The normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia under Chinese mediation may well mark the beginning of a new era. On the one hand, the co-management of the Middle East by regional powers, mainly by the Gulf States (Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates), embodies this potential “new era”, partly because no "great" power is willing and able to take the responsibility that comes with being a diplomatic superpower in the Middle East. The United States intends to focus on China; the latter calibrates its gestures and allocates its resources with the purpose of developing its power by 2049; Russia, meanwhile, a “colossus with feet made of clay” 1 , seems bogged down by the crusade it is waging in Ukraine 2 . On the other hand, the diversification of regional relations shapes this potential “new era” in the Middle East, diversification which is itself a reflection of the changing balance of power that provokes the current “panic of the world”, a metaphor used by Thomas Gomart, director of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), in his eponymous book 3 .

Diversification and co-management of Middle Eastern affairs by the region's powers lead to a reconfiguration of alliances, which seems to be tilting eastwards. See Syria's reinstatement in the Arab League, the Moscow meeting of Russian, Syrian, Turkish and Iranian defense ministers 4 , the 25-year strategic agreement between Iran and China 5 , Saudi Arabia and Iran's rapprochement to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 6 , which also attracts Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Bahrain: little by little, the "Beijing Consensus" 7 seems to become the modus vivendi of the “MENA area” for the years to come (Middle East and North Africa).

This new era in the history of the Middle East seems to be characterized by a current regional détente. The frequent exchanges between the El-Assad and Ben-Zayed families 8 , President Raissi's visit to Damascus 9 and his planned visit to Riyadh at the invitation of King Salman 10 , reveal a new willingness to cooperate among autocrats. There are many signs of détente in the region. To name a few: the Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement after ten years of distant relations; the maritime agreement between Israel and Lebanon; the boom in diplomatic, security and economic exchanges between the parties to the Abraham accords; the revival of oil exports from Kurdistan, made possible by the agreement between Erbil and Baghdad 11 ; the resumption of economic relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar (creation of a joint business council) 12 ; the multiplication of multilateral forums in the region, such as, for example, (i) the Baghdad conferences bringing together Iran, France and numerous Arab states including Saudi Arabia (ii) the organization of COP27 in Egypt and COP28 in the UAE, (iii) the creation of a regional forum on gas in the Mediterranean sea.

Co-management of political affairs by regional powers, reconfiguration of alliances, diplomatic détente, a multiplication of initiatives: how will these dynamics change the Middle East over the next twenty years?

Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict geopolitical evolutions and their consequences over such a long period of time, this article proposes that, in the light of recent events, the Middle East will experience over the next twenty years:

1 - The strengthening of authoritarian regimes and the repression of all democratic or revolutionary aspirations;

2 - The weakening of non-state actors and the reduction of trouble spots in the region;

3 - A decline of confession-based confrontations;

4 - The economic development of states and their preparation for the “next world”.

The strengthening of authoritarian regimes after a decade of revolutions

Regional dynamics seem to be consolidating the power that autocrats - from Bashar El-Assad to General Sissi and the populist Kaïs Said 13 - have been snatched from the Arab springs. While the unipolar moment (1990s) gave rise to the domino theory of the neocon servatives in the US (2000s), the illusion of democratization in Middle Eastern societies seems buried, just like any hope of ensuring the respect for human rights.

The Afghan experience is indicative of the end of a cycle that is sounding the death knell for fundamental freedoms, which are at the core of the western democratic system. Though the US invested $1,000 billion dollars in Afghanistan over twenty years 14 , its troops left Kabul without preventing the Taliban from returning to power. Admittedly, the Atlantic alliance in general, and US forces in particular, are not exempt from reproach, as it is documented that they violated the laws of war and that they tortured would-be terrorists in detention camps 15 . The fact remains, however, that their stated aim was to develop Afghanistan's political, economic, security and social institutions in a way that suited US interests 16 . In other words, the world's leading power wanted to transform Afghanistan in its own image, so that it would eventually embrace American values and come under its orbit. This phase is now over. All attempts to democratize Afghanistan have come to nothing, and the Taliban are giving free rein to their ideological totalitarianism. Amnesty International reports that the Taliban are committing repeated human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests, attacks on ethnic minorities, abductions and enforced disappearances 17 . Since 2021, the Taliban have excluded girls from secondary school, university and NGO activities, and forced women to travel in the presence of a man (Mahram) 18 .

