of state addressed the Turkish Grand National Assembly and adopted a notably tougher tone compared to his initial - nuanced - reactions to the conflict, showcased Erdoğan’s new ambitions in the crisis. In a series of sharp tirades, he left behind his initial hesitation and resumed an assertive vigour reminiscent of his often dominant stance in addressing the West over the last decade.

The surprising initial moderation

The Turkish President’s response to the attack on 7 October 2023 was unexpectedly moderate. He stated, “We invite all parties to act reasonably and avoid impulsive steps that provoke tensions”. Historically, the leader of the AKP had been a strong advocate not only for the Palestinian cause but also for Hamas during previous Gaza conflicts. On 10 October, he called upon the international community to prevent further escalation, offered to “mediate in facilitating dialogue between the conflicting parties”, supported the organisation of prisoner exchanges, and appealed to Hamas for the release of kidnapped hostages. This approach and these initiatives were reminiscent of Erdoğan’s actions during the Ukrainian crisis, where he played a pivotal role in forging connections between Russians and Ukrainians, resulting in the grain deal of 22 July 2022 (which had been frozen since July 2023) and subsequent prisoner exchanges.

The Turkish executive promptly involved parliament in its efforts to promote moderation. Following its initial response, on 12 October, Turkish Members of Parliament issued a joint declaration, calling for de-escalation. This declaration had the support of the five largest parliamentary groups in the chamber, which includes the AKP (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s party), CHP (opposition Kemalists), YSP (opposition Kurdish Left), MHP (AKP-allied far-right nationalists), İYİ Parti (opposition moderate nationalists), and the SP (the small historic opposition Islamist party). Certain Turkish Islamist circles expressed disappointment with the prevailing official moderation. They circulated fake videos of Erdoğan on social networks, using previous statements by the Turkish president to falsely suggest that he had committed to military intervention if Israel attacked Gaza. Additionally, there were rumours, which were denied by Ankara, suggesting that this moderation was influenced by the presence of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of the political wing of Hamas, in Turkey on 7 October.

The beginnings of a shift in position and its assertion

In the days that followed, the start of Israeli reprisals and, in particular, the significant number of civilian casualties they caused in the Palestinian enclave, placed the Turkish President in a delicate position. This compelled him to gradually harden his tone toward the Jewish state. Nevertheless, Turkey, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan at the forefront, persisted in extensive diplomatic efforts to seek a resolution to the crisis. Erdoğan, after several days, finally condemned the Israeli strikes on Gaza and went on to characterise Israel’s actions as not those of a state but of an “organisation” - a term he typically employs when referring to the Kurdish PKK. This progression led to discussions of state terror, culminating on 17 October after the Al-Alhi hospital strike, after which Turkey declared three days of mourning. The Turkish President accused Israel, describing the tragedy as a “crime against humanity, almost tantamount to a genocide”.

This notable shift in tone was accompanied by criticism of the West, accused of “fanning the flames”, and the UN, chastised for its persistent ineffectiveness. Turkey’s complete repositioning is now in progress. On 25 October, before the AKP group in parliament, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the cancellation of his planned trip to Israel as part of the diplomatic normalisation between the two countries, expressing a sense of being “mistreated” by Netanyahu. He further asserted, “Hamas is not a terrorist organisation but a group of liberators defending their land”. Finally, he extended an invitation to the Turkish people to join a major gathering in Istanbul on 28 October 2023, in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

During his address on this occasion, Erdoğan spoke forthrightly. He proclaimed that “Israel’s war crimes will be denounced on the international stage” and pointed an accusatory finger at the West, holding them accountable for the situation in Gaza due to their unwavering support for the Hebrew state. He expressed astonishment at the contrasting approach taken towards the humanitarian situations in Ukraine and Gaza. The rhetoric accompanying this shift in Turkey’s position is noteworthy, particularly when it suggested that the West may be pursuing “a new crusade of the Cross against the Crescent”. These remarks led Israel to recall its diplomats to reassess the relationship between the two countries. On 4 November 2023, Turkey reciprocated by recalling its ambassador from Tel Aviv. It is evident that after months of efforts over the past two years to normalise relations with Israel, the Turkish President has had to abandon his goal. However, this is not the first time that the situation in Gaza has strained relations between Turkey and Israel.