The repression of popular movements also bears the seeds of the consolidation of authoritarianism and the end of the "democratic experiment", i.e., the attempt to transform the political, economic and social institutions of nation-states in the Middle East so that their guiding principles are the separation of power, the effective implementation of the rule of law, respect for fundamental freedoms and the protection of minorities 19 . The authoritarian tightening in Algeria since 2019 (Hirak), described by Le Monde as a "Kafkaesque repression" 20 , can be seen through the dissolution of "emblematic structures" of civil society or the imprisonment of dissenting voices (Rachad movement): La Ligue algérienne de défense des droits de l'homme, Rassemblement Actions Jeunesse, SOS Bab-El-Oued, Radio M and the daily Liberté have all disappeared since President Tebboune came to power, thanks to the support of the army general staff 21 .

A similar mechanism is at work in other countries in the region: the suffocation of protest movements in Iraq throughout 2019 led to the deaths of 669 people between October 1^st and December 31 22 ."Assassinations, kidnappings, hostage-taking, imprisonment, torture, individual and family threats": the authorities "killed without any form of restraint" 23 . In Iran, 160 protesters died and 700 were arrested between November 15^th and November 30^th, 2019 24 . During the 2022 protests, which set the country ablaze after the death of Mahsa Amini, the repression apparently became even more ferocious: the number of executions increased, the use of torture has become the norm, just like violence by the authorities and the imprisonment of activists on dubious grounds 25 . The Iranian regime employs similar methods to those used in Syria, despite the maximum pressure exerted by the United States on the theocratic regime of which Ali Khamenei is the Supreme Leader.

The current war in Sudan also reveals the authoritarian states’ fear of revolutionary contagion. The support of Egypt, and to a lesser extent of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for General Al-Burhan's forces, is indicative of what Jean-Pierre Filiu calls "the alliance of autocrats", most of which receive "the definite support of Russia" 26 .

After twenty years of "war on terror", nation-building, revolutions and counter revolutions, the 2020 decade seems to introduce the return of autocracies in the region. The repression of demonstrations and democratic aspirations lay the foundations for the return of unshakeable powers to the Middle East’s political scene. Reinforced by the economic situation and changing regional dynamics, the region's states may well consolidate their power over the next twenty years, not least because an entire generation has paid the price for daring to demand civil and political rights.

The Weakening of Non-state Actors and the Reduction of Trouble Spots in the Region

The strengthening of authoritarianism and the increased cooperation between powers, symbolized by the Iranian-Saudi agreement, could weaken non-state players in the long term. Several factors seem to support this thesis.

Firstly, certain terrorist groups could lose valuable financial and political support in the event of increased cooperation between rival powers. In other words, the Islamic State or Daesh would no longer represent an existential threat to the region through its plans of creating a state covering Iraq and Syria 27 . Daesh's ambitions have certainly not changed. But military and/or political cooperation between states which, until recently, did not cooperate, and the reduction in the Islamic State’s financial resources due to the withdrawal of the financial support some countries have provided it, may no longer enable the organization to afford implementing its goals.

Admittedly, Daesh remains a real threat: 1,116 attacks and 2,083 victims were recorded in 2021 28 . What's more, radicalization in the camps for displaced persons in Syria and Iraq is a reality: the Kurdish-run al-Hol camp on the Syrian-Iraqi border has become a recruitment platform for the jihadists, who control a large part of it. In addition, the absence of a genuine policy, regarding the support and the reintegration of indoctrinated children or traumatized adults, raises the fear of a "time bomb" among vulnerable people who may take arms against the State in the future. It is possible that the terrorist threat will re-emerge in the years to come.

It is possible, but not with the same intensity as in 2014. It should be remembered that Daesh grew between 2006 and 2017, not least because the geopolitical context was favorable to terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda's "success" in 2001 galvanized its sympathizers. The 2003 American intervention in Iraq generated chaos. The Syrian regime's release of prisoners weakened the opposition and strengthened the radical islamists. Add to these events the political instability and insecurity during the early years of the Arab Spring, and the refusal of the US to intervene... Now, we are entering a new era, which no longer seems favorable to the operational expansion of non-state actors. The 2020s seem to be a decade of heightened nationalism, great power rivalry, US disengagement from the Middle East, the measured presence of China, which is seeking above all to secure its energy needs; the 2020s also represent the fatigue of populations repressed by their governments, as well the growth of regional and global challenges, such as climate change, the answer to which requires political stability.

Against this backdrop, we can imagine a scenario in which the threat of Daesh or its avatars diminishes over the next ten or twenty years: today, terrorism-related crises already spread further around the Sahel, even if they are also present in Afghanistan. In other words, the pendulum of Middle Eastern history seems to swing from the struggle of populations for a little dignity, at the cost of social and political instability, to the weakening of non-state actors via the consolidation of the state security apparatus.

The same applies to the long-term weakening of the PKK and its regional branches in Syria and Iraq. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are already targeted by Turkish raids. Greater cooperation between regional powers and a return to Syrian sovereignty, particularly in the Rojava region, would weaken non-state actors. Even if a political settlement in Syria has not been reached yet, the rehabilitation of Bashar Al-Assad makes it likely that his state apparatus will be consolidated, that American and European forces will leave Rojava and, consequently, that the regime will consolidate Syria's borders. What's more, in the absence of condemnation of the crimes committed in Syria, in the absence of pacification or regime change, the country's humanitarian crisis may be alleviated nonetheless, given that Syria has become a place of confrontation between regional powers. An alignment of interests regarding the Syrian question increases the likelihood of a settlement for Syrian refugees or, at the very least, of a political settlement facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, which may prevent the flare-up of a new crisis that would destabilize the region.

The Houthis, for their part, reached the beginning of an agreement with the Saudis in April 2023. It is likely that normalization between Iran and Saudi Arabia would bring an end to the crisis in Yemen. The truce on fighting in 2022, the lifting of the blockade on the port of Hodeïda and Sanaa airport and, more fundamentally, Saudi Arabia's willingness to withdraw from Yemen "without losing face", will probably lead to the end of the conflict between the Houthis and the "legitimate" government, even if there is a risk that local dynamics will continue. This risk must be taken seriously, as "Yemen must be understood through its own internal dynamics" 29 . In any case, the disengagement of the regional powers will at least lead to a calmer situation in Yemen, which will facilitate the chances of a long-term settlement. The beginning of a solution lies in the exchange of prisoners between the government and the Houthis.

Admittedly, the negotiations between the Saudis and the Houthis take place in the absence of representatives of the internationally recognized government and the tribes that supported the Houthis against the Saudis. This strengthens the position of the Houthis, feeds a sense of betrayal and injustice among the marginalized parties, and could lead to misunderstanding and therefore to instability in the country.

However, the Houthis have become a major player in Yemen. In ten or twenty years' time, it is possible that they will be integrated into the state and that a lasting end to the crisis will find its way.

A decline of confession-based confrontations

The co-management of powers in the region, the strengthening of states, their strategic diversification and the current détente in the Middle East also foreshadow the possible decline of confession-based confrontations. Two arguments can be put forward.

Firstly, conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East is not so much an inescapable matrix, but rather the consequence of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry that has structured alliances since the Islamic revolution of 1979, which "opened up a cold war throughout the Middle East" 30 . The implementation of the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran could reduce their motivation to support actors on sectarian grounds. Secondly, authoritarian regimes with consolidated power will no longer need to resort to sectarian logic to survive. Put differently, the consolidation of authoritarian regimes, after a decade of instability, would reduce confessional polarization, insofar as regimes in the recent past, threatened by popular movements, followed the adage of ‘divide and rule’ to instrumentalize social groups. Indeed, "confessional logic is also used at local level in Arab countries as a tool of division and social control" 31 by states. For instance, the Syrian regime instrumentalized Christians and Alawites. Nuri al-Maliki instrumentalized Shiites in Iraq, while Al-Qaeda’s leaders developed an anti-Shiite discourse, which was "mechanically supposed to enable jihadists to appear as the defenders of Sunnis" 32 .

As far as Iraq is concerned, the Iranian-Saudi agreement could lay the foundations for overcoming or reducing the weight of sectarian logics, for which the current Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Soudani, is the guarantor. He has already asked his ministers, the leaders of the Coordination Framework and other influential Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish parties to abandon partisan positions and favor the interests of the State.