Erdoğan’s Israeli-Palestinian balancing act

Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise the State of Israel when it was founded. During the initial decades of the Cold War, despite often rocky relations with the Arab world, Turkey maintained a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East, not only politically, but also economically and militarily. However, this bond began to wane after the Six-Day War, with Ankara’s support for resolution 242 and its acceptance of a PLO office on its territory in 1979. Nevertheless, strong ties persisted between the two countries when the AKP came to power following its victory in the early elections of 2002, and this alignment endured for several more years.

A shift occurred at the end of 2000s when Turkey embarked on a diplomatic offensive to break free from its strategic isolation in the Middle East and rekindle relations with the Arab world. To substantiate the authenticity of this new diplomatic approach, Erdoğan aimed to position himself as a champion of the Palestinian cause. However, more than merely opposing the establishment of new settlements in the West Bank (a stance held by certain Western countries as well), it was his proactive initiatives in support of Gaza and the relationships he forged with Hamas that primarily contributed to the deterioration of relations between the two countries.

In early 2009, the Israeli army’s “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza triggered the well-known confrontation between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Shimon Peres at the Davos Forum, famously remembered as the "one minute!" incident. A year later, in May 2010, a significantly more serious incident occurred when a flotilla chartered by an Islamic NGO, with the tacit approval of the AKP government, attempted to break the blockade of the Gaza Strip. The flagship of this flotilla, the Mavi Marmara, was intercepted by Israeli commandos, resulting in the tragic deaths of nine Turkish aid workers. This event not only bolstered Turkey’s resurging prestige in the Muslim world but also elevated Erdoğan’s popularity domestically, particularly among a Turkish electorate empathetic to the Palestinian cause. In July 2021, during his visit to Cairo against the backdrop of the Arab Spring and Egypt’s post-Mubarak political transition, the Turkish president sought to capitalise on his advantage. He made a fruitless attempt to convince Egyptian authorities to extend his trip to Gaza, where he believed - perhaps rightly - that he would receive a hero’s welcome. The process of restoring Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations, which had been severely strained by the flotilla incident, would prove to be a lengthy and intricate endeavour, even after Israel’s apology in 2013 and its agreement to compensate the victims’ families.

During this period, tensions between the two nations flared on multiple occasions. In 2014, for instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan strongly condemned the “Protective Border” military operation in Gaza, likening the Israeli army’s actions of having “surpassed Hitler in barbarism”. The painstaking normalisation of Turkish-Israeli relations, achieved in 2016, faced setbacks in 2018 due to fresh clashes in Gaza. That year, amid the Great March of Return, Israeli forces killed numerous Palestinians from Gaza who were protesting against the relocation of the American embassy to Jerusalem by Donald Trump. In response, Erdoğan labelled Benjamin Netanyahu as a “terrorist”, prompting Netanyahu to retort that he would “not be lectured by someone who regularly bombs Kurdish villages”. Following this exchange, Turkish and Israeli ambassadors were once again recalled. It wasn’t until 2022 that a new phase of normalisation occurred, marked by the exchange of ambassadors, following high-level official meetings, including the visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Turkey.

The inner workings of a fickle relationship with Israel

The Turkish-Israeli relationship has undeniably weathered the successive crises that both countries have confronted, largely due to their ability to preserve shared interests despite their differences. 

Firstly, these interests are bilateral, particularly in the domains of economics and energy. The significant and at times serious disputes that have punctuated their relations over the past decade have not substantially hindered the vigour of their economic ties. Trade between the two nations amounted to $500 million in the mid-1980s, surged to $1.3 billion in 2002, $4 billion in 2007, $6.2 billion in 2018, and reached $7.5 billion in 2021. The spectrum of this trade spans a wide array of sectors, including chemicals, fuels, automotive, high-tech products, and even tourism. In recent years, Turkey has achieved a trade surplus as it aspires to transport Israeli gas to Europe through the development of new pipelines, thereby competing with Egypt, which currently imports Israeli gas, liquefies it, and re-exports it to global markets.

Furthermore, beyond their economic collaboration, the two nations occasionally identify significant areas of strategic alignment. Notably, they share a strong aversion to the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. While Turkey does not view Iran as its primary adversary in the Middle East, unlike Israel, it occasionally exercises caution regarding Iran and even engages in intelligence cooperation with Israel. For instance, in 2022, the intelligence services of both countries collaborated to thwart planned actions by an Iranian cell targeting Israeli tourists in Turkey. Lastly, Israel serves as a vital and long-standing ally of Azerbaijan, a nation described by Turkey as a brotherly country. Similar to Israel, Turkey provided substantial support in the recent conflict that enabled Baku to re-establish its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.

More broadly, the Turkish-Israeli reconciliation in the last three years, preceding the Hamas attack, has been part of the transformation of the strategic balance in the Middle East brought about by the Abraham agreements normalising relations between Israel and part of the Arab world. Launched by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, this process has expanded to include Morocco and Sudan, with Saudi Arabia expected to join in the near future. Simultaneously, since 2021, Turkey has normalised its relations (which had become difficult since the Qatari crisis in 2017 and the Khashoggi affair in 2018) with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which hold significant financial influence.This development is especially valuable as Ankara endeavours to navigate the ongoing and severe economic crisis that has persisted for several years.

The immediate reasons for a pro-Palestinian turnaround

Coincidently, it is currently in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s immediate interests to adopt a more resolute stance against Israel and reposition himself as a champion of the Palestinian cause. On the international stage, particularly within the Muslim world, the Turkish leader has filled the void left by Saudi Arabia’s perceived inaction. Saudi Arabia’s image has not only suffered a decline in public opinion within Arab-Muslim nations due to its initial alignment with the Abraham Accords before 7 October, but also because it chose to proceed with its Riyadh Season, a grand festival of entertainment featuring numerous sports and entertainment celebrities, drawing millions of visitors annually since 2019. This decision appears to underscore Riyadh’s apparent indifference to the unfolding crisis in the Middle East, giving the impression that the kingdom prioritises maintaining an expensive event tied to the modernisation efforts led by Prince Mohammed bin Salman over expressing concern for the well-being of the Palestinian people in Gaza. Furthermore, the fact that Gaza is governed by a movement associated with the Muslim Brotherhood - a group considered an ideological and political challenge to Saudi Wahhabism - adds another layer of complexity to the situation.

On the domestic political front, the Turkish-Israeli confrontations of the past decade have recurrently provided the AKP and its leader with opportunities to position themselves as champions of Muslim causes, thereby fortifying their electoral base. This base has been under threat due to the erosion of their political authority and the ongoing economic crisis. It’s worth noting that in 2013, just a few months prior to the first presidential election through universal suffrage that ultimately propelled him to the highest office, Erdoğan launched a high-profile billboard campaign underscoring his role in securing an official apology from Israel for the Mavi Marmara incident. On 28 October 2023, during the large rally in Istanbul in support of Gaza, Erdoğan revisited this narrative. This event also allowed him to momentarily divert attention from the forthcoming centenary celebrations of Mustafa Kemal’s Republic. Notably, these celebrations had spurred numerous spontaneous street and workplace demonstrations throughout Turkey, which were not always well-received by the authorities. In the current climate, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is banking on this show of support for Gaza to bolster his popularity in the lead-up to the municipal elections scheduled for the spring of 2024. During these elections, he will attempt to win back the major cities he lost in 2019, namely Istanbul and Ankara.

In conclusion, it is necessary to place Erdoğan’s recent Middle Eastern diplomatic shift in the context of Turkey’s broader history of foreign policy orientations and practices. Abrupt changes and the inherent contradictions within them are by no means unique to Turkey alone, far from it! The perplexities and inconsistencies exhibited by numerous Western and Middle Eastern governments since the onset of the current war in Gaza are very revealing in this respect. However, Turkish foreign policy has, over the past decade, become somewhat synonymous with such ambivalent postures. This is evident not only in its establishment of strong ties with Russia and China while maintaining its historic membership in NATO but also in its regional strategies, including its delicate balancing acts between Kiev and Moscow in the Ukrainian conflict and, more recently, between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza crisis. A more detailed examination of this country’s diplomatic history, from the early days of the Republic, would reveal that Turkey, situated at the crossroads of several geographical, cultural, religious, political, and strategic realms, has often opted for, or even been compelled to navigate perilous tightropes between opposing positions. This has been especially true during the interwar period, the Second World War, and the Cold War, but that, of course, is another story.

To cite this article : Jean Marcou, "War in Gaza: Erdoğan’s shift from Cautiousness to Offensive", Centre français de recherche sur l'Irak, (CFRI), 06/11/2023, [online]. https://cfri-irak.com/en/article/a-modifier-2023-11-06

The CFRI does not take collective positions. Its publications only represent the views of their individual authors.