Yet, this analytical framework faces many obstacles. For example, the agreement between Baghdad and Erbil is only temporary, insofar as it depends on the Parliament's adoption of the Iraqi budget bill for the years 2023, 2024 and 2025. While the Kurds did not express any disagreement with the bill, the Sunnis did. Indeed, the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammed al-Halboussi (Sunni), reportedly went on leave for two weeks just before the reading of the bill in Parliament. The persistence of a conflict between the presidents of the legislative and executive powers endangers the political process in Iraq. More generally, it is likely that each side will continue to exploit its sectarian base to achieve its own political objectives, as is the case regarding the allocation of the state budget.

At the same time, Iraq's socio-political landscape also shows signs of "de-confessionalization". For example, the 2019 demonstrations saw Shiites questioning "the very principle of the confessional distribution of power" 33 , imposed by the US after the fall of Saddam Hussein, as many protesters above all called for an end to corruption and Iranian control: on November 4^th, 2019, the Iranian consulate was attacked in Karbala 34 . Thus, it seems that a social base in Iraq, especially the youth, wished for the reduction in confessional logics and the technocratization of their rulers. In addition, Muqtada al-Sadr's nationalist line and the interdenominational gathering of the Coordination Framework reveal that the political landscape is evolving in Iraq.

Confessionalization in Lebanon, meanwhile, appears to be a taboo: the last official census of Lebanon's demographic distribution dates back to 1932. A fortiori, confessional tensions are set to continue in Lebanon as the demographic question continues to fuel political cleavages, to which we can add other factors: interference of external actors, Hezbollah’s position, corruption, the economic crisis and the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Lebanon. However, it is worth mentioning that the 2019 protests and the 2022 elections are indicative, among other things, of a popular desire to transcend denominational cleavages. In 2019, protesters were mainly calling for the resignation of the authorities "and their replacement by governments of technocrats" 35 . Abstention hit new records during the May 15^th, 2022, elections, while 13 independent candidates gained access to the parliament. These figures show that a significant number of Lebanese were dissatisfied with their leaders. Even if Lebanon is still in a stalemate, the agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia could at least facilitate a way out of the crisis. What's more, many voices are calling for Lebanon to be "de-confessionalized". These calls multiply at a time when the collapse of the State is provoking a general sense of frustration, even if the idea of secularizing the country goes back as far as the period of the French mandate.

The economic development of states and their preparation for the “next world”

Like the rest of the world, the Middle East is undergoing a period of significant transition: climate change, water-related challenges, problems relating to the development of sustainable and sufficient agriculture, energy and digital transition, youth unemployment, growing inequalities - many challenges threaten countries, their societies and their governments. Therefore, they aim to stabilize the region at all costs in order to create a business-friendly environment without which the regional powers will be unable to attract investment and prepare their economies for the "next world". Indeed, the 2011 uprisings were partly socio-economic in origin: according to the World Bank, the middle class was dissatisfied with "the deterioration in [its] standard of living due to the lack of job prospects in the formal sector, the poor quality of public services and the lack of an ethic of responsibility on the part of public authorities" 36 . Furthermore, another World Bank document estimates that, by 2030, "more than half of the world's extremely poor people will live in countries characterized by fragility, conflict and violence" 37 .

Authoritarian regimes have realized that economic development in the Middle East is a sine qua non for their survival. For such economic development to take place, in their view, civil peace has to be maintained. During the 2022 Baghdad Summit held in Jordan, Marshal Sissi even said that "the crises of recent years show that stability requires the strengthening of the role of the State" 38 . However, the current geopolitical context is highly uncertain. According to the International Monetary Fund, the year 2022 is characterized by "exceptional headwinds and uncertainty, particularly for commodity-exporting countries" 39 . So it's hardly surprising that uncertainty is prompting governments to verticalize power even further.

It is within this geopolitical framework that economic and commercial opportunities are unfolding in the Middle East, and that states are preparing for the challenges of the "next world”. The Gulf monarchies have developed a new financial strategy aimed at reducing their dependence on oil revenues and transforming their economic model based on energy rents. With this in mind, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are keen to monetize their assets and their geostrategic location between East and West (via the New Silk Road Initiative), and to develop their tourism, port and high-tech sectors. The UAE also introduced a corporate income tax 40 , while the Emir of Dubai announced an 8,000-billion-euro investment plan aimed at making the city a key financial center 41 . Saudi Aramco and AD Ports recent IPOs also bear witness to Riyad’s and Abou Dhabi’s preparation for the “next world”. Saudi growth of 3.3% in 2021 is not only attributed to the rise in hydrocarbon prices, but also to "the 6.6% acceleration in non-oil activities" 42 .

This strategy also applies to other countries. For example, Kuwaiti and Qatari sovereign wealth funds are greening their portfolios 43 . It is therefore clear that, despite the supposed slowness of this transition or the ambivalence of the public policies implemented by hydrocarbon-exporting countries, described by some as "green washing" or simply as a desire to show off, the countries of "North Africa and Middle East" are aware of the stakes. It's no coincidence that the COP 27 was held in Egypt, and that the COP 28 will be held in the UAE. State initiatives are not as weak as we might be led to believe. For example, Saudi Arabia organized the Saudi Green Initiative in October 2021 and Sustainability Week in January 2022 44 . Riyadh and Abu Dhabi aim to generate half their electricity from non-carbon sources (renewable or nuclear) within the space of a few years 45 ; Egypt has issued $750 million in green bonds 46 ; Jordan attempts, in spite of numerous challenges, to reform its water sector 47 ; Morocco, for its part, plans to increase the share of solar energy in its energy mix by 2030 48 .

Since the region is particularly affected by the economic and political challenges of climate change and the energy transition, the efforts made are far from sufficient. However, they are indicative of the long-term trajectory of these economies.

Economic diplomacy in the region is also evolving. As they seek to diversify their relations, states are keen to encourage trade with a wide range of partners, as illustrated by the advanced negotiations between Qatar and Morocco on the establishment of a free-trade zone 49 . Over the past ten years, Doha has also signed "bilateral trade agreements with the world's leading economies, including China, France, India and South Korea" 50 .

The new business environment is bringing projects to other countries in the Middle East. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Soudani recently announced that Saudi Arabia could invest up to $100 billion in Iraq, particularly in the energy and transport sectors 51 . The agreement between Riyadh and Teheran also opens up the prospect of Saudi investment in Iran 52 . Some countries in the region also develop economic relations with Europe. While the European Union has drastically reduced its dependence on Russian gas, it is seeking to secure its supplies. In this context, Egypt, the European Union and Israel have signed a tripartite agreement on liquefied natural gas (LNG) 53 . In the long term, the European Union's climate ambitions could increase cooperation between Europe and the MENA region: according to Ferid Belhaj, World Bank Vice President for North Africa and the Middle East, "Europe's transition to renewable energy could be increasingly associated with a vigorous development of clean energy production in the MENA region" 54 . Several projects could see the light of day in the coming years: an electricity interconnection project between Italy and Tunisia, the development of cross-border trade in green energy between countries in the Mediterranean 55 , gas exploration by an Israeli company off the Moroccan coast 56 , made possible by the Abraham accords 57 .

The future of the Middle East is uncertain. No one could have predicted the upheavals the region has undergone over the last twenty years. However, the exercise of reflecting on the trajectory of states over a 20-year period, in the light of major trends, is not meaningless. While it may not enable us to anticipate the vicissitudes future populations will experience, such an exercise, at least, can clarify the way in which we understand the present.

In this respect, the Iranian-Saudi agreement seems historic and decisive for the future of the region. Whereas the rivalry between Riyadh and Teheran structured the understanding between the players, their normalization could also restructure it. Given that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the powers revolving around the Iranian Supreme Leader notably the Council of Guardians of the Constitution) and the Saudi monarchy share a common survival instinct, it seems likely that the Chinese model of governance, whose principle is economic development without democracy, will become the guiding principle for authoritarian states.

The strengthening of the state may have numerous consequences: the weakening of non-state actors and the reduction in the number of crises, a decrease in confession-based confrontations as these would no longer ensure the interests of the regimes, and the development of the region, which will experience unprecedented challenges, at the price of a strengthening of the repressive machinery of autocracies.

To cite this article :
Saghi Sofinzon, "A Chinese model in the Middle East for the next 20 years?", Centre français de recherche sur l'Irak, (CFRI), 14/06/2023, https://cfri-irak.com/en/article/a-chinese-model-in-the-middle-east-for-the-next-20-years-2023-06-13 [online